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ABSTRACT 
RACE AND CITY-COUNTY CONSOLIDATION: 
BLACK VOTING PARTICIPATION AND MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS 
Angela Stallings Hagan 
April 8, 2009 
Despite the fact that few large metropolitan areas have had city-county consolidations, 
interest remains high in these mergers as a means of restructuring urban government. 
Evaluation literature on city-county consolidations generally focuses on the criteria of efficiency 
and efficacy, not equity. Economic growth, cost savings, and tax levels and service provision are 
discussed more than the distribution of resources and power. There is a particular dearth of 
literature on political equity as it pertains to racial minorities. This study attempts to fill that void 
through the examination of black political participation levels prior to and following the four large-
scale city-county consolidations in the last century: Nashville-Davidson County; Jacksonville-
Duval County; Indianapolis-Marion County; and Louisville-Jefferson County. A common 
argument against consolidation is that it dilutes minority voting strength since urban minority 
populations have historically been concentrated in central cities. It is posited that black voter 
participation will decrease following consolidation due to a perception of loss of power. Further, 
sub-hypotheses positing that participation will vary among black voters according to 
socioeconomic status are explored. Mixed results are found in terms of turnout over time among 
the cities. 
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There has long been a debate over the structure of urban government In terms of the 
manner in which metropolitan governments are organized, there are two major schools of 
thought: polycentrism and consolidation. Polycentrism is associated with a "fragmented" form of 
government, conSisting of many small units of government, whereas consolidation is concerned 
with a small number of local governments. 
The consolidationist movement started out in the early twentieth century as a "good 
government" movement of sorts, determined to clean up corruption and reform local systems rife 
with machine politics. Beginning in the 1960s, a high rate of government proliferation spurred by 
suburban and special district growth added fuel to the consolidation movement, whose advocates 
believed that a high number of governments was ineffective and inefficient (Savitch and Vogel 
1996; Stephens and Wikstrom 2000). 
Adherents to the polycentric approach decry the use of terms like "fragmented" and 
"crazy quilt" patterns of government, preferring the notion of local pLiblic economies in the form of 
complex networks of governance. Public choice theorists such as Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren 
(1961) and Parks and Oakerson (1989) argue for a market-based view irrwhich citizens "vote 
with their feet" by choosing the area within the larger area that most closely matches their 
taxation and service provision preferences, which in turn leads local governments to be more 
efficient in order to remain competitive. Moreover, in respons~ to criticisms that the lack of a 
strong central metropolitan government leads to conflict which bars progress, Bish and Ostrom 
(1973, p. 94) say that can be viewed as a positive factor because "[f]ragmentation of authority 
does increase levels of visible conflict But visible conflict may bring out information. clarify 
issues and encourage a search for mutually agreeable solution." 
Since the beginning of the reform debate, few large metropolitan areas have undergone 
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government consolidation in any form. The issue is typically decided by voters, although there 
are exceptions, such as Indianapolis' consolidation with Marion County. The number of large 
areas with successful city-county consolidation referenda can be counted on one hand: Nashville-
Davidson County (1962); Jacksonville-Duval County, Florida (1967); Indianapolis-Marion County 
(1969); and most recently, Louisville-Jefferson County, Kentucky (2000).1 Between the 
Jacksonville and Louisville consolidations, there have been some medium and smaller cities-
Lexington-Fayette County, Kentucky (1972), Athens-Clarke County, Georgia (1990), and Kansas 
City-Wyandotte County, Kansas (1997) for example--- that have merged with their counties. For 
the most part, however, failures heavily outweigh successes in city-county consolidation efforts. 
Since the 1947 consolidation in Baton Rouge, there have been fewer than 30 city-county mergers 
in any size metropolitan area. 2 
The low number of cases and uniqueness of each case contributes to a lack of 
comparative studies, making generalizations difficult. Most consolidation has been in the form of 
city-county mergers, and those are no more than a few dozen, including areas much smaller than 
Nashville-Davidson County and Jacksonville-Duval County, Florida. Evidence in support of 
consolidation's beneficial effects, mostly based on cases of city-county merger, is often 
inconclusive, with researchers acknowledging mixed results or often using associative evidence 
in lieu of analysis based in quasi-experimental designs or other research with controls for various 
factors that might affect outcomes (Bish and Ostrom 1973; Savitch and Vogel 1996; Stephens 
. and Wikstrom 2000). Similarly, many arguments of the public choice school tend to be largely 
theoretical without extensive empirical support, though some studies have shown negative results 
such as increased taxes and costs or a decrease in services (Benton and Gamble 1983; Condrey 
1994); Stephens and Wikstrom 2000). 
Over the 30 years between the Indianapolis and Louisville mergers, debates about the 
merits of "fragmented" versus consolidated governments continued, with scholars evaluating the 
I Some, such as Stephens and Wikstrom (2000) might incI ude the 1947 consolidation of Baton Rouge, 
Louisiana and its parish. However, it was not a city over 250,000, like Nashville, Jacksonville, 
Indianapolis, or Louisville. 
2 Condrey (1994) notes that there. were only 20 between 1947 and 1994. Stephens and Wikstrom (2000) 
~ention Augusta-Richmond County, Georgia and Kansas City-Wyandotte County, Kansas in the 1990s. 
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limited number of cases available for study. The debate has never really been resolved (partially 
due to the lack of cases for making generalizations), and the arguments remain much the same. 
The New Regionalism 
In contrast, however, urban socioeconomic realities have changed, and students of urban 
government have shifted their focus to reflect today's urban condition. Population and job shifts 
from cities to suburbs and exurbs have presented fiscal challenges for central cities that have lost 
tax bases, and smaller governments outside of the cities may lack the resources to efficiently and 
effectively provide key services to constituents. Moreover, global economic competition has 
forced regions in the U.S. and abroad to compete in the realm of economic development, so it is 
no longer simply a question of cities versus suburbs. In fact, many scholars would say that 
central cities and surrounding parts of metropolitan areas share problems ranging from traffic 
congestion to job retention to provision of water and sewer services and must band together to 
deal with them. Regional scholars such as Peirce (1993) and Dreier, Mollenkopf, and Swanstrom 
(2001) feel that the global marketplace renders cities and metropolitan regions much more 
important. Strategies for improving cities' fiscal, social, and environmental health should be 
designed and implemented on a regional level rather than by individual municipalities that really 
share common interests and challenges. Specifically, the New Regionalism movement arose in 
the 1990s as scholars began to question how to govern urban areas in order to address these 
. concerns. This movement goes beyond the old reform debate of simply how to structure 
government, asking what means of governance are most appropriate. Do we need to change our 
governments, or rather, the way in which we govern? Should the arrangements be formal 
structures or informal systems? Of the New Regionalists, Rusk (1995; 1999) is the most focused 
on government structure. 
Interdependence of core central cities, their suburbs, and exurbs provides an impetus for 
a renewed focus on regional governance that waned with public choice theory and criticisms of 
federal initiatives such as that of the council of government (COG) movement. 
The abstract force· of globalization, with its accompanying economiC restructuring and 
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trend toward geographic decentralization in urban areas, is often linked to the rising importance of 
cities and their regions over the past two decades (see Savitch and Kantor 2002, e.g.). 
Joel Garreau (1988) documents the growing trend in the development of edge cities and 
the decline of central cities in metropolitan regions. Although he does not seem to find much fault 
with this new urban form of these seemingly self-sufficient, self-contained places of work, 
residence, and retail, Peirce et al .(1993), Rusk (1995; 1999), Downs (1995), Dreier et al. (2001), 
and others are quite alarmed at the increasing levels of racial and income segregation, 
environmental consequences of "sprawling" growth, and challenges to economic development 
they associate with detachment of cities and suburbs. 
Cities and their suburbs are economically interdependent. Competition between core 
cities and other parts of the metropolitan area can actually hurt the region overall. Regions with 
large income inequalities between the cities and suburbs grow less than other regions, and the 
incomes of central cities and the suburbs tend to rise and fall together (Savitch et al. 1993; see 
also Dreier, Mollenkopf and Swanstrom 2001). 
Savitch and Vogel (1996) review regional governance arrangements, providing a useful 
framework ranging from various forms of "metropolitan government," to "mutual adjustment," to 
"avoidance and conflict." Rather than enumerate and address every specific strategy that is 
described, which would be an exhaustive task, I will group them in the following categories along 
the government-governance spectrum of paths to new regionalism: 
1. Formal Government Consolidations involving the City: Referring to a single-tiered 
government, these strategies primarily consist of merger of a major city and the county within 
which it is contained. Another approach is the annexation of unincorporated areas by a city. Very 
few city-county consolidation referenda have passed, and annexations are fairly uncommon. Both 
are heavily dependent on state legislatures, which make rules regarding municipal government 
structures. 
2. Multi-tiered Government: In practice, there are only a handful of these forms, which 
include two-tiered and three-tiered governments. The two-tiered is a federative approach, 
involving a metropolitan agency and local agencies, in which regional functions are organized and 
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carried out separately from more local functions. Miami-Dade County is the primary example. 
The three-tiered approach involves local governments, a metropolitan agency, and the state 
government. The only two examples are Minneapolis-St. Paul's Metropolitan Service District, 
well-known for its regional revenue-sharing arrangement, and Portland, Oregon's Metropolitan 
Service District, known for its regional planning work. 
3. Linked Functions and Complex Networks/Examples of "Mutual Adjustment": Cities 
such as Louisville (prior to its recent consolidation) and Pittsburgh serve as examples of regions 
that are not completely "fragmented," yet not consolidated. Louisville voters approved in 2000 a 
city-county government that will took effect in 2003. Prior to 2003, Louisville and its home 
county, Jefferson, had many linked functions, arrangements that Stephens and Wikstrom (2000) 
categorize with terms such as joint powers agreements, e.g. their city-county planning 
commission, and special districts, e.g. the Transit Authority of River City. Pittsburgh has complex 
networks in which public-private cooperation promoted economic development opportunities. 
Voluntary, relatively informal cooperation in forms such as a council of government and business 
organizations such as chambers of commerce, were relied upon. 
4. Status quol"avoidance and conflict/public choice/polycentrism: These alternatives 
were previously described in the first section. 
Evaluations and Criteria 
On what basis are we to evaluate the various alternatives for metropolitan governance? 
In the literature, evaluations are commonly based on the ability to effectively deliver services in an 
efficient manner. Yet, government remains charged with equal protection and treatment of its 
citizens. Therefore, we might conclude that criteria for evaluation of metropolitan governance 
arrangements should include equity in addition to efficiency and efficacy. In fact, these criteria 
are often discussed in the literature on government and governance. Dreier, Mollenkopf, and 
Swanstrom (2001) cite efficiency, environmental, economic competition, and equity as arguments 
for regionalism. Savitch and Vogel (1996) note that consolidationists base their arguments on 
efficiency, cost, service delivery, economic growth, and social reform. Rusk (1995; 1999), for 
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example, believes that consolidated urban structures yield racial integration. 
The efficiency criterion is a major selling point for consolidation and has been commonly 
studied, with researchers analyzing taxes and costs before and after consolidation (e.g., Benton 
and Gamble 1983; Condrey 1994). 
In terms of effectiveness, proponents of city-county consolidation often claim that service 
delivery is improved with this type of consolidation. Stephens and Wikstrom (2000) credit the 
consolidated city/county governments of Nashville, Jacksonville, and Indianapolis with providing 
more effective and uniform services in their regions, particularly in the areas of mass 
transportation, sewers, and water, and land-use planning. They also laud the multi-tier approach 
of Portland. Research on bureaucracy and privatization of government has demonstrated some 
functions, particularly capital-intensive services such as planning and infrastructure, are more 
effectively, efficiently, and equitably carried out on a regional basis, whereas other more labor-
intensive services such as police protection and garbage collection, may be best left to smaller or 
special jurisdictions to coordinate (Wilson 1989; Savas 2000). Prominent regionalists, however, 
have emphasized that informal arrangements, while they may have good intentions, lack the 
authority and power to achieve goals and objectives (Dreier et al. 2001, e.g.). Perhaps this is 
why more formal structural reorganizations, i.e. consolidations, although they face political 
challenges, continue to be seen as integral strategies. 
In terms of equity, Rusk (1995; 1999), Peirce et al. (1993), and Dreier et al. (2001) find 
grave racial and income disparities in areas lacking regional governance and government. Rusk 
claims that segregation is lower in consolidated areas. The three-tier arrangement in 
Minneapolis-St. Paul was able to redistribute tax revenues across the region. Savitch and Vogel 
(1996; 2000b) also point to the success of the Louisville-Jefferson County Compact for sharing an 
occupational tax between the poorer central city and the wealthier suburbs, though it proved in 
2000 to be politically unpopular because of concerns about unfair treatment of the suburbs, which 
contain a greater number of residents but received a disproportionately lower amount of 
revenues. 
The "new regionalism" movement has tended to be less focused on structure than with 
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functioning, although prominent urbanist David Rusk has stressed the importance of city 
boundaries in addressing severe socioeconomic problems faced by many U.S. cities. In Cities 
Without Suburbs (1995), he analyzes "elastic" and "inelastic" cities, claiming that the former, 
comprised of those that can increase their area-and thereby population and tax base-through 
annexation or consolidation with other municipalities have and will fare better than inelastic cities. 
He continues the consolidation theme in Inside Game, Outside Game (1999), emphasizing the 
superiority of single "big box" government structures over multiple "little boxes" in pooling 
resources, setting policies, and arranging service provision. 
Rusk makes this claim about merger of central cities and the counties in which they 
reside: "Without city-county consolidation, which lifted both cities out of slow erosion, the current 
status of Nashville and Indianapolis would probably be not much different from that of Louisville 
and Milwaukee" (1995, p. 25). 
Some research offers a basis to cast some doubt as to the necessity of municipal 
consolidation to improve socioeconomic conditions. Sancton (2000) refers to two Advisory 
Council on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) reports that suggest that job growth and 
economic recovery may "relate only indirectly to structural arrangements" and can be 
accomplished without consolidation. 3 Savitch and Vogel (2000a; 2004) have shown pre-
consolidation improvements in indicators of disparity and increased investment in Louisville. 
Reorganization, Race, and Poverty 
The literature on public choice and metropolitan government has tended to focus on 
studies of efficiency and efficacy criteria to the detriment of equity concerns, particularly those 
relating to racial minorities and the low-income population. Marshall (1972) laments the lack of 
coverage of minority concerns in the early literature on reform and consolidation: 
[A]II these treatments of metropolitan reform have at least one trait in common-
they have not focused on its impact on minorities. The actual or projected effects 
of reorganization on blacks, browns, Indians, and Puerto Ricans are considered 
superficially, if at all. Individual works sometimes include subsections on the way 
Negroes have voted on reform proposals and their attitudes toward reform, but 
3 A 1988 ACIR report examined the central city of St. Louis and the county containing it. A 1992 report 
analyzed Allegheny County and Pittsburgh. 
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most of the space is typically devoted to discussions of implications for suburbs 
and central cities. Of course the term central city often encompasses minorities, 
but it includes many other interests such as downtown businessmen and white 
residents. So the racial and ethnic aspects of reorganization are too often implicit 
rather than explicit. Minority interests are given much less attention than majority 
interests (p. 10). 
He makes a case for the study of consolidation's impact on minorities, adding, 
As we have become aware that race and ethnic issues are central to a wide 
variety of urban problems, reorganization must be expressly reexamined in these 
terms. Since metropolitan reform involves changes in the divisions of power and 
rewards, the stakes for minorities are potentially very high (p. 10). 
Although Marshall's observations were made in 1972, one could make a similar 
assessment of the state of the literature three decades later. Indeed, several studies on the 
political and economic impacts of metropolitan reorganization have included sections or 
subsections on black electoral representation or central city services, but there are few works on 
reform and consolidation that focus on the impacts of racial minorities. Harrigan and Vogel 
(2000, p.365-367) review the literature for impacts of consolidation on minorities, noting that most 
of the studies that discuss race seem primarily concerned with minority vote dilution. 
Owen and Willbern (1985) and Lyons (1977) briefly discuss race, focusing on black 
opposition and electoral outcomes, in their analyses of city-county consolidations in Indianapolis 
and Lexington. Owen and Willbern (1985) describe pre-consolidation attitudes by Indianapolis's 
black leaders as mixed, with some enthusiastic about the potential to bring tax revenue into the 
city but others concerned about dilution of voting strength. They paint a positive picture, 
however, of minority electoral representation in post-consolidation Indianapolis-Marion County 
Unigov, citing greater proportional representation of blacks and the continued appointment of 
blacks to high administrative offices. They also claim that even though the Republican party 
wrested power away from the Democrats, with whom blacks have typically identified, blacks have 
leadership in the minority Democratic Party. Moreover, they believe that the fact that Republican 
mayoral candidates getting more black votes post-consolidation "suggests a substantial level of 
black acceptance of Unigov" (p. 199). 
In contrast, others have found that blacks have suffered politically in Indianapolis. A 
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1992 conference paper by William Blomquist claims that black political influence was 
considerably diluted. 4 Over 90 percent of black votes were for Democratic candidates. In a city 
in which Democrats did not have an overwhelming majority, the black vote became an important 
base of support and allied the retention of Democratic power. Blomquist says that after Unigov, 
suburban Republicans took control and blacks became a "minority within a minority." In addition, 
he claims that the voting advantage of Republicans contributed to a decline in Democratic voter 
turnout by discouraging voters. Moreover, in another study of Indianapolis, Blomquist and Parks 
(1995), while they don't refer to race specifically, find that there is little evidence or even evidence 
to the contrary that central-city residents got better services or an equitable redistribution of the 
financial base. Pre-consolidation satisfaction with public services was not substantially different 
between the city and county balance outside the city. Moreover, Blomquist and Parks claim that 
suburban Republicans who captured Indianapolis's land and population were the primary 
beneficiaries of tax/finance base sharing: 
This remaking [of downtown], however, was not made possible by an 
inflow of new tax dollars from the suburbs; rather, most of the public costs accrue 
to residents of the pre-Unigov city, especially those who live in the Center 
Township. The combination of service-delivery financing via special district and 
TIF-ing downtown has given Center Township residents the highest tax burdens 
in the consolidated city-county. The Unigov consolidation did not give central-city 
residents access to a wider tax base. It gave suburban leaders access to the 
central-city base with which to pursue development projects chosen by them, not 
by city residents (1995, p. 53). 
Their analysis is interesting in terms of potentially negative political impacts upon 
minorities. What would have been more interesting, however, is if Blomquist and Parks had 
analyzed the extent to which central-city residents, particularly minorities, had benefited from the 
economic growth the Indianapolis-Marion County experienced. 
Lyons (1972) treats the issue of race in consolidation campaigns in a short section in his 
book on the Lexington-Fayette County, Kentucky merger: He notes that it is difficult to find hard 
evidence to either confirm or reject hypotheses on voter reactions by race. Some findings have 
shown that "central-city blacks tend to resist being politically and governmentally consolidated 
4 Cited in Harrigan and Vogel (2000): Blomquist. W. (1992). "Metropolitan organization and local 
politics: the Indianapolis-Marion County experience." Paper presented at April 9-11, 1992, annual meeting 
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with predominantly white fringe areas"; however, he notes, there are not many cases of large 
majorities against merger among central-city blacks. An Augusta, Georgia consolidation was 
only narrowly defeated even though the city was 50% black. In Nashville and Jacksonville, he 
adds, merger passed although there was a solid black majority in opposition in Nashville but not 
in Jacksonville. The higher approval by blacks in Jacksonville could have been influenced by the 
high probability of more annexations if the merger didn't pass. In Lexington, 85% of blacks lived 
in the central city but constituted a relatively small proportion-about 15% --of the population. 
Lyons says blacks had little to gain from opposition and faced at worst slight dilution of voting 
power. As was the case in Jacksonville, failure of merger would very likely mean more 
annexations and the at-large electoral system, under which blacks had not reached a critical 
mass of representation, would continue. 
Swanson (2000) says that Jacksonville's consolidation with Duval County diluted the 
black vote because the inner city was 40 percent black but the population in the merged city-
county was only about 25 percent black. He notes (p. 234) that blacks gained "a degree of 
access, representation, and influence, although suburban white interests continued to be 
politically dominant." This is consistent with Swanson's earlier analysis of Jacksonville, in which 
he says that black representation on the city council is more or less proportionate to blacks' share 
of the population, but notes that the number of Republican seats is increasing and that white 
suburbanites wield power (Swanson 1996). Moreover, he suggests that race played a part in 
garnering support for consolidation. Increased racial and economic segregation contributed to 
social unrest that made business and civic leaders uncomfortable. "Although race was a latent 
issue," he claims, "some white leaders understood the need to dilute the influence of black inner-
city residents" (p.235). 
Seamon and Feiock (1995, p. 1745) claim that "[i]n the short run, access of minorities can 
be guaranteed by drawing one or more minority districts, but in the long-run minority 
representation is diluted." Their study of the impact of consolidation upon political participation is 
designed to address a void in the literature. Examination of voter turnout in Jacksonville and 
of the Midwest Political Science Association in Chicago. 
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Duval County over 33 years, 14 prior to consolidation and 19 thereafter, reveals that 
consolidation had a statistically significant negative impact on both average and high voter 
turnout, reducing the figures by 17.6 and 18 percent respectively (Seamon and Feiock 1995). 
Although Seamon and Feiock do not address voter data by race, they suggest that the decrease 
in participation merits further research as to whether consolidated government disenfranchises 
"historically underrepresented groups" (1995, p. 1750). 
Swanson (1996), in addition to discussing the political impacts of consolidation on 
minorities, treats the issue of socioeconomic equity. Supporters of consolidation in Jacksonville 
emphasized "textbook" principles in reorganization: economic efficiency, administrative 
effectiveness, political accountability, and socioeconomic and political equity (p. 234). "Urban 
reformers," he says, "tend to emphasize effectiveness and efficiency, with some reference to 
accountability (with better representation of minorities on the City CounCil), but with virtually no 
reference to the equity and the needs of lower-income families" (p. 234). Although merging the 
inner city population with the suburban county population into the new consolidated area 
statistically diluted socioeconomic concerns such as poverty, disparities between residents of the 
inner city and suburban residents, as well as those between blacks and whites, remain 
considerable. Swanson says Jacksonville remains one of the country's most segregated 
metropolitan areas. His comparison of indicators such as poverty, educational attainment, 
median family income, employment rates, and the number of female-headed households reveals 
that residents of the "urban core" have the highest rates of poverty, unemployment, and single-
parent families and the lowest levels of education and income. Moreover, black families were 
disproportionately low-income compared to whites. 
The lack of attention to impacts upon minorities and the poor in central cities is somewhat 
ironic given that Rusk prescribes consolidation as a remedy to the segregation of such persons in 
cities, which he calls perhaps the most pressing problem the metropolitan United States faces. 
Regionalists such as Neil Peirce agree that regional approaches to government and governance 
are necessary to address the racial and economic segregation. In one of the few examinations of 
metropolitan organization focusing solely on race, john a. powell (2000) is adamant that a 
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federated regional system is necessary to alleviate the socioeconomic problems associated with 
isolation and concentration of poor minorities in central cities. 
Some scholars and other proponents of consolidation have questioned the prioritization 
of black representation in central cities over the reorganization of metropolitan government, 
claiming that it is preferable to have some influence and share in a stronger, more viable urban 
government rather than dominate a financially-distressed, declining city (Krefetz and Sharaf 1977; 
Rusk 1995,1999). Their claims and policy recommendations, however, are based largely on 
theory rather than based on empirical research or statistical analysis. For his comparison of 
"elastic" and inelastic" cities in Cities Without Suburbs, Rusk grouped 14 cities into seven pairings 
based on similar numbers of new homebuyers from 1950-1990 and black percentage of total 
population. Does this make sense as the major basis of comparability? Some of the pairings 
represent cities from the same region of the county, but is it fair to compare Houston with Detroit 
or Syracuse with Albuquerque? Since segregation measures tended to be higher in the "elastic" 
cities, Rusk concludes that consolidation (since many cities have limited ability to annex outlying 
areas) is necessary. Swanson's 1996 analysis of socioeconomic disparities in Jacksonville 
provides reason to test the assertion that metropolitan consolidation as a form of regional 
governance will improve the lot of inner city minorities and the poor. 
The Need for Literature on Race and Consolidation 
As a "path to the new regionalism," consolidation, in particular city-county consolidation, 
remains an important research topic in the field of urban and public affairs. The Fall 2000 State 
and Local Government Review symposium focused on "paths to the new regionalism," included 
three articles on consolidation. Public Administration Quarterly's Summer 2000 symposium 
asked: "Is city-county consolidation good policy?" Prominent urban scholar David Rusk promotes 
city-county consolidation as a means to better governance. Cities such as Memphis and 
Pittsburgh have been re-considering consolidation in the wake of the 2003 merger of Louisville 
and Jefferson County, Kentucky governments. 
The urban governance literature focused on the theme, "Does structure matter?" offers 
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relatively few studies on structure and its impact upon racial groups. Altshuler et al. (1999) note 
that the claim by Rusk, Neil Peirce, and others that structure does matter in the case of 
consolidated government and the well-being of minorities and low-income people is a relatively 
untested claim in need of empirical research. 
This study seeks to begin to fill the research void by examining whether and how city-
county consolidation has affected blacks politically, particularly in terms of voter participation. 
Voting Literature, Blacks, and Consolidation 
Interestingly, in addition to a dearth of literature on impacts of consolidation on minorities, 
there is also a noted lack of emphasis on consolidation's impact on voter participation, note 
Seamon and Feiock (1995), who discuss reasons that consolidation may impact political access 
and participation: 
First, voters may perceive that individual political actions, particularly voting, have 
less consequence in larger government. The influence of particular community 
interests in diluted by expanding the size of the jurisdiction. Second, reforms 
making local government more professional and bureaucratic may result in 
citizens perceiving that metro government is unresponsive to individual or local 
needs ... Third consolidation may also increase the importance of big money in 
local elections. Numerous studies show that campaign spending is the most 
important factor in predicting outcomes in a variety of kinds of local elections. By 
increasing the cost of pursuing office, consolidated government may make public 
office less available to those without personal wealth or access to special interest 
money (p. 1746). 
Seamon and Feiock (1995) found in their time-series analysis that consolidation reduced 
average voter turnout by 17.6% in Jacksonville-Duval County, Florida. Their analysis did not 
include a breakdown by race. 
Voter turnout is a primary indicator of political participation, which reflects both citizen 
interest in as well as a sense of power in the political arena. Enfranchisement allows citizens to 
register their opinions and preferences by voting for the candidates they feel best represent their 
interests. Election of the preferred candidate, in theory, benefits the citizen when the elected 
official makes policy decisions in the interest of the citizen. Various factors affect levels of 
general voter turnout, including the type of election, i.e., offices at stake, key issues at stake, 
particular candidates, and competitiveness of the election. 
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Kenneth Thompson, who has written on the importance of voting, particularly for blacks, 
comments, 
"The century-long history of black attempts to achieve the right to vote and white 
attempts, particularly in the South, to deny them that right illuminates the stakes 
involved. Voting is no mere privilege, nor is it just an act of symbolic significance. 
The right to vote is a fundamental political right because, as the Supreme Court 
has ruled, it is "preservative of all rights." (Reynolds v. Syms, 377 U.S. 533, 
1964). Since exercise of the franchise is an essential means by which our 
citizens ensure that those governing will be responsible, denial of access to the 
ballot box ultimately results in the denial of other fundamental rights." (Thompson 
1982, p. 2). 
The passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1964 and the Voting Rights Act (VRA) in 1965 gave 
minorities, especially blacks, legal recourse to fight race-based discrimination and voice their 
political choices. Restrictions on voting had included tactics such as literacy requirements, 
residence requirements, poll taxes, grandfather clauses, and the white primary (A It 1984; 
Davidson & Grofman 1994). 
Thompson's 1982 examination of the impact of the VRA focuses on political participation 
and the voting behavior of blacks. This analysis relies on Census biennial post-election surveys 
of households. Samples are large but problematic because data are self-reported and 
respondents are also asked about the voting behavior of other household members. He notes 
that attempts to validate the national data at the local level with local registration and election 
data show "consistent overreporting" for both blacks and whites, although it is slightly higher for 
blacks. However: 
" ... though the absolute levels of black electoral participation reported in the 
Census data are likely to be higher than in reality, the trends from year to year 
appear to reflect actual progressions reliably, owing to the relative constancy with 
which black citizens overreport their electoral participation ... " (Thompson 1982, p. 
6) 
Thompson (1982) notes that there was a 1964-1980 downward national trend in electoral 
participation among the population in general. Southern blacks were the only group to reported a 
net gain in participation in those years, which he attributes to the VRA. The trend 
" ... suggests the early impact of the Voting Rights Act was to stimulate black 
registration, voting efforts and candidacy by blacks who, for the first time, saw a 
realistic possibility of electoral success in certain districts" (Thompson 1982, 
p.16). 
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Interestingly, in Florida and Tennessee-both states in which a city-county consolidation 
occurred in the 1960s-voting registration rates for blacks were at their peak, about 60 percent, 
prior to the VRA. It had risen quickly since the 1940s, when "no southern state had a black voter 
registration rate above 7 percent." (A It 1984, p. 354). 
Even though the VRA may have helped empower blacks politically and enhance their 
electoral participation on a national and regional level, particularly in the South, metropolitan 
government structure also may have had an impact. Harrigan and Vogel (2003) note that 
"[c]reation of metropolitan governments threatens minorities-especially African Americans-with 
dilution of their voting power" (p. 273). 
"The techniques most likely to dilute African American voting influence were 
probably annexation and at-large elections. Annexation is felt to reduce African 
American influence when a city annexes suburban white residents and thereby 
decreases the proportion of the city's electorate that is African American. At-
large elections, it is charged, enable the white majority to minimize if not prevnet 
African American representation on the city council" (Harrigan & Vogel 2003, p. 
121 ). 
In general, studies have concluded that district/ward versus at-large representation and 
elections can make a positive difference in African American representation. However, scholars 
such as Charles S. Bullock charge that ward elections amount to "little more than token 
representation" and can trade off substantive representation because racial barriers may be 
enforced with ward systems with their descriptive representation (Harrigan & Vogel 2003, p. 123). 
Grofman and Davidson (1994) found at-large elections in majority-white cities with black 
population of at least 10 percent to have a "deleterious effect" on black representation. In cities 
that elected by district, "black officeholding was practically nonexistent in council districts less 
than 40 percent black buLit was close to 100 percent of all officeholders in districts greater than 
60 percent black" (p.320). 
Alford & Lee (1968) found that nonpartisan elections and reformed government structures 
(defined in terms of council-manager or appointed mayor versus elected mayor-council) tend to 
reduce voter turnout. Their earlier findings were supported by later work by Karnig and Walter 
(1983), who did, however, see a regional improvement in voter turnout in the South, which they 
attribute to the VRA. 
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In general, political participation has tended to be equated with voter turnout (Leighley 
1995). Leighley reviews the participation literature on the "standard socioeconomic model" 
(SES), mobilization theory, and rational choice theory. The widely-accepted SES model, 
developed from the seminal work of Verba and Nie (1972), holds that participation is driven by 
time, money, skills and civic orientations. Education and income are key variables, as is 
occupation. Higher socioeconomic status people are more likely to participate. Most of the 
evidence on mobilization model focuses on voter turnout. Motivations for mobilization include 
close or competitive elections, high campaign spending, and multiple races on the ballot. 
Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) also discuss party contacting, electoral competitiveness, social 
movements, voluntary associations, and group memberships. Verba and Nie (1972) also find 
active memberships in associations, particularly political organizations, affect turnout. 
Rationality choice theory weighs the costs and benefits of participation. Positive aspects of 
participation include broad societal benefits, such as preservation of democracy, and individual 
benefits, such as the minimization of the probability of a least preferred candidate winning. 
Although Leighley urges that research be conducted on other forms of political 
participation such as joining groups, campaigning, and making direct contacts, she notes that 
"lack of appropriate data on participation other than voting makes it nearly impossible to assess 
the consequences of the types of participation that are probably most likely to have a direct 
influence on government officials" (Leighley 1995, p. 196). 
However, it remains important to study voting participation. Work by Hill and Leighley 
(1992) and others has shown that "who votes matters." For example, higher levels of turnout 
among the poor are associated with higher welfare benefits. 
Leighley and Vedlitz (1999) tested five participation theories-Socioeconomic Status, 
Psychological Resources, Social Connectedness, Group Identity or Consciousness, and Group 
Conflict-across four racial/ethnic groups-Anglos, African-Americans, Asian-Americans, and 
Mexican-Americans-using data drawn from a statewide public opinion survey in Texas. 
Psychological Resources refer to factors such as political interest and trust in government. Social 
Connectedness relates to factors such as organizational involvement, church attendance, marital 
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status, homeownership. Group conflict refers to competition for resources, hostility, or fear, e.g., 
the conflict seen between whites and blacks in the South in the earlier twentieth century. 
Testing Socioeconomic Status (SES) using education and income and Social 
Connectedness using homeownership, length of residence, and marital status, the SES and 
Psychological models were strongly supported. The Social Connectedness model was partially 
supported; homeownership was significant only for some groups (not blacks or white) and marital 
status was not significant for any. Intergroup distance as measure of group identity was 
significant for blacks and Asians, although the relationship was opposite that predicted: if one 
feels more distant from other groups, one participates less (Leighley & Vedlitz 1999). 
Other research has shown more of a connection between blacks' social connectedness 
and group identity and their political participation. Racial group consciousness has been linked to 
mobilization by Verba and Nie 1972 and Shingles 1981. Dawson, Brown, and Allen (1990) found 
that blacks with higher socioeconomic status and religious guidance are more likely to participate 
in political process in the form of voting, campaigning, and contacting public officials. Exposure to 
black media sources and a racial-identity belief system also contributed to increased involvement 
in the political system by blacks, although SES and religiosity were the two major predictors of 
voting. Religiosity was measured based on questions from 1980 National Survey of Black 
Americans: how often read religious books, watch or listen to programs, pray, ask someone to 
pray for you, and how religious would you say you areas. Racial beliefs were measured by 
closeness to black mass groups such as church, working, rich, poor, etc., elite groups, black 
autonomy, positive sterotypes, negative stereotypes. 
Murray and Vedlitz (1977) note that black participation has been shown in the literature to 
be higher than one would expect given the lower SES of blacks. They used census data and 
precinct level electoral data to examine how SES variables within racial groups might affect voting 
participation. Precincts were chosen because they tend to be racially and economically 
homogeneous. Registration rates were about the same for blacks and whites in the mid-1970s, 
and turnout differences between blacks and white were relatively small. A gain in black 
participation versus white could not be explained entirely by SES since black SES did not 
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considerably increase relative to white SES. Murray and Vedlitz indicate that the gain might 
support the idea that "blacks participate at much higher levels in political affairs than one would 
expect given their relative socioeconomic status in American society" (p. 1067). A positive 
relation between higher SES and voting was found for blacks, although less pronounced than for 
whites. 
Murray and Vedlitz (1977) offer two hypotheses in concluding comments. First, as Verba 
and Nie (1972) have posited, blacks participate more because of their awareness of blacks as a 
deprived group. Secondly, blacks may be better organized than whites in the communities in the 
study, leading to higher levels of registration and voting than expected. Observers in those five 
communities "thought that local blacks were more highly organized for electoral politics than were 
local whites" (p. 1071). 
More recent research on black voter turnout as a form of political participation, a Census 
Bureau working paper, examined black voter turnout in congressional elections, analyzing 
differences in black turnout by various demographic factors. In general, black voter participation 
increased with factors such as age, educational attainment, and income, although it began to 
decrease once passing middle age, middle income, and baccalaureate education levels (Gaither 
& Newburger 2000). 
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CHAPTER II 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY 
Research Premise and Methodology Overview 
There are many questions about the impact of consolidation on minorities; however, the 
aim of this study is to begin to fill the literature void by examining how consolidation has affected 
blacks politically, particularly in terms of voting participation. This examination takes the form of a 
collective case study analyzing three truly large, metropolitan cities before and after consolidation 
with their home counties. Included in the pre-post analysis are Nashville-Davidson County, and 
Jacksonville-Duval County, and the more recent Louisville-Jefferson County consolidation. 
Indianapolis-Marion County was also intended for inclusion but for various reasons had to be 
excluded (see Appendix B).5 These cities have been selected because they are the only cases of 
city-county consolidation of this size in the past century, according to Harrigan and Vogel (2003): 
"Counting Louisville, there have been only four successful consolidations in 
larger cities (250,000 or more people) since the early 1900s: Nashville-Davidson 
County (1962), Jacksonville-Duval County (1967), and Indianapolis-Marion 
County (1969)" (p.259-260). 
Essentially, analysis of these sites would exhaust the population of large-scale consolidations, 
similar to the approach of Skocpol in a 1979 study of social revolutions (as cited in Feagin, Orum, 
& Sjoberg 1991). Other smaller consolidated city-counties would not be comparable. 
Scale is an issue for political impact in these cities because they each initially contained 
over a quarter-million persons and sizeable black populations, e.g., pre-consolidation Jacksonville 
was approximately 40 percent black. Moreover, each city significantly increased its size with the 
consolidation of a county that added at least 100,000 "suburbanites." Moreover, the suburban 
5 Analysis of Indianapolis is limited due to restrictions on data and the availability of maps, so this 
study focuses on the three other cities and includes discussion of Indianapolis-Marion County in 
the appendix. 
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areas tend to be white and more largely Republican-leaning than the central city. Harrigan and 
Vogel (2003) note that "African Americans are primarily Democratic and concentrated in the 
central city" (p. 275). One might expect consolidation, then, to have a considerable impact on 
black voting power and consequently, participation. 
Furthermore, it is important to focus analysis of voting behavior of blacks on the 
metropolitan cities that consolidated in the second half of the twentieth century because the 
federal legislation in the 1960s set the stage for greater political equity of racial minorities. 
A common criticism of the case study approach is that it lacks generalizability. According 
to Yin, "case studies, like experiments, are generalizable to theoretical positions and not to 
populations or universes" (1974, p.23 as cited in Snow and Anderson 1991 p.165). He cited their 
utility in clarifying theory. Earlier work by Eckstein (1975) also outlined the value of case studies 
in building and testing theory, such as the "crucial case" or "most-likely" and "least-likely" fit case. 
Improved validity may be an advantage of case study. Feagin, Orum and Sjoberg (1991, 
p. 19) state: "Although the case study must rely on a good deal of judgment, exercised by the 
observer, the great strength of this form is that it does permit the observer to assemble 
complementary and overlapping measures of the same phenomena." The advantage comes 
from using multiple sources of data. 
This study employs both quantitative and qualititative forms of data, with quantitative 
examination of pre-consolidation and post-consolidation election data complemented by 
qualitative contextual analysis. According to Babbie (2001, p.344), "[t]he most effective evaluation 
research is one that combines qualitative and quantitative components." 
The mixed methods approach, as it has come to be called, is increasingly employed in 
social science research (Creswell 2003). Of the three forms Creswell discusses-sequential, 
concurrent, and transformativEr-this study takes an approach most similar to the sequential form, 
though in a different order, featuring qualitative discussion followed up with quantitative analysis. 
The quantitative portion of the research is based on voter participation data from 
precincts with a majority black population. In addition, levels of both descriptive and sUbstantive 
representation for blacks are discussed, in terms of the number of blacks elected pre- and post-
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consolidation and partisan electoral representation; representation may provide some insight into 
voter participation. 
The study is also informed by qualitative analysis that explores the context for results 
seen in the quantitative analysis. Babbie notes that problems of validity might result because 
content analysis is "limited to the examination of recorded communications" (2001, p. 315). 
However, Babbie cites advantages of content analysis, including that it is economical, and it also 
allows the study of processes occurring over a long period of time. 
Review of archived newspaper articles and publications of local groups with an interest in 
government and/or race issues provide a more contextual basis for understanding how the 
governmental structure affected blacks politically, i.e., in terms of voter participation and 
involvement with the electoral process. Some select interviews with local experts supplement the 
data in Nashville and Jacksonville. 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
The overarching question is "How does city-county consolidation affect black voter 
participation in local government elections?" There are three possibilities: it is not affected, it 
decreases, or it increases. Because the impact of consolidation on blacks' voting behavior has 
not been substantially treated in the literature, it is difficult to hypothesize the effects. Given the 
scale of the four consolidations and the resulting possible dilution of minority voting strength, 
some directional change should be expected. The participation literature has shown that blacks 
may behave differently from whites due to factors such as racial group identity (Verba and Nie 
1972; Murray and Vedlitz 1977; Shingles 1981; Dawson, Brown, and Allen 1990). Blacks may 
have been mobilized by a perceived threat to their voting strength as a result of consolidation, for 
example. 
The independent variable in this study, however, is the consolidation of the central city 
and its county. Therefore, it is hypothesized that, post-conSOlidation, black voting behavior would 
decrease in accordance with the consolidation literature, as in Seamon and Feiock's 1995 study 
of general voting behavior. Black voters may have been discouraged by the dilution of their 
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voting power and consequently stayed home from the polls. 
This study's primary hypothesis is that black voter turnout in local government elections 
decreases following large-scale consolidations. We should see decreasing levels of black voter 
participation over time, beginning with the election preceding consolidation and including a 
minimum of two to three post-consolidation local government elections. Decreased levels of 
voting participation may also coincide with a decrease in descriptive or substantive representation 
due to the scale of the consolidations and the number of suburban whites and Republicans added 
to the electoral base. Lower black voter turnout would likely have a detrimental effect on black 
representation. 
Several secondary hypotheses stem from the primary question and hypothesis. Because 
consolidation's impact on black voting has been largely unexamined, it is important to begin to 
apply black voting behavior theories in an examination of consolidation and black voting. The 
participation literature has also shown that the Socioeconomic Status (SES) model holds for 
blacks and that there may also be a Social Connectedness role; therefore, we might expect to 
see variations among blacks according to various demographic and/or socioeconomic variables. 
Along with a hypothesized decrease in black voting participation, there may be decreases seen 
among subgroups of blacks. In essence, the lower the SES, the further consolidation might 
dampen black voting behavior. In this study, for example, majority black precincts with lower 
family incomes may have lower turnout rates than majority black precincts with higher incomes. 
Each sub-hypothesis addresses how black voter turnout may vary by characteristics 
including education, income, poverty, tenure, and age. A directional hypothesis is specified for 
each. 
In terms of education, the hypothesis is that black voter turnout decreases with less 
education. 
For income, the hypothesis is that black voter participation decreases as income levels 
decrease. 
Both of these variables are key components of the widely-accepted Socioeconomic 
Status participation model, which has been shown to hold for the general population as well as for 
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blacks (Dawson, Brown, & Allen 1990; Leighley & Vedlitz 1999, for example). 
It is hypothesized that, in terms of poverty, black voter turnout is lower among poverty 
households. Although poverty is not a component of the SES model, poverty is closely 
associated with income. Blacks, particularly central city blacks, also tend to have high poverty 
rates. 
In terms of household tenure, the hypothesis is that black voter turnout is higher among 
owners than among renters. Homeownership is often considered a measure of Social 
Connectedness. Although the work of Leighley and Vedlitz (1999) did not find a significant 
relationship between tenure and participation for blacks, there may be a connection, particularly 
since lower-income households are not typically homeowners. Moreover, it is interesting to 
examine the tenure relationship for blacks given lower homeownership rates for blacks relative to 
whites. 
Finally, it is hypothesized that black voter turnout is depressed among younger 
populations. The voting literature holds that participation increases with age for whites and the 
general population. Age is a crucial variable to examine for blacks given that the black population 
is a younger population, so the voting age population tends to be smaller for blacks than for 
whites. 
All sub-hypotheses are consistent with previous voter participation literature, which holds 
that older persons, those who have more education and income, and homeowners are more likely 
to vote (Bass & Kasper 1999). 
Data and Operationalization 
The methodology of the study is built on pre-post consolidation election analysis of three 
large consolidated city-counties: Nashville-Davidson County, Tennessee; Jacksonville-Duval 
County, Florida; and Louisville-Jefferson County, Kentucky. Aside from Indianapolis-Marion 
County, which was intended for inclusion but for various reasons had to be excluded (see 
Appendix B), these cities are the only ones of their size to have undergone a consolidation, which 
essentially exhausts the population of large urban consolidations. Smaller city-county 
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consolidation sites, such as Athens-Clarke County, Georgia and Kansas City-Wyandotte, Kansas, 
would not be comparable. 
Nashville, Jacksonville, and Louisville share a similar development pattern in terms of 
black political representation in municipal government and steps toward local government 
reorganization. 6 For each of those three cities, there was a long period without any black 
representation at the local level. In Nashville and Jacksonville, blacks had served in local 
government in the late 1800s and early 1900s, but there were decades-long breaks. In Louisville, 
the first black representative was elected to the Board of Aldermen in the 1940s. Nashville filled 
its 40-year void in 1951, but Jacksonville didn't have a breakthrough in black representation until 
the late 1960s, earlier in the year in which a consolidation referendum passed. Moreover, each 
city had a history of government restructuring or proposals to do so. Both Nashville and Louisville 
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had previous failed city-county consolidation attempts. Figures 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 show the 
timelines for representation and restructuring milestones in each of the three cities, along with 
6 Indianapolis differs in that consolidation happened directly as a result of an act of the state 
legislature, not following a public referendum. 
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elections preceding and following the successful consolidation referenda. 
Figure 2.2 
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In each site-with the exception of Indianapolis due to limitations on available maps and 
data-voter data are analyzed for the last one or two municipal elections including a mayoral race 
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preceding the consolidation and a minimum of two to three municipal mayoral elections following 
the consolidation. Moreover, Nashville, Jacksonville, and Louisville are each matched with a 
comparable non-consolidated city within their respective states, as a control of sorts. 
Voting turnout data are obtained through local government offices and/or local newspaper 
archives. 
Local election data are examined at the lowest possible level, the precinct, unless data 
availability issues require substitution of a larger level, with the unit of analysis as majority black 
voting precincts. A simple majority is greater than 50 percent. The voting rights literature 
references a "65 percent rule" (e.g., Swain 1995). The iterature on residential segregation by 
race utilizes a 60 percent "hypersegregation" criterion (Massey & Denton 1993). Segregation 
data have also tended to show a "racial tipping point" in which whites would prefer not to live in a 
neighborhood; polls have indicated that the median white's ideal neighborhood is 75 percent 
white, 25 percent non-white. Moreover, data show that the median black lives in a neighborhood 
that is 52 percent black (Easterly 2004.) While a simple majority could have sufficed for the 
purpose of this study, especially since that is the basis on which consolidated government plans 
have counted majority black districts, 70 percent is used as a cut-off because of the high degree 
of residential segregation in the study sites; the vast majority of black areas are above 70 percent 
black. 
Because local voter data are not generally available by race, black districts are 
determined by matching voting precincts to their respective Census tracts for which 
socioeconomic and demographic data are available. Since the demographic data are not 
available for the individual voters, analysis is limited to black district descriptive statistics such as 
the average, median, and range of the socioeconomic characteristics of district households. 
Specific socioeconomic characteristics data examined in detail include those outlined in 
the research questions and hypotheses section: education, income, and household tenure. Data 
for these variables is collected from Census summary data for the units of analysis. Education 
will be based on aggregate levels of educational attainment, including percentages with "less than 
high school," "some college," etc. Income is based primarily on median household income. 
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Tenure is based on percent owners and/or percent renters. Poverty and age, initially planned for 
examination, have been removed due to data restrictions. 
For the qualitative portion of the analysis, select interviews with local consolidation 
experts (in Nashville and Jacksonville), newspaper articles, and various local publications related 
to the consolidation and post-consolidation elections help inform the interpretation of the study's 
findings. The latter are particularly useful for the older consolidations since many of the local 
leaders at the time of the consolidations may no longer be living. 
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CHAPTER III 
NASHVILLE-DAVIDSON COUNTY BACKGROUND 
Nashville was the first of the study cities to undergo a city-county consolidation. A 1962 
public referendum was successful following previous attempts to reorganize local government 
through consolidation and annexation. At the time of consolidation, blacks comprised over one-
third of the city's population, and the support of the black community was considered essential to 
the passage of the referendum. This chapter chronicles black politics and representation in 
Nashville prior to consolidation, offers background on local government and the push for 
consolidation, and provides an overview of post-consolidation black political power and 
participation. 
BLACK POLITICS AND NASHVILLE GOVERNMENT PRIOR TO CONSOLIDATION 
In the post-Civil War period through 1900, blacks held 77 elected or appointed public 
positions in Tennessee, 19 of whom were elected to the state's general assembly and 25 of 
whom served in city governments. Few blacks were elected or appointed to any state, county, or 
municipal office in Tennessee for most of the period between 1900 and 1965. Scott (1964) 
attributes the phenomenon to apathy and a lack of organization. 
But for the most part, the majority of Negroes in Tennessee followed the line of 
least resistance and made no attempts to participate in the political affairs of the 
state. It was further evidenced during this sixty-five year period that Negroes in 
Tennessee made feeble efforts in presenting themselves as candidates for 
political positions, whether elective or appointive. Those who made 
announcements and presented themselves for office, in most cases were 
subjected to the most feeble political support from the Negroes in their voting 
district. With reference to the apathy among Negro voters, the Nashville Banner 
quoted a panel of Negro political and civic leaders of Nashville and Davidson 
County as saying, 'The Negro must loose his apathy toward politics and voting if 
he is to enjoy first class citizenship.' ... It would seem that Negroes were divided 
into numerous political camps and small organizations throughout the state and 
overlooked the political advantage of voting as a solid group (Scott 1964, p. 89). 
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Democratic Nashville is described as having two factions, one of which was more 
"sympathetic" toward blacks. Black candidates ran for Nashville City Council and were defeated 
in 1939 and 1943. No black was elected to municipal office in Nashvi"e from 1912 until after 
1950. By then, some strong black political organizations had begun to develop in Tennessee, 
including the City-County Democratic League of Nashville and Davidson County, which organized 
with only five members in 1938 and swelled to over 6,000 members by 1950 (Scott 1964). In 
1951, two black men, Alexander Looby and Robert Li"ard, were elected as council members in 
Nashville. Looby won in the general election against another black man; there were no white 
candidates in the fifth ward's first district. Blacks ran in four other districts, but among those only 
Li"ard won, in a run-off race in the second ward's third district. Scott (1964) notes that three new 
black candidates in addition to Looby and Li"ard ran for office in other districts in 1955 but were 
defeated. 
Moody (1965) notes that blacks comprised 37.9 percent of the "core city" population and 
"there were none outside Nashvi"e" (p. 44). 
Black politics in Nashvi"e in the 1950s and 1960s are characterized by Moody (1965) as 
"somewhat atypical" and "difficult to categorize." Moody adds, 
There are Negro ward bosses who serve as the flunkies of white politicians; there 
is a traditional Negro political machine, bearing some similarities to the Dawson 
machine of Chicago; there are individual Negro leaders with great personal 
prestige but little organizational apparatus; and there is a group of middle class 
Negroes who have been able to develop an effective political organization of their 
own (Moody 1965, p. 44). 
Nashvi"e was considered a "center of Negro higher education" with Fisk University, 
Meharry Medical College, and Tennessee A & I (Moody 1965, p.44). 
1960 Census data show that the black population was concentrated near the central 
business district, 
"on the western bank of the Cumberland River, on the eastern side of the loop 
made by the river. The Negro district runs westward along this loop, bounded 
roughly to the north by Jefferson Street. South of West End Avenue (or 
Broadway) the Negro district begins near 17th Avenue (the actual line of 
demarcation is probably Division Street) and runs eastward to the river" (Moody 
1965, p. 45). 
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The push for consolidation 
Prior to consolidation, the separate entities of Nashville and Davidson County were 
governed by a city council and strong mayor, and a county court and executive judge, 
respectively. Democrats dominated the political scene in Middle Tennessee, but "party struggle 
play[ed] a very limited part in local government" (Booth 1963, p. 12). 
Nashville and Davidson County consolidated following a successful public vote in 1962. 
Voters had previously rejected a proposal in 1958. In both instances, a dual majority was 
required. In 1958, city residents supported the plan, but residents of the outlying county did not. 
In 1962, residents of the county heartily supported the consolidation, but the plan passed with 
limited support in the city (Booth 1963). 
Interest had grown in government reform as the Nashville population began to shift 
outside of the central city into the outlying portions of 533~square-mile Davidson County. 
Consequently, the city was losing its tax base of wealthier residents and supporting a mostly low-
income black population, while the county was not prepared to handle urban services to the 
rapidly growing population. A large portion of the county outside Nashville was not served by key 
urban services. A sewer system was missing in many areas and street and sidewalk 
infrastructure could not keep pace with growth. Police, fire, and garbage services were offered 
on a small-scale and subscription basis (Booth 1963). 
Robert Horton, a former Planning Commission staff member and later special assistant to 
former Davidson County judge and Nashville mayor Beverly Briley, said that although 
consolidation had been discussed in a 1952 report he helped write for the Community Services 
Commission, consolidation had not generated much public interest until Briley gave a speech at 
the Rotary Club in 1955 (Bucy 1995, Horton interview transcript). 
Harry Lester, a member of the Tennessee General Assembly elected in 1957, said that 
he became aware of the issue of consolidation in Nashville and Davidson County "when people in 
the city became fearful that a black could get elected mayor" (Bucy 1995, p. 5 of Lester interview 
transcript). 
The separate planning commissions in Davidson County and Nashville recommended 
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consolidation in a jOint October 1956 report. In 1957, the Davidson County legislative delegation 
introduced an act to authorize a charter commission to study government reform in Davidson 
County. It was subsequently approved, and the mayor and judge appointed members, including 
a "Negro" councilman. The charter commission introduced a reform proposal calling for a 21-
member metropolitan council. The state legislature enacted a constitutional amendment allowing 
a vote on the issue, requiring approval of the measure separately in both the county and the city 
(Booth 1963). 
The referendum was defeated in June 1958, with the city approving and the county 
balance rejecting the plan. Supporters included both large newspapers-the Tennessean and 
the Nashville Banner-the Chamber of Commerce, the mayor and county judge, the League of 
Women Voters, and other citizens groups in the Citizens Committee for Metro Government. 
Booth (1963) notes that, perhaps due to the influence of the black councilman supporting 
consolidation, the "two precincts dominated by Negro residents only narrowly voted against 
adoption. Some observers considered this a moral victory, for it had generally been assumed 
that the Negro voters of Nashville would strongly oppose consolidation" (Booth 1963, p.65). 
Vocal opposition came mostly from county/suburban teachers groups, firefighters, and police in 
the last week before the vote. According to Booth (1963), a lack of ardent pro-consolidation 
campaigning to educate the public and gain strong support was probably a major factor in the 
defeat. He also notes that many city council members and county magistrates would have lost 
positions, since the 22 council member positions and 53 magistrate positions would have been 
reduced to a 21-member metropolitan council. 
Following the failed referendum, Davidson County raised taxes and Nashville began to 
annex areas in order to address financial woes. The Tennessean renewed its support of a 
consolidated government. while the Banner opposed further efforts, opining that the people had 
spoken. When the city annexed some industrial areas in 1958 and some residential areas in 
1960. interest in Metro was revived by some concerned citizens. In 1961, a preliminary 
referendum question asked voters to ratify a legislative act to activate a new commission to 
prepare another charter for consolidated government. The referendum passed in August. and a 
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charter commission consisting of the same members as in 1958, plus two new members, was 
appointed and introduced a new charter in 1962 (Booth 1963). 
The major difference between the 1958 and 1962 charters was the composition of the 
council. Forty council members would be elected, 35 from districts and five at large. In addition, 
a vice mayor would be elected at large, creating a 41-member council with a strong mayor for 
Nashville Metro. The 1962 referendum passed in both the city and the county, although the 
support base was nearly a reverse from 1958, with the county balance strongly supporting Metro 
and support in the city narrower. Campaigning by both supporters and opponents was 
enthusiastic and began early, unlike the previous effort. This time the mayor and one of the big 
newspapers were strong opponents of Metro, while supporters in the Citizens Committee for 
Better Government included many of the previous supporters such as the Tennessean, Chamber 
of Commerce members, and the League of Women Voters (Booth 1963). 
The 1962 charter commission had 10 members. Eight of them had previously served in 
1958. Those eight included two blacks: G.S. Meadors, "a retired Negro druggist," and Z. 
Alexander Looby, "a popular Negro attorney and city councilman" (Hawkins 1966, p. 71). 
"The major issues were once again the disposition of the schools, representation on the 
Metro council (including the question of Negro representation), the nature of the two taxing 
districts, and the provisions relating to pensions, civil service, and other employee matters" 
(Hawkins 1966, p. 73). 
Representation issues 
When the state legislature amended the constitution to allow cities and counties to 
consolidate and authorized a charter commission, Robert Horton was assigned to work for the 
Charter Commission. Among the key issues the commission debated was the size of the council 
and the number of at-large members. Horton said that black commission member Alexander 
Looby wanted more districts and fewer at-large seats, baSically conveying that, "you are going to 
need to be able to say to the black community that this is not just a device to eliminate our right to 
representation" (Bucy 1995, p. 10 of Horton interview transcript). 
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George Barrett, prominent attorney and consolidation advocate, recalled a meeting with 
black leaders Avon Williams and Charlie Johnson. He and his colleagues made the argument 
that 
' ... you can either cooperate and help create this and you'll have some significant 
voice. If you let it happen through annexation, the city will just continue to spread 
out to the white suburbs and the black vote will be diluted.' The blacks would 
have a smaller percentage of the seats if annexation continued. The argument 
for the blacks was that you could be enlightened and cut yourself a deal or you 
could be unenlightened and left out. 'It was one of those times when your 
interests and the public interests merges' (Bucy 1995, p. 5 of Barrett interview 
transcript). 
Beverly Briley, Davidson County jUdge-executive who served as Nashville's mayor from 
1963 to 1975, said that Alexander Looby's support of consolidation was critical. So respected 
was Looby that Briley felt he could have been Nashville's first black mayor if he had opposed 
consolidation (Bucy 1995). Another Charter Commission member, businessman Victor Johnson, 
recalls advising Looby, 
If we don't have Metropolitan government for Nashville, the core city will atrophy 
and whoever is the first black mayor will have nothing but trouble. It is much 
better in your lifetime and in my lifetime, for this community to grow and prosper 
economically and the lot of the blacks will improve with it (Bucy 1995, p. 2 of 
Johnson interview transcript). 
David Scobey, who was elected to an at-large seat on the first metropolitan council and later 
served as Vice-Mayor, said that Johnson helped convince Looby to support consolidation and 
that many people believed Looby could be the mayor. He was seen as "the key to the black 
community" (Bucy 1995, p. 5 of Scobey interview transcript). 
In public hearings in October 1961, Robert Lillard, a black attorney who was a city 
councilman, spoke. "It was understood, of course, that Lillard represented those Negroes who 
were concerned lest consolidated government cancel their growing strength in the old city. If 
automatic reapportionment could be achieved, plus representation based strictly upon population, 
the Negroes' cause would obviously be better served" (Hawkins 1966, p. 74). 
"District boundaries were drawn up so the 29 of them were predominantly white and 6 
predominantly Negro. (Some Negroes charged, however, that the lines were located in such a 
manner as to give them six possible representatives and no more in the foreseeable future). 
Automatic reapportionment was also included in the charter" (Hawkins 1966, p. 75). 
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The 1962 charter commission redrew the council district lines to create six majority black 
districts after an earlier plan would have made it difficult for blacks to win in any district. 
The charter was filed for referendum on April 2, 1962, but on April 18 some opponents 
filed a suit in chancery court claiming the charter and enabling legislative act were 
unconstitutional. These opponents included Robert Lillard, the mayor of Belle Meade, and the 
former commissioner of Forest Hills. Their attempt was unsuccessful (Hawkins 1966). 
In the 1962 campaign, the opposition was led by Nashville Mayor Ben West. West had a 
strong political machine from which to rally opponents in the city. Proponents emphasized the 
possibility of further annexation and also tried to portray the city government as bloated and 
corrupt. Opponents said Metro's promises would be hard to keep and that it would not end 
"duplication, overlapping, and fragmentation" (Hawkins 1966, p. 89). Among key proponents 
were the Chamber of Commerce, the League of Women Voters, members of the Charter 
Commission, the Council of Jewish Women, the Nashville Tennessean, the Davidson County 
Association of Fire and Police Departments, the Citizens Committee for Better Government, the 
Tennessee Taxpayers Association, County Judge Beverly Briley, the Nashville Vice-Mayor, some 
labor leaders, and "Negro intellectuals," among others. Key opponents included members of 
Nashville fire and police departments, officials in small cities, the Nashville Building and Trades 
Council, the Nashville Banner, Mayor Ben West, and "Negro traditionalists" (Hawkins 1966). 
In terms of black support and opposition to Metro, "Negro traditionalists" and "Negro 
intellectuals" are distinguished as follows: 
The terms 'traditionalists' and 'intellectuals' are used here solely for classificatory 
purposes and to illustrate the different approaches each group takes toward 
politics. No pejorative connotations are intended by the author. Thus the latter 
term is used simply because the group has a high percentage of university 
professors. The 'traditionalists' presumably view Negro political progress in 
much the same way that traditional ward politicians view progress-in terms of 
job-giving public projects in their districts. The newer 'intellectuals,' on the other 
hand, are supposed to have a much broader view of Negro progress. They think 
of expanding Negro political, educational, and employment opportunities in 
almost every sphere, and at least on a statewide basis (Hawkins 1966, p. 91). 
Fisk University and Meharry Medical College were traditionally-black colleges located in 
Nashville. Some of their professors, including Vivian Henderson of Fisk, were proponents of 
Metro. Other prominent intellectuals included the president of the NAACP, attorney Avon 
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Williams, and Z. Alexander Looby. 
Professor Henderson was probably the most active of this group. In addition to 
his television appearance, he spoke to a number of gatherings sponsored by the 
CCBG and affiliated organizations. His theme-indeed the theme of most of this 
group-was that Metro was really a question of good government versus 
antiquated government. Metro, he felt, was in the interest of a better community, 
without whose growth all would suffer. Considerations of this sort, many argued, 
took precedence over the fact that consolidation would dilute the voting power of 
the Negro community (Hawkins 1966, p. 97). 
In terms of black opposition, Hawkins offers these comments on the traditionalists: 
[L]arge numbers of 'traditionalist' Negroes, led by City Councilman Robert Lillard, 
looked upon Metro as a dilution of their voting strength. Lillard used his own 
organization to combat Metro and to stress this undesirable future. According to 
Lillard himself, his organization sent out in his district some three thousand 
mimeographed leaflets stressing the loss of Negro voting strength under Metro. 
Similar leaflets were distributed in other districts by Negro Boy Scouts under the 
direction of the Davidson County Democratic League. In addition Lillard made 
frequent personal appearances, often to debate Metro proponents." (Hawkins 
1966, p. 101). 
The Davidson County Democratic League was a black organization set up to increase 
black voter registration. It later publicly opposed consolidation. 
In discussing the racial variable in terms of Metro support, Hawkins (1966) cites an 
unpublished 1962 research paper by Boardman Stewart of the Political Science Department at 
Vanderbilt University. According to Hawkins, Stewart 
determined the percentage of nonwhites in each of the city's forty-two precincts. 
Inasmuch as census tract boundaries do not coincide with precinct boundaries in 
Nashville, this was almost a Herculean task. Briefly, Stewart's procedure was to 
fit the census data (white and nonwhite), presented block by block in terms of 
census tracts, into the precincts. This in turn involved a good deal of field work to 
determine exact boundaries. His procedure disclosed that thirteen precincts, all 
in the old City of Nashville, had a majority of 'nonwhites.' The per cent of 
nonwhites varied from 57.9 to 98.9. The vote in these precincts (using planning 
commission data) compared with that in the remainder of the precincts in the old 
city ... Only two precincts with a nonwhite majority supported Metro. Both were in 
the councilmanic district of Z. Alexander Looby ... ln striking contrast, the three 
precincts in Councilman Robert Lillard's district returned pro-Metro votes of only 
32, 21, and 39 percent. The reader will recall that a majority of Negro voters also 
voted against consolidation in 1958. Only one of Looby's precincts was in the 
yes column in 1958, and none of Lillard's was (Hawkins 1966, p. 132-133). 
Hawkins comments that the voting dilution message must have reached significant 
numbers of blacks and that the low educational level of blacks may have also been a factor 
because of the difficulty in understanding the "complex issue" of consolidation. 
Stewart's paper was his master's thesis, which was never completed and was 
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subsequently lost. 7 
Vanderbilt University Political Science honors student Peter Moody (1965) describes four 
black politicians, eac;;h representative of a "type." "Good Jelly" Jones is called an Uncle Tom, 
Robert Lillard a machine boss, Z. Alexander Looby a black intellectual without an organization, 
and Avon Williams a "rather militant person who is president of an effective political organization 
of militant Negroes" (p. 46). 
Lillard is described as a "true Negro boss." Lillard led the Davidson County Democratic 
League (DCDL) and had ties to Mayor Ben West and the old city machine. West Indies native 
Looby was a "life-long Republican." Looby was well-liked, probably the most respected member 
of the Negro community" (Moody 1965, p. 48-49). Avon Williams, Looby's junior law partner, 
headed the Davidson County Independent Political Council (DCIPC). The DCIPC was a 
progressive organization that dreamed of building a coalition of blacks, labor, and poor whites. 
The DCDL and the DCIPC represented two "contending" factions of black politics in 
Nashville. "If the DCDL is a group of professional politicians organized to practice professional 
politics, the DCIPC is a group of middle class Negroes organized to raise the status of the Negro 
through political action ... " (Moody 1965, p. 50). 
Nashville showed characteristics of both northern and southern politics, which made the 
situation for blacks mixed. "In Nashville there exists a highly articulate Negro middle class. In the 
North such a class is ineffective because of class antagonism-the middle class cannot relate to 
the rest of the Negro community. In the South, however, this line is blurred, perhaps because of 
the greater amount of overt color prejudice" (Moody 1965, p. 52). 
POST-CONSOLIDATION BLACK POLITICAL POWER AND PARTICIPATION 
Voters in Nashville and Davidson County approved consolidation with a dual majority in 
August 1962. Five blacks were elected to the first Metropolitan Council in Nashville in November 
1962: Alexander Looby, Robert Lillard, Harold Love, John Driver, and Mansfield Douglas. Looby 
and Lillard had served since 1951. Love had been elected to city council in a special election in 
7 Author telephone interview with Boardman "Bo" Stewart of Franklin, Tennessee, October 11, 2005. 
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1961 following annexation (Scott 1964). A white woman with family ties to the black community, 
was the sixth council member from the majority black districts (Moody 1965). 
How did blacks feel about Metro? One would have expected them to oppose it given the 
population dilution. Blacks comprised 19.22 percent of Davidson County, but one-third of 
Nashville prior to the annexations. However, blacks were split on Metro along factional lines. 
Lillard opposed it. Looby supported it. Many politically active blacks, particularly those involved 
with the DCIPC (though the DCIPC took no official position), felt the plan was inevitable and that 
they should be on the winning side. Williams and the DCIPC used the issue of potential vote 
dilution as a catalyst to register more black voters once the plan passed (Moody 1965). 
Mansfield Douglas, a black man elected to the first metro council, said he believed that 
many blacks voted for consolidation in 1962 as a way to "get back at" Mayor Ben West for his 
decision to close city swimming pools out of fear of racial confrontations (Bucy 1995). 
Moody (1965) reviews findings from a survey conducted by Vanderbilt University 
professor Daniel Grant in 1964. Forty-one blacks, 16 percent of the random sample of Davidson 
County registered voters, were included. In terms of who most benefited from Metro's adoption, 
1.8% of whites and 4.8% of blacks said blacks did. Interestingly, 4.8 percent of blacks also felt 
blacks were "harmed most" though no whites did. Results may have been biased, particularly 
those for blacks, since whites interviewers were asking the survey questions. 
Moody (1965) claims that blacks were able to use "concurrent voting," working in alliance 
with other groups, to maintain their political strength. With one exception (1962 mayoral 
election), he notes that DCIPC candidates carried the county. The DCIPC aligned itself with the 
metro machine, distinct from the old city machine. Perhaps, too, the DCIPC's post- Metro efforts 
to register blacks helped to mitigate the voting strength dilution resulting from joining "lily white" 
outlying Davidson County with the black population concentrated in the central city. 
However, others believe that the lot of blacks did not improve with Metro. Fate Thomas, 
a political organizer who worked in the Criminal Court Clerk's Office when Nashville consolidated 
and later became long-time sheriff of the consolidated government, felt consolidation ultimately 
hurt the black community. lin an interview with Carole Bucy, he referred to the size of the black 
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voting population being 29 percent but that a black councilman-at-Iarge had never been elected 
(Sucy 1995). 
Mansfield Douglas, a black member of the first metropolitan council, also felt that 
consolidation did not help blacks. 
'Frankly, I never did have a lot of enthusiasm for consolidation the governments 
because it would diminish the percentage of the minority population and would 
place the interests of minorities at a disadvantage and I think that it did that. 
Metropolitan government has provided the ability to make significant progress 
economically. I don't think that minorities have necessarily shared in that 
progress in terms of what it has been able to achieve ... ' (Sucy 1995, p 2 of 
Douglas interview transcript). 
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CHAPTER IV 
NASHVILLE-DAVIDSON COUNTY DATA AND ANALYSIS 
Race was a major ilssue in the push for consolidation in Nashville. The black community 
was divided in its support, organized into two distinct factions. This chapter examines black voter 
turnout in the two mayoral elections prior to consolidation and the three mayoral elections 
following the consolidation and finds an increase in turnout following the consolidation. Moreover, 
a brief comparison to unconsolidated Memphis is included, along with some possible 
explanations for changes in participation levels. 
Data and availability issues, 
Nashville voter reglistration data for the study years were generally unavailable at any unit 
smaller than the city. Moreover, voter turnout data on a precinct or even representative-district 
level were not available for all years from the local elections commission or other government 
archives. In some cases, voter data published in newspapers had to be consulted as a data 
source. 
Furthermore, the lack of detailed maps at a precinct level for post-consolidation years 
meant that representative-district units, rather than precincts, had to be matched to Census 
tracts.8 Council districts consist of multiple precincts. Finally, contrary to the case in 
Jacksonville, where Census and electoral geographic boundaries were more closely aligned, 
many of Nashville's majority black tracts both split precincts with other tracts and are split among 
precincts in pre-consolidation years as well as split council districts with other tracts in post-
consolidation years. However, no tracts are actually split among wards prior to consolidation and 
8 Pre-consolidation maps on file at Nashville-Davidson County Metro Archives. Metro council district map 
as published in 1962. 
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relatively few tracts are split among council districts post-consolidation; that is, majority-black 
tracts tend to fall entirely within one ward or district, though they may constitute less than 100% of 
the district boundary.9 
With detailed maps generally unavailable and geo-coding altogether unavailable, the 
matches of Census tract geography to electoral boundaries was achieved primarily through close 
eye-level scrutiny of large-scale electoral maps and smaller Census tract maps, but, in a few 
cases, it was achieved through electronic scanning and image layering of tract and election 
precinct/district maps. Therefore, analysis will lack some precision. Figure 4.1 shows an example 
of eye-level matching of Census and electoral geography in Nashville. The 1966 electoral map 
was a large poster size in its original form that was photocopied in small sections and stitched 
together. Census tract street boundaries were then hand-drawn on the map. Appendix A 
discusses the technique for electronic matching. 
A lack of precision also stems from the fact that tracts split precincts/districts with other 
tracts and often comprise IE~SS than an entire district. Fortunately, in many cases, the splits occur 
with other majority-black tracts because the patterns of residential segregation by race mean the 
bulk of black tracts are contiguous. Therefore, "supertract" groups of majority-black tracts can be 
analyzed for a higher degree of precision. Otherwise, one must accept the caveat that voters had 
to be assigned to Census tracts based on an estimate of the tract's geographic composition of a 
precinct or district. 
Nashville data 
Voters approved the consolidation of Nashville and Davidson County in a June 1962 
referendum. The new metropolitan government took effect in April 1963, with the election for 
metropolitan officials taking place in November 1962. Mayoral elections immediately prior to and 
following the June 1962 consolidation approval were held in Nashville in 1955, 1959, 1962, 1966, 
and 1971. The year 1951 is also notable, particularly in terms of black voting interest. In that 
year, at least one black was assured a seat since there were no white 
9 In 1962 and 1966, only three majority black tracts wcrc split betwecn two council districts. In 1971, only 
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Figure 4.1 
1966 Nashville Electoral Boundaries with Hand-drawn Tracts 
candidates in the first district of the city's Fifth Ward and this was the first time that district 
members were voted upon solely by residents of the district instead of all districts within a ward 
(Nashville Banner, 9 May 1951, Nashville voters have three election choices) . Moreover, it was 
the first local election since 1871 to be held without a poll tax (Nashville Tennessean, 1 March 
1951 , City's may vote to be tax free). However, another new law requiring all registered voters to 
vote in the precinct in which they reside caused some confusion , especially when thousands of 
voters were mailed cards advising them of new poll ing places only two days prior to the May 10, 
1951 election (Nashville Tennessean, 9 May 1951, 10,500 get notices of new voting places) . 
Nevertheless, two blacks, Alexander Looby and Robert Lillard , were elected to the Nashville City 
one such tract was split. 
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Council in 1951, Looby in the initial election and Lillard in the May 24 run-off election. 
During the 1950s, there were ten Census tracts in Nashville with a black population over 
50 percent: 3, 4, 5, 10, 11, 16, 19,24, 26, and 27. All but Tract 26 had a black population over 70 
percent. In the 1960s, there were twelve majority black tracts: all those from 1950 plus tracts 25 
and 35. All but Tract 35 had a black population over 70 percent, though its percentage, 69.67 
percent, could be rounded to the 70 percent cut-off criterion employed for this analysis. Following 
the 1970 Census and the consolidation, tracts were renumbered. In 1970, there were 18 tracts in 
Nashville-Davidson County with a black population over 50 percent: 118, 119, 127, 136, 137, 
138,139,140,141,142,143,144,148,160,162,163,170, and 171. All but tracts 140 and 171 
had black population proportions over 70 percent. Moreover, all but 127 and 171 appear to fall 
within the former city boundary. 
Table 4.1 
Composition of 70% Majority Black Tracts in Nashville-Davidson County, 
1950-1960 
Tract 1950 Percent Black 1960 Percent Black 
3 97.53 99.09% 
4 93.41 98.95% 
5 96.98 99.43% 
10 75.90 91.01% 
11 82.39 89.80% 
16 81.64 89.18% 
19 86.02 92.63% 
24 96.15 98.93% 
25 Not majority 70.87% 
26 64.43 91.30% 
27 99.48 99.99% 
In the 1955 election, turnout was relatively high compared to previous municipal elections 
in Nashville, with 48.45% of registered city voters going to the polls. In that year, almost 24 
percent of voters in majority black areas participated. Turnout in black tracts varied widely, 
ranging from 10.43 percent to 65.71 percent, although the range low and high seemed to be 
extreme outliers since half of the tracts had turnout within a few percentage points of the turnout 
for all black tracts (see Table 4.3). 
42 
Table 4.2 
Composition of 70% Majority Black Tracts in Nashville-Davidson County, 1970 
Tract 1970 Percent Black 
118 75.09% 
119 78.24% 














Note: Tract 127 was located outside former Nashville city boundanes. 
Table 4.3 
1955 Nashville Mayoral Election Turnout, Majority Black Tracts 
Tract Total Voted 1950 Voting Age Tract Level 
Population Turnout 
3 471 4517 10.43% 
4 786 3594 21.87% 
5 696 3790 18.36% 
10 345 1683 20.49% 
11 479 2185 21.92% 
16 837 3733 22.41% 
19 1290 4184 30.83% 
24 223 1291 17.27% 
26 1927 2932 65.71% 
27 619 4443 13.94% 
"Supertracts" 
TOTAL 3, 4, 26, & 27 3803 15486 24.56% 
TOTAL 10 and 24 568 2974 19.10% 
TOTAL ALL 7673 32352 23.72% 
BLACK TRACTS 
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Election turnout in 1959 showed a drop-off among blacks, from 23.72 to 16.65 percent. 
Although voter registration for Nashville's entire city was unavailable for 1959, it is apparent that 
overall voting levels-and likely overall turnout-also dropped; a total of 32,943 voters 
participated city-wide in the 1955 mayoral election, while only 24,287 participated in 1959.10 
Turnout in the black tracts ranged from 6.12 percent to 33.77 percent, which was a smaller range 
than in 1955 (see Table 4.4). 
Table 4.4 
1959 Nashville Mayoral Election Turnout, Majority Black Tracts 
Tract Total Voted 1950 Voting Age Tract Level Turnout 
Population 
3 395 4517 8.75% 
4 395 3594 11.00% 
5 232 3790 6.12% 
10 210 1683 12.48% 
11 573 2185 26.22% 
16 479 3733 12.83% 
19 647 4184 15.45% 
24 210 1291 16.27% 
26 990 2932 33.77% 
27 1254 4443 28.21% 
"Supertracts" 
3, 4, 26, and 27 3034 15486 19.59% 
10 and 24 420 2974 14.12% 
TOTAL ALL 5385 32352 16.65% 
BLACK TRACTS 
The first election for the new metropolitan mayor and council was held in November 1962 
following the June 1962 referendum approval by voters. Turnout among blacks in 1962 was 
higher than in 1955, but still considerably lower than overall turnout, at 21.93 percent compared 
to over 63 percent in Nashville-Davidson County. Turnout in black tracts ranged from 12.80 
percent to 41.75 percent, although over half of the tracts were within a few percentage points of 
the total turnout for all black tracts (see Table 4.5). 
The 1966 metropolitan election was historically significant because it was the first time 
10 Nashville Banner (1955, May 13). Vote in citywide races. Nashville Tennessean (1959, May 15). Vote 
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that there was a run-off in the mayoral election. Given that interest, in addition to this being the 
first election for municipal offices following the passage of civil rights and voting rights legislation, 
one might have expected a notable increase in black turnout. Yet, turnout in the majority black 
tracts was merely 22.25 percent, only fractionally higher than 1962 turnout. Overall turnout did 
decrease from over 63 percent in 1962 to 58.10 percent in the 1966 run-off election in which the 
mayor's race was decided. Turnout in black tracts ranged from 10.86 percent to 39.39 percent, 
but over half tracts had turnout within a few percentage points of the total turnout for all black 
tracts (see Table 4.6). 
Table 4.5 
1962 Nashville Mayoral Election Turnout, Majority Black Tracts 
Tract Total Voted 1960 Voting Age Tract Level Turnout 
Population 
3 876 3962 22.11 
4 730 3375 21.61 
5 323 2008 16.09 
10 323 908 35.59 
11 642 1760 36.45 
16 642 3261 19.67 
19 423 3303 12.80 
24 323 774 41.75 
25 329 949 34.67 
26 888 3217 27.59 
27 1033 5966 17.32 
"Supertracts" 
3, 4, 25, and 27 2968 14252 20.83% 
5,10, and 24 969 3690 26.26% 
11 and 16 1284 5021 25.57% 
TOTAL ALL 6943 31662 21.93% 
BLACK TRACTS 
In 1971, overall voter turnout in the election for mayor fell to 56.08 percent. However, 
voter turnout in majority black tracts soared to approximately 37 percent. The figure is also 
approximately 37 percent when the 70 percent majority black tract that fell mostly outside of the 
former city boundary, Tract 127, is excluded. This finding is contrary to expectations that black 
by precincts. 
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turnout would have decreased following consolidation, particularly since overall turnout also 
Table 4.6 
1966 Nashville Mayoral Election Turnout, Majority Black Tracts 
Tract Total Voted 1960 Voting Age Tract Level Turnout 
Population 
3 931 3962 23.50% 
4 804 3375 23.82% 
5 252 2008 12.57% 
10 252 908 27.79% 
11 693 1760 39.39% 
16 693 3261 21.26% 
19 359 3303 10.86% 
24 252 774 32.60% 
25 305 949 32.11% 
26 961 3217 29.86% 
27 1121 5966 18.79% 
"Supertracts" 
3, 4, 25, and 27 3161 14252 22.18% 
5,10, and 24 756 3690 20.49% 
11 and 16 1386 5021 27.60% 
TOTAL ALL 7045 31662 22.25% 
BLACK TRACTS 
decreased. Some factors to consider are that Census tracts were redrawn and completely 
renumbered following the 1970 Census. Moreover, Nashville Metro council districts were also 
redrawn following the 1970 Census according to the charter's requirement. There were more 
black tracts in 1971 following the 1970 census, and the turnout between black tracts ranged 
widely, from 15.48 to 69.25 percent (see Table 4.7). 
Boardman Stewart" who wrote a Vanderbilt University paper on black support of Metro, 
recalled in a 2005 telephone interview that "if it was a racially-defined election, then blacks turned 
out; if not, they didn't".11 
In the 1971 election, segregationist candidate Casey Jenkins was squaring off against 
incumbent Beverly Briley in the runoff election. The two had been narrowed from an initial field of 
nine candidates in the first election. Jenkins had made concerns about busing a hot-button issue 
II Author telephone interview with Boardman "Bo" Stewart of Franklin, Tennessee, October 11, 2005. 
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(Nashville Tennessean, 7 August 1971).12 Jenkins's candidacy and strong showing in the earlier 
election may have served to rally black voters. 
Table 4.7 
1971 Nashville Mayoral Election Turnout, Majority Black Tracts 
Tract Total Voted 1970 Voting Age Tract Level Turnout 
Population 
118 1287 2981 43.17% 
119 427 1898 22.51% 
127* 2521 3640 69.25% 
136 1541 6400 24.08% 
137 1884 4103 45.92% 
138 471 1789 26.33% 
139 785 2293 34.23% 
141 443 881 50.28% 
142 534 3450 15.48% 
143 534 2642 20.21% 
144 1290 2575 50.08% 
148 785 2408 32.62% 
160 524 1730 30.27% 
162 984 2188 44.98% 
163 984 2033 48.40% 
170 984 2781 35.39% 
"Supertracts" 
118 and 119 1714 4879 35.13% 
137,138, and 139 3140 14585 21.53% 
141-144 2801 9548 29.34% 
162,163, and 170 2952 7002 42.16% 
148 and 160 1309 4138 31.63% 
TOTAL ALL 16200 43792 36.99% 
BLACK TRACTS 
Note: Tract 127 was located outside the former NashVille city boundary. 
Turnout for the entire local electorate in contests in which a mayor was elected was not 
available for all of the study years, although a trend of increase over time can be seen in Figure 1. 
In 1955, overall turnout was approximately 48.45 percent. 13 Turnout data were not available for 
1959 and 1962 from either local government or newspaper sources. In 1966 and 1971, turnout 
12 Editorial appearing in the Nashville Tennessean, 7 August 1971. 
13 1955 overall turnout figure based on Nashville Banner accounts published in table on May 13, 1955 and 
in article: Hatcher, 1. (1955, May 12). Only V2 voters expected to go to polls today. Nashville Banner, At. 
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approached 60 percent, at 58.10 and 59.00 percent respectively. Runoff election contests for 
mayor were held for the first time in 1966 and again in 1971 . Turnout was essentially the same 
for both the initial and runoff elections in both of those years. 
With the exception of the seven percentage point decrease between the 1955 pnd 1959 
elections, black voter turnout in Nashville remained fairly level over the study period until the 1971 
election. There was virtually no increase in black voter turnout-less than half a percent--
between the 1962 and 1966 elections, when one might have expected black participation to have 
increased following the 1965 Voting Rights Act. It is still possible that the legislation might have 
increased black turnout. Because turnout data for all Nashville city voters was unavailable for 
1962, it is a possibility that turnout decreased for all voters between 1962 and 1966, but that 
voting rights legislation stimulated black turnout to keep it level. Figure 4.1 illustrates turnout 
trends over time, while Table 4.8 lists the figures. 
Figure 4.2 
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Table 4.8 
Comparison of Turnout Over Time, Nashville 
Year Black Turnout Overall Turnout 
1955 23.7% 48.5% 
1959 16.7% nfa 
1962 21.9% nfa 
1966 22.3% 58.1% 
1971 37.0% 59.0% 
Unconsolidated Memphis as a Comparison 
Because Nashville consolidated not long before passage of the Civil Rights Act and 
Voting Rights Act, new rights for blacks may have increased political participation of blacks, 
particularly voting participation, and especially in the election years immediately prior to and 
subsequent to the legislation. Unconsolidated Memphis makes an ideal control in terms of 
checking for possible effects in Nashville because both are in the same state, both have 
considerable black popUlations-though Memphis's is much larger-and both have considered 
consolidation. 
In Memphis, black political organization was stronger than in Nashville and other large 
Tennessee cities in the early 1900s, but weakened from the 1920s through the 1960s: 
Negroes in Memphis and Shelby County between 1900 and 1925, during the first 
part of the [1900-1965] period were more aggressive in politics and governmental 
affairs than were Negroes in Nashville, Chattanooga, and Knoxville. Through the 
efforts of the late Robert (Bob) Church, Waymon Wilkerson, LeRoy McCoy, J. T. 
Settles, and Bert M. Roddy in organizing the Lincoln Leagues, Negroes in 
Memphis and Shelby County became a dynamic and potent force in political 
affairs in Shelby County during the period ... During the latter part of the period, 
1925 through 1965, Negroes in Memphis and Shelby County lost most of the 
political aggressiveness that was once generated among the Negro voters during 
the period from 1900 to 1925 (Scott 1964, p.117). 
According to Scott (1964), black voter apathy was apparent when black insurance 
executive Dr. J. E. Walker ran for the Memphis City Board of Education in 1951 and was defeated 
handily. Walker received only 7,433 votes, under eight percent of all votes cast although blacks 
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comprised nearly 19 percent of registered voters. In 1955, another black candidate, Rev. Roy 
Love, also ran for the school board, but received 19,501 votes, over 260 percent the number 
Walker had received four years prior, signaling possible growing black political will (Scott 1964). 
Others, however, paint a different picture of black political participation in Memphis. 
Black voter registration and participation in Memphis was already relatively high in the 
1940s and 1950s, perhaps due in large part to the powerful Edward Crump political machine, 
which relied heavily on blacks and foreign-born residents, populations with which it could trade 
favors and exploit, for its power base (Tucker 1980). Large gains in black registration were also 
seen in the 1950s. A 77 percent increase between 1951 and 1955 brought the number of 
registered blacks to 39,000. Blacks represented about 25 percent of all registered voters while 
comprising around 37 percent of the population. By 1959, over 57,000 blacks were registered to 
vote, representing one-third of all registered voters, bringing that figure close to proportionate with 
their population percentage (Silver and Moeser 1995). 
In 1951, approximately one-third of registered blacks in Memphis voted in the local 
election. Voter turnout of Memphis blacks in local elections tended to hover in the 30 to 40 
percent range until 1959 (Silver and Moeser 1995). The Crump Machine had collapsed in 1954 
with Crump's death. Although he had given some civil service jobs to blacks, segregationist 
Crump had not picked any blacks to run for local office (Tucker 1980). In the 1959 mayoral 
election, however, five blacks were running for local offices, including public works commissioner, 
at which the strongest chance of a black winning local office was seen. Stakes were high, as no 
black had been elected to local office since 1879. Black voter turnout was an astonishing 63 
percent, though white turnout was also "substantial" (Wright 1993). In 1963, black turnout could 
be estimated as being at least 50 percent.'4 In that year, a very close race for Division 3 City 
Judge pitted popular black attorney and minister Benjamin Hooks against white candidate Ray 
14 Estimate based on the two Memphis Press-Scimitar articles, one stating that there were 69,697 blacks 
registered to vote and the other stating that "about 35,000" of the votes for Hooks were "negro votes." 
Porteous. C. (4 November 1963). Farris, Hinds each predicts '65,000 will vote for me.' Memphis Press-
Scimitar, page 21; Porteous, C. (8 November 1963). City Hall will have a new look: three are new on 5-
man commission. Memphis Press-Scimitar, page 1. 
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Churchill. The story was even picked up by the New York Times. 15 Despite continued gains in 
black registration, black turnout had fallen to 39 percent, compared to 66 percent for whites, in 
the 1967 Memphis mayoral general election despite the fact that a black candidate was running 
for mayor (Wright 1993). Run-off election data were not considerably different: 40 percent for 
blacks and 60 percent for whites. Wright (2000) attributes lower 1967 turnout and apparent black 
apathy to the fact that highly-popular segregationist candidate and former mayor Henry Loeb, Jr. 
was running and the perception that the black candidate, A. W. Willis, was not strong. 
Consequently, blacks gave more of their support to William Ingram, the most "black-friendly" of 
the other white candidates. In 1975, black turnout in the general mayoral election was 36 percent 
compared to 64 percent for whites, although run-off turnout was 56.5 and 59.1 percent 
respectively (Wright 1993). 
Figure 4.3 




e 8. 40.00% b...:.-c.c.--',-,-e....-,~ 
-5 30.00% ~=-'--~% 
s:: 




1959 1963 1967 1975 
Mayoral election year 
What can be gleaned from black voting participation in unconsolidated Memphis in regard 
to the possible impact of the Voting Rights Act upon partiCipation in consolidated Nashville? One 
might have expected black participation in Memphis to have increased following voting rights 
15 New York Times (8 November 1963). Negro in Memphis loses in close vote. Reprinted from New York 
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legislation; however, the opposite was true, at least in terms of municipal races. Figure 4.2 
depicts black voter turnout in Memphis. In Nashville, black voter participation was generally 
unchanged in the election immediately following the Voting Rights Act but jumped nearly 50 
percent for the next election. Although there may be some error due to limitations on data 
availability, in both cases, the trends and particular circumstances suggest that other exogenous 
factors, such as particular issues and candidates (as in the case of 1971 with segregationist 
candidate Casey Jenkins), in the election(s) played a stronger role. 
Socioeconomic Factors 
The wide range in turnout in the black tracts for given election years also lends itself to 
further analysis. It is possible that election-specific factors played a role, such as the race in a 
particular district, but the fact that lower turnout and higher turnout numbers seem to be 
concentrated in some of the same areas over time suggests that voter characteristics might play 
a role. As hypothesized, socioeconomic differences between the tracts might explain some of the 
difference in turnout. Initial plans for this dissertation called for exploration of income, poverty 
levels, educational attainment, age, and housing tenure as contributors to spatial differences in 
black participation levels. Due to data availability restrictions, however, age has been removed. 
The Census reports for 1970 did not include median age on a tract basis; rather, population by 
age groups was reported. Therefore, only a median age group, with a range of multiple years, 
could be calculated, and the usefulness thereof was minimal. Moreover, any analysis of the 
poverty population must be restricted to post-1960s elections, since the concept of a poverty line 
was established in the 1960s and data were not reported for the 1960 Census. 
It was hypothesized that as educational attainment increased, voter participation would 
increase. The 1971 election is not included in the table since the census tract numbering system 
and map changed; therefore 1950 and 1960 tracts would not be comparable across the table. 
Measured in terms of years of education for the population 25 and older, the data are somewhat 
contrary to expectations. In 1955, for example, the two traces with the most highly-educated 
Times online archive service. 
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residents had the lowest turnout rates, though several in the middle of the education range were 
also in the middle of the turnout range. In 1959, 1962, and 1966, the data were also mixed with 
some exceptional extremes but mostly middling tendencies (see Table 4.9). Though it is not 
included in the table, the same is true for 1971. Overall, however, educational attainment might 
not explain much of the difference in voting turnout among black tracts. 
It was hypothesized that as income increased, voter turnout would increase. Income was 
measured in terms of tract median household income as a percentage of city median household 
income. The 1971 election is not included in the table since the census tract numbering system 
and map changed; therefore 1950 and 1960 tracts would not be comparable across the table. 
Although there were some mixed results, in all years, including 1971, the highest income levels 
had the highest turnout rates and the lowest were among the lowest (see Table 4.10). Overall, 
however, due to the small number of tracts and the fact that there were multiple exceptions to the 














Comparison of Educational Attainment (median for population 25 and older) 
and Voter Turnout by Tract, Nashville 1955 - 1966 
Tract Years Turnout Turnout Years Turnout Turnout 
Education 1955 1959 Education 1962 1966 
1950 1960 
9 10.43% 8.75% 8.9 22.11% 23.50% 
8 21.87% 11.00% 8.5 21.61% 23.82% 
7.4 18.36% 6.12% 6.9 16.09% 12.57% 
7.5 20.49% 12.48% 8 35.59% 27.79% 
8.4 21.92% 26.22% 8.8 36.45% 39.39% 
7.2 22.41% 12.83% 7.9 19.67% 21.26% 
7.6 30.83% 15.45% 8 12.80% 10.86% 
6.2 17.27% 16.27% 7.6 41.75% 32.60% 
* * * 7.8 34.67% 32.11% 
7.6 65.71% 33.77% 8.6 27.59% 29.86% 














Comparison of Household Median Income (as percentage of area median income) and 
Voter Turnout by Tract, Nashville, 1955-1966 
Tract Household Turnout Turnout Household Turnout Turnout 
Income, % 1955 1959 Income, % 1962 1966 
of Area, of Area, 
1949 1959 
62.67% 10.43% 8.75% 55.02% 22.11% 23.50% 
59.84% 21.87% 11.00% 58.31% 21.61% 23.82% 
56.49% 18.36% 6.12% 65.24% 16.09% 12.57% 
60.84% 20.49% 12.48% 66.27% 35.59% 27.79% 
92.98% 21.92% 26.22% 73.60% 36.45% 39.39% 
74.19% 22.41% 12.83% 73.53% 19.67% 21.26% 
65.29% 30.83% 15.45% 65.90% 12.80% 10.86% 
60.00% 17.27% 16.27% 55.72% 41.75% 32.60% 
* * * 54.09% 34.67% 32.11% 
97.02% 65.71% 33.77% 91.71% 27.59% 29.86% 
44.03% 13.94% 28.21% 39.28% 17.32% 18.79% 
Tenure status, as measured by the homeownership rate, showed mixed correlations with 
turnout over the years. In 1955, some of the tracts with highest homeownership rates had the 
lowest turnout rates, counter to the hypothesis that homeownership and voting participation are 
directly correlated. There were more direct correlations in 1959. Data were mostly mixed in 1962 
and 1966 (see Table 4.11). The 1971 election is not included in the table since the census tract 
numbering system and map changed; therefore 1950 and 1960 tracts would not be comparable 
across the table. Although it is not included in the table, 1971 showed mostly mixed results as 
well. Although the tract with the highest homeowners hip rate also had the highest turnout, some 
of the lowest in terms of homeownership showed some of the highest turnout rates. Therefore, 
tenure may not be very useful in explaining the difference in turnout among black tracts. 
Nashville in Summary 
Black voting in Nashville did not follow the hypothesized decrease in turnout following the 
consolidation of the city of Nashville and Davidson County, at least during the study period. 















Comparison of Tenure (homeownership percentage) 
and Voter Turnout by Tract, Nashville, 1955-1966 
Percent Turnout Turnout Percent Turnout Turnout 
Owned 1955 1959 Owned 1962 1966 
1950 1960 
45.59% 10.43% 8.75% 40.07% 22.11% 23.50% 
13.42% 21.87% 11.00% 9.74% 21.61% 23.82% 
16.93% 18.36% 6.12% 21.68% 16,09% 12.57% 
16.62% 20.49% 12.48% 19.79% 35.59% 27.79% 
37.05% 21.92% 26.22% 38.82% 36.45% 39.39% 
31.78% 22.41% 12.83% 28.87% 19.67% 21.26% 
26.99% 30.83% 15.45% 24.19% 12.80% 10.86% 
16.53% 17.27% 16.27% 17.20% 41.75% 32.60% 
* * * 32.68% 34.67% 32.11% 
51.32% 65.71% 33.77% 63.85% 27.59% 29.86% 
55.62% 13.94% 28.21% 40.86% 17.32% 18.79% 
Table 4.12 
Black Turnout Changes and Possible Explanations 
Time Period Change Factors/Notes 
1955-1959 -7 percent lack of interest among total 
population; overall voting 
also down 
1959-1962 +5.2 percent Possible "first blush effect" 
of consolidation 
1962-1966 +0.4 percent Virtually unchanged; nothing 
of note 
1966-1971 + 14.7 percent Segregationist candidate for 
Mayor rallies black voters 
A five percent increase was seen in the first election involving the mayoral race (1962) 
following the merger. Since there was virtually no change between the1962 election and 1966, it 
is possible that the 1962 election was a sort of "first blush" effect from the consolidation, with 
public interest in the "new" government. The lack of a decrease in the next election might be 
attributable to effects of civil rights and voting rights legislation keeping turnout level when it might 
have decreased. However, there was a large increase, nearly 15 percent, among black voters in 
the next election. Since general turnout was virtually unchanged, it seems that some racial factor 
was at play. 
Unconsolidated Memphis was utilized as a comparison to check for possible effects of 
55 
the Voting Rights Act and Civil Rights Act, both passed shortly after the Nashville consolidation, 
upon black voter turnout in Nashville. Since Memphis actually saw a decrease in black voter 
turnout in the same time period-pre- and post-Voting Rights Act--other factors may have had a 
stronger effect on black turnout in Nashville. In the case of the large jump in turnout between 
1966 and 1971, contextual analysis makes a case for interest in the mayoral race, in which an 
outspoken segregationist was running for mayor. The candidacy and campaign of segregationist 
Casey Jenkins may have served to rally black voters and drive them to the polls in Significantly 
increased numbers. 
In terms of the differences in turnout among black voting districts, the socioeconomic 
variables examined did not consistently explain variations. There were some correlations 
between turnout and income, education levels, and tenure, respectively. However, many notable 
exceptions to expectations make it likely that other factors, whether socioeconomic or political, 
such as the strength of a particular race in a district, may have played stronger roles. 
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CHAPTER V. 
JACKSONVILLE-DUVAL COUNTY BACKGROUND 
Jacksonville was the second of the study cities to undergo a city-county consolidation. A 
1967 public referendum was successful following previous attempts to reorganize local 
government through consolidation and annexation. At the time of consolidation, blacks 
comprised over 40 percent of the city's population (with some projections that the city was well on 
its way to becoming majority-black), and the support of the black community was considered 
es·sential to the passage of the referendum. This chapter chronicles black politics and 
representation in Jacksonville prior to consolidation, offers background on local government and 
the push for consolidation, and provides an overview of post-consolidation black political power 
and participation. 
BLACK POLITICS AND JACKSONVILLE GOVERNMENT NINETEENTH CENTURY TO 1967 
Historically speaking, Jacksonville could be considered a black city because of its larger-
than-average black population percentage. In the late 1800s and early 1900s, blacks were a 
majority of the city's population. In the 1930s and 1940s, blacks comprised over one-third of 
Jacksonville's residents. By 1960, over 40 percent of the population was black. Although the city 
consolidated with the county in 1968 following a 1967 referendum, the old city boundaries had a 
population that was over 47 percent black in 1970. Even after Jacksonville's physical area and 
population increased with its consolidation with mostly white Duval County, blacks still comprised 
about 28 percent of the entire Duval County population in 2000, with the largest concentrations of 
that population remaining within the inner city census tracts. 
Between 1865 and 1907, 13 blacks were elected to local offices in Jacksonville. There 
were also 16 blacks elected from Jacksonville to serve in the Florida state legislature during the 
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1865-1900 period (Bartley 2000). 
Racist backlash to black political participation followed in the early 1900s. White 
Democrats began using tactics such as purging blacks from registration lists, employing a white 
primary, levying poll taxes and otherwise circumventing the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments. Bartley (2000) notes that the white tactics led to a 69 percent decrease in black 
voting in Florida and that no blacks in Jacksonville were elected to local office for sixty years, 
from 1907 until 1967. Moreover, the state legislature mandated at-large voting in Jacksonville, 
which made it difficult for black voters to elect black candidates. Even though there was a ward-
based representation system, the ward representatives were elected at-large (Bartley 2000). 
Blacks had identified with the Republican Party in the 1800s and early 1900s; that was 
Abraham Lincoln's Republican Party. They started identifying more closely with the Democratic 
Party after the New Deal. Post-World War II, the white Democrats in Florida rewrote party 
membership guidelines to exclude blacks. This procedure was actually upheld by the Supreme 
Court in Grovey v. Townsend (1935) due to it being a "private act by private citizens" (Bartley 
2000). 
In 1946, blacks were 21 % of Jacksonville's registered voters. Moreover, there were 
12,000 black Democrats registered by 1947. Black leaders led drives to register them as 
Democrats, in spite of what whites Florida Democratic leaders had previously done. Decisions by 
the U.S. Circuit Court and the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals held and upheld that blacks must be 
allowed to register as Democrats (Bartley 2000). 
Jacksonville government underwent a reorganization in 1951. The executive branch 
consisted of a stronger chief executive mayor and five-member city commission. The legislative 
branch consisted of a nine-member council representing districts but elected at-large. A seven-
member county commission was also elected at-large. 
Black candidates entered Jacksonville city council races in 1951 and throughout the 
1950s but were unsuccessful. There was some optimism about the 1959 city council elections, 
and growing black voting clout served to rally whites. The Florida Times-Union and Jacksonville 
Journal newspapers advised whites to turn out to vote. The Times-Union, a "consistent opponent 
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of African-American political participation," actually "advised city officials to annex Jacksonville's 
surrounding areas to reduce Black political influence" (Bartley 2000, p. 53). This would have 
diluted black voting strength by adding 147,000 new white residents. 
"Suburban growth also contributed to new political realities. If Whites continued their 
flight from Jacksonville, minorities would be left to run the city. The process had almost created 
demographic parity as the city council elections approached. In 1940 there were 82,798 Whites 
and 28,798 African-Americans in Jacksonville. By 1960, there were 118,286 Whites and 82,525 
African-Americans" (Bartley 2000, p. 123). 
In 1967, the first black representatives since 1907 were elected to the city council. They 
were women: Mary Singleton and Sallye Mathis. They would have to run again the same year for 
new seats in new districts for a new council in a consolidated city-county government in which 
blacks comprised much less of the population than they had in the former city. 
LOCAL PROBLEMS AND THE PUSH FOR CONSOLIDATION 
As has been well documented in the literature, pre-consolidation Jacksonville was 
plagued by a host of problems, including the possibility of school disaccreditation, air and water 
pollution, sewer capacity issues, inadequate police and fire protection outside city limits, bloated 
government budgets and increasing taxes, rising crime rates, slum housing in the city, and more 
(Martin 1993; Stephens and Wikstrom 2000). 
Rapidly shifting residential patterns contributed heavily to the problems. The population 
in the county balance increased from 99,512 to 327,000 from 1950 to 1965, a drastic change of 
over 228 percent in just 15 years. During the same period, the city population decreased by 3.2 
percent-from 204,517 to 198,000-while the budget grew from $23.9 million to $94.8 million, an 
increase approaching 300 percent. The city budget, plagued by a winnowing tax base, was 
shouldering the burden of rapid growth in the county (Martin 1993). 
Because of fiscal strains on the city and county, reformers began looking to alternative 
forms of government. Plus, on a more subtle level, concerns about race and political power were 
probably also a factor (Swanson 2000). 
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In January 1965, the state legislature authorized a 50-citizen committee to study 
government in Jacksonville. The Duval County legislative delegation named the members. Four 
blacks were appointed to the committee, including Earl Johnson, an attorney who became the 
commission's secretary as well as liaison with the black community (Crooks, October 26, 2005 e-
mail; Martin 1993). 
Annexation was discussed as a possible means to alleviate the fiscal crisis. 
Consolidation was thrust to the forefront in 1965 with the "Yates Manifesto," a one-sentence 
recommendation from a panel of business and civic leaders convened by Claude Yates. Yates 
was a retired vice president of Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company in Florida and 
had begun serving as president of the Jacksonville Chamber of Commerce. The statement called 
upon the Duval County delegation of the Florida legislature to prepare an enabling act for Duval 
citizens to vote on the consolidation of government within Duval County. (Martin 1993) 
The Local Government Study Commission released its report and recommendations in 
May 1966. The chairman of the Study Commission, J.J. Daniel, was also a member of the 
Florida Publishing Company board of directors. Daniel urged Florida Publishing Company vice 
president Robert Feagin to involve the local newspapers in the consolidation campaign. Richard 
Martin [author] was contracted to develop and conduct Jacksonville Journal and Jacksonville 
Times-Union campaigns to "educate the whole community on the nature of its problems and the 
reasons why consolidation was needed to solve them ... " (Martin 1993, p. 97). 
Martin (1993) describes a series of legislative events between "Black Hats" and "White 
Hats" in the Duval delegation, with the Black Hats opposed to the consolidation plan and 
attempting to subtly ensure the failure of the plan with political maneuvering, including trying to 
put through the unamended plan, which would likely be rejected by voters. Eventually, a few key 
changes, including reducing the consolidated governing body from 21 to 19, with five members 
elected at-large and 14 being district-based. 
After 18 months, the report Blueprint for Improvement was released with findings and 
recommendations, including a consolidated city-county government. Twenty problem areas were 
highlighted: "disaccredited schools; significant water and air pollution; high crime rate; loss of 
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property values in Jacksonville; inadequate land use patterns; high comparative cost of 
government; lack of public confidence in government; low voter registration; economic stagnation; 
traffic problems; low wages and a relatively unskilled work force; poor sewage facilities county-
wide; inadequate water facilities in the outlying areas; poor fire protection in outlying areas; 
inefficient sanitation system for outlying areas; an unworkable tax assessment policy; inadequate 
prison facilities and parole procedures; inadequate and wasteful governmental purchasing 
procedures; huge gaps in library services in outlying areas; and racial unrest" (Bartley 2000, p. 
141-142). 
Enabling legislation was introduced in mid-1967. The plan originally called for a 21-
member city council. The figure was later amended to 19, including 14 district-elected members 
and five additional council members elected at large. Blacks were in the majority in three 
districts. 
There was concern that blacks had the most to lose with consolidation, as their political 
clout was finally beginning to grow with voting rights and civil rights legislation and their 
increasing population percentage in Jacksonville. "In 1967, African-Americans made up over 42 
percent of the city's population and held nearly 40 percent of the voting strength. But Blacks held 
only two of nine city council seats. Consolidation would dilute Black political strength because it 
would be reduced to 28 percent of the total population and 26 percent of the voting strength. 
African-Americans would have to accept three districts in a 14-district city run by a 19-member 
council. African-Americans virtually abandoned hope of winning any of the five at-large seats to 
be created under consolidation (Bartley p. 143)." 
Pro-consolidationists argued that at least consolidation gave blacks some guarantee of 
representation because of district-based voting. Some blacks said that the bigger picture was 
more important that representation, that problems needed to be fixed. Urban League officials and 
the NAACP backed consolidation. The Florida Star never took an official position (Crooks 2004). 
Since blacks comprised nearly 40 percent of the city's registered voters, black community 
leader Clanzel Brown and Councilwoman Sallye Mathis led the drive in the "Negro" areas. Mary 
Singleton was opposed to consolidation. Renewed emphasis later had to be given to courting 
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black voters when some changes made to proposed council district lines placed Mary Singleton 
into the same district as Sallye Mathis. Both were serving as city council members after being 
elected earlier in 1967; they were the first blacks to be elected to local offices in decades. 
A necessary technical revision to the council district map placed-inadvertently or 
intentionally?-Mary Singleton into a district already occupied by Sallye Mathis. Some leaders, 
including Wendell Holmes of the NAACP and Sallye Mathis, charged that "Black Hat" legislators 
had tried to sabotage the consolidation campaign efforts by upsetting the black community 
(Martin 1993). 
Pat Caddell, a high school student serving as an aide to Representative Shultz, came up 
with a plan that placed the two women in different districts (Crooks 2004; Martin 1993). When 
the legislature approved the plan, the Times-Union ran the headline "Negro leaders endorse 
consolidation for Duval." The article mentioned Dr. W.W. Schell, vice president of the Greater 
Jacksonville Economic Opportunity and president emeritus of the Jacksonville Urban League, 
was chairing a group of black leaders campaigning for consolidation. 
Mary Singleton continued her opposition, claiming consolidation would reduce black 
representation and dilute black voting strength. 
"Negroes controlled approximately 40 percent of the Jacksonville vote. Under 
consolidation that percentage would be significantly reduced. Furthermore, population trends 
showed a shifting of white middle- and upper-class families out of the city and a polarization of 
Negroes within the city ... Conversely, there could be no doubt that strong support for 
consolidation developed among segments of the white population of Duval County because of a 
fear that Negroes might one day control the city government. There were whites who believed 
that if this trend continued the city might soon have a Negro mayor" (Martin 1993, p. 156). 
Former city official and black community leader Alton Yates commented, 
"There was a tremendous fear through the city that Jacksonville was rapidly 
becoming a black city. Blacks comprised, I want to think, about 42-44 percent of 
the population. It was largely believed that the city was getting close to electing a 
black mayor ... But white flight as far as the tax base had already started fleeing to 
the suburbs. So, it was very important for the consolidation charter to pass in my 
opinion for that reason" (Jacksonville Public Library 2006). 
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It was pointed out that with at-large voting, there was no guarantee that white 
suburbanites couldn't prevent blacks from winning council seats. Consolidation, its supporters 
insisted, would at least guarantee at least 3 of the 14 district-based seats and give blacks an 
opportunity to run in the five at-large contests. 
Although there were some prominent black leaders supporting consolidation, two black 
newspapers opposed it, according to Martin (1993). The Advocate spoke out against it. The 
Florida Star, published by Eric Simpson, didn't endorse consolidation editorially, though it 
presented both sides (Crooks 2004); Martin apparently considers lack of endorsement to be 
opposition. "For many Negroes the choice between the old ways and consolidation wasn't hard 
to make. They had only to look around-at the open drainage ditches, the privies, shanties, 
unpaved streets, and rundown schools-to make up their minds" (Martin 1993, p. 158). One 
major factor in garnering more support, black and white, for consolidation may have been some 
local government scandals (Crooks, October 2005 interview). City government corruption was 
uncovered by local media in 1965 and 1966. City officials had done such things as purchase 
luxury automobiles for city officials on a non-competitive basis, charge personal purchases to city 
accounts, and award insurance contracts to friends and political supporters without regard to 
pricing or need. (Crooks 2004). 
Local television station WJXT helped create support for government reform with its series 
of investigative documentaries including one on police department mismanagement and another 
called "Government by Gaslight," describing overlapping, confusing layers of local government. 
In 1965 a special expose type report uncovered a scandal in the procurement of the city's 
automobile fleet. A series on the city's insurance programs aired in 1966, again documenting 
possible fraud, and, at the least, gross mismanagement of taxpayers' dollars. WJXT continued 
its investigative reporting on "questionable city practices and programs (Martin 1993, p. 75)." 
Martin suggests that WJXT's charges prompted Circuit Court Judge Marion W. Gooding to call on 
May 17, 1966, for a grand jury investigation. When the grand jury process was completed in 
early November, two of the five city commissioners, four of nine city council members, the city 
auditor and the recreation chief had been indicted (Martin 1993). 
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Scholar Bert Swanson agrees that the Jacksonville reformers' move to professionalize 
the government and leave behind the corruption was a key factor, however; "under the surface, 
racism was a big factor. There were projections that the city could become half-black as early as 
1972. Although the reformers were keyed in on professionalization, they were savvy in playing 
up-or at least not doing much to downplay-people's fears, such as racial concerns" (Swanson 
interview October 24, 2005). 
James Crooks also notes that Louis Ritter, mayor from 1965-67, did not win re-election in 
1967 despite popularity and a good relationship with the African American community. Ritter had 
appointed the first blacks to city policy-making and advisory boards and agencies. Instead, 
Tanzler won on a reform ticket. "White middle-class residents voted for him in substantial 
numbers to overcome organized party and African American support for the incumbent" (Crooks 
2004 p. 51). In 2006, former mayor Lou Ritter commented in retrospect, "One of the main 
reasons why people overwhelmingly voted for consolidation is because they did not want to see a 
black man serving as mayor, and it split the community greatly" (Jacksonville Public Library 
2006). On August 8,1967, voters in Jacksonville and Duval County, Florida approved a 
referendum to consolidate the two governments into one Greater Jacksonville. Elections for 
officeholders in the new government were held later that fall, and the new government was 
officially installed in October 1968. Over 86,000-86,079---Duval County residents voted. 
Consolidation was approved 54,493 to 29,768. Within the city, the vote was 19,534 for, 9,677 
against. In the County balance, it was 30,858 and 17,192, respectively. 
Perhaps surprisingly, the margin was much closer among blacks than for all voters. 
Blacks countywide voted 4,433 for, 3,117 against. In the county balance only, the black vote was 
1,487 for, 963 against (Martin 1993). Almost 65 percent voted for consolidation. Black 
Jacksonville had supported it 59 to 41 percent, whereas the whole population of the old city was 
in favor nearly 2 to 1 and in Duval County 64 to 36. 
"Though critics still remained, the larger community, including both African 
Americans and previously reluctant suburbanites, came close to a consensus, a 
major accomplishment in a city plagued by racial, economic, educational, 
environmental, and political divisions. Still, among the critics were an 
undetermined yet substantial number of people who voted against consolidation 
for the very reason Mary Singleton feared: the dilution of black political power. 
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This fear, that whites intended for consolidation to dilute black Jacksonville's 
political power, became a belief among many local African Americans. Historian 
Abel A. Bartley describes the fears of Frank Hampton, Mary Singleton, and 
newspaper editor Eric Simpson at the time. Almost thirty-five years later, 
attorney A. Wellington Barlow and newspaper editor Isiah Williams repeated the 
concerns. African American supporters at the time, however, saw a trade-off. 
They acknowledged white dominance into the foreseeable future with 
consolidation but accepted the half loaf of guaranteed district seats on city 
council and the promise of improved urban services so badly needed in the 
neglected urban core under the old regime. They also saw the possibility that if 
African Americans did become a majority in the future, state legislators might still 
annex enough white suburbs to maintain control, without a referendum. As a 
result, most black leaders "saw consolidation as the lesser of two evils." (Crooks 
2004 p. 57-58). 
POST CONSOLIDATION BLACK POLITICAL POWER AND PARTICIPATION 
Primary elections were held October 24, 1967. Blacks ran in District 8 (Sallye Mathis), 
the old Third Ward; District 7 (Oscar Taylor, "Tank" Tankersly, and Rev. Earnest Newman); and 
District 11 (Mary Singleton). Earl Johnson decided to run for an at-large seat. Mathis won 
handily and did not face a run-off (held if leading candidate did not receive a majority) or a 
Republican in the general election. Tankersly and Taylor had a run-off election, with Taylor 
winning. Singleton faced no opposition in the primary. Johnson was able to beat conservative 
white candidate Roger West in the run-off. Although voting was "light" for the November 7 run-off 
elections-turnout was less than 50 percent-voting was high in the Johnson-West race, with 
67,000 of 76,518 voters making a choice in that contest. Johnson won 36,925 to 30,104 (Bartley 
p. 149). 
In the December 5 general election, only two blacks had Republican opponents, Johnson 
and Taylor. However, Taylor, Johnson, Singleton, and Mathis were all elected to the 
consolidated city-county government. Bartley notes that "[more] voters cast ballots in the group 
five at-large race than in any other council race" (2000, p. 150), which probably had to do with 
racial concerns. 
Looking back on the pro-consolidation vote, blacks may have felt that they basically had 
to choose between power in a declining city or sharing in potential recovery and growth. "In 1968 
Johnson explained his support [of consolidation] by saying: " 'The wealth was leaving 
Jacksonville. Population as a whole was declining. There just was no good reason why we 
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should keep what government we had. The Negro had more to lose by opposing consolidation. 
We had to think about what happens to a city all black. Would industry come? Would tourists? 
Would it become a citywide slum?' " (Bartley 2000 p. 152). 
There was some black opposition to consolidation that continued years afterward. In 
1969, local NAACP president Lynwood Lee said Jacksonville was "pussy-footing around" with 
urban renewal projects and public housing was among the worst in the South. He added that, 
"We are paying city taxes and not getting city benefits" (Martin 1993, p.314, quoting Lee from a 
March 22, 1969 Times-Union article). 
In an October 1, 1978 Times-Union article by Randolph Pendleton entitled "Has merger 
benefited blacks?" Frank Hampton and Eric Simpson claimed that the black position had not 
progressed but regressed and that blacks had lost political strength, and thereby economic 
power. Earl Johnson, formerly an ardent consolidation supporter, said that he was not sure he 
would support it "[k]nowing what I know now." Johnson felt the government efforts to improve 
black neighborhoods were not nearly enough, and that resources weren't going there due to 
decreased black political strength (Martin 1993). In 1981, Johnson was quoted in the 
Jacksonville Journal as saying that "[r]etrospectively, I note a number of towns that did turn Black 
and were able to grow as such" (Martin 1993 p.152). 
Swanson (interview 2005) agrees that although the consolidation gave blacks some "real 
access," in perpetuity they are going to be a minority. Moreover, he believes consolidation has 
"created a schizoid polity. There's not much contact between city blacks and suburban whites." 
A 1973 study by Joan Carver found that black leaders were not as enthusiastic as white 
leaders, but felt they had "much greater accessibility" than in the past (Crooks 2004). At the 1977 
First Conference on Jacksonville History at the University of North Florida, Carver commented 
that consolidation's "general thrust had been favorable to the interests of blacks," although she 
expressed some reservation (cited by Crooks 2004). Crooks explains: 
"On the one hand, black participation throughout government had increased due 
to the election of district representatives to city council and the commitment of 
top city officials to appoint blacks to positions of responsibility. Blacks were 
making white officials aware of black needs. Further, the willingness of the 
consolidation government to accept federal dollars provided resources to expand 
public health and public housing programs in the black community. On the other 
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hand, consolidated government had little interest in legislating equal job or 
housing opportunities. Further, the city's low-tax, low-spend policies meant fewer 
social services in the minority community, where they were greatly needed," 
(Crooks 2004 p. 208). 
Crooks summarized other black opinion expressed at a 1993 University of North Florida 
Humanities Council symposium "Race Relations in Jacksonville Since Consolidation." The event, 
organized by Crooks and fellow UNF History professor Carolyn Williams, included eight African 
Americans on the panel of 11 participants. Crooks noted: "Jacksonville's African Americans, who 
comprised one-quarter of the population, did not see equity or equal opportunity as a 
consequence of consolidated government. Twenty-five years later, many blacks still looked for its 
benefits." 
Black concerns about having a voice in the consolidated government have persisted. 
The Jacksonville Community Council Inc. (JCCI) conducts an annual Quality of Ufe in 
Jacksonville: Indicators and Progress report in collaboration with the University of North Florida. 
Survey data show that Jacksonville residents continue to believe felt racism is a community 
problem, with nearly two-thirds of blacks and over half of whites agreeing (JCCI 2002). 
Furthermore, a 2000 survey revealed that "far fewer Black respondents believed that local 
government gives equal representation to the interests and concerns of all racial and minority 
groups ... " (JCCI 2002, p. 10). This same 2002 report also profiled the case of consolidation as 
an example of continued racial differences in perceptions of discrimination, noting that "[b]lacks 
are more likely to stress white fears about the growing population and political power of blacks in 
the pre-consolidated City of Jacksonville as driving the consolidation movement" (p. 9). 
More recently, in February 2007, a group called the Jacksonville Leadership Coalition 
called for the abolition of consolidated government in Jacksonville to "make city government and 
police more responsive to minorities' concerns and needs" (Brumley/Florida Times Union 
February 10, 2007). 
Swanson (2000) cites Feiock, Seamon, and Dorsey (1994): "Electoral participation in 
Jacksonville was low and declined after consolidation." Feiock, Seamon, and Dorsey (1994) 
conducted a time series analysis of electoral participation, 14 years before and 19 years after 
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consolidation. They found that turnout in Jacksonville decreased by about 18 percent, which was 
more than the decrease in other Florida urban counties. 
"Although consolidation tends to favor the core more than the periphery, the 
merger in Jacksonville reversed this notion. The black vote was diluted by 
consolidation; before the merger, over 40 percent of the population in the inner 
city was black, but in the new polity only one-quarter of the population comprised 
blacks. Although central-city blacks gained an increased tax base and a degree 
of access, representation, and influence, suburban whites continued to dominate 
politically." (Swanson 2000) 
Crooks said it is "still controversial about why consolidation became such a big issue. 
African-Americans said it was to prevent the city from becoming majority-black. Why, then, did 
60 percent of blacks vote for consolidation? The population was 42 percent black in 1967 and 
was on its way to becoming majority-black in the early 1970s. One reason for support of 
consolidation was a county government "powerless" to provide urban services (Crooks interview 
Oct 25, 2005). Crooks said, "I personally feel that the consolidation election was strongly 
influenced by indictments, particularly as shown on local television exposes. Petty corruption had 
not been a big concern, though, before the exposes on the scandals." Equally important factors 
were the disaccreditation of the schools and the county's lack of infrastructure following rapid 
growth. (Crooks interview Oct 25, 2005). 
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CHAPTER VI 
JACKSONVILLE-DUVAL COUNTY DATA AND ANALYSIS 
Race was a major issue in the push for consolidation in Jacksonville. The black 
community was divided in its support, and concerns about racial, political, and social equity under 
a consolidated government continue in Jacksonville. This chapter examines voter turnout in the 
two elections involving the mayor's race prior to consolidation and three following the 
consolidation and finds that turnout did decrease following the consolidation. A brief comparison 
to unconsolidated Tampa is included, along with some possible explanations for changes in 
participation levels. 
Voters approved the consolidation of Jacksonville and Duval County in August 1967 and 
the new government took effect in 1968. Local elections involving a mayoral race to be 
considered in this study include two prior to consolidation, held in 1963 and in the spring of 1967, 
and three after consolidation, 1971, 1975, and 1979. 
Preliminary research revealed that voter registration data by race were available on a 
precinct level in 1963 and in 1968 (which might offer a close approximation for 1967 elections, 
though precincts may have changed slightly). Majority black precincts, as indicated by precinct-
level registration by race, had a very low average turnout of 4.4 percent in the 1963 general 
election. Conversely, majority black precincts had a turnout of roughly 53% in the 1967 general 
election. This dramatic difference led to the question, "Is this difference due to the fact that civil 
rights and voting rights legislation post-dated the earlier election, or were there other factors, such 
as corruption scandals and the problems with schools and municipal services that created an 
interest for voters?" Two questions subsequently arose as a way to gauge the relative impact 
federal legislation may have played: Was black turnout considerably lower than overall turnout? 
Was black registration also low? 
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Voter turnout in Jacksonville and Duval County was characteristically low for many years 
preceding consolidation (Blueprint for Improvement 1966). Overall turnout in the 1963 general 
election was 12 percent; in 1967, 53 percent. The 1967 overall turnout and black turnout were 
basically the same. For 1963, there had been a difference of 7.6 percent, which may not be out 
of line with the literature showing turnouts generally being lower for blacks than for whites. 
Moreover, registration among blacks, at least according to 1963 and 1968 Duval County 
Supervisor of Elections records, was closely in line with blacks' population percentage. Blacks 
comprised 33.8 percent of city registered voters in 1963. In 1968, black were 40 percent of city 
registered voters and 20 percent of county voters. 
If there weren't huge differences in turnout by race and black registration didn't spike 
dramatically, it may be safely concluded that the impact of civil rights and voting rights legislation 
upon the difference in participation levels between 1963 and 1967 general elections was 
relatively minimal. What then, caused the jump from 12 percent to 53 percent in overall voting 
turnout? Searches of newspaper archives revealed that mayors were not always necessarily 
elected in the general elections in Jacksonville. 
Although the original intent in the research design was to look at turnout in general 
elections, Jacksonville's unique political environment requires the examination of primary 
elections in lieu of general elections for certain years. Because the vast majority of voters in both 
Jacksonville and Duval County were registered as Democrats throughout the 1960s and into the 
1970s, depending on the number and popularity of candidates, mayors were more or less elected 
in the primaries for some years. In 1963, for example, 95.7 percent of registered voters within 
Jacksonville city limits were Democrats. That year, the mayor was elected in the first of two 
primaries held. In 1968, Democrats still comprised 94.4 percent of city registered voters and over 
90 percent of Duval County voters. However, the mayoral election in 1967 was decided in the 
general election following an initial primary and a second run-off primary. Table 6.1 profiles voter 
registration and turnout and types of elections in which the mayoral winner was decided, for each 




Voter Registration and Participation Profile 
Jacksonville Mayoral Elections 1963-1979 
In 1960, there were seven census tracts within the city of Jacksonville that were at least 
70% nonwhite; two tracts, 2 and 5, had simple majority-black populations but did not have black 
populations over 70 percent black recorded until the 1970 Census. Additionally, there were four 
census tracts in Duval County in the Lake Forest-Riverview area (northeast of the city boundary) 
that were greater than 70% nonwhite: 107, 114, 115, and 116. In 1970, there were 13 tracts that 
were over 70% nonwhite.16 Although this study is focused on the city of Jacksonville pre- and 
post-consolidation, it might be beneficial to include examination of black electoral participation in 
those majority-minority tracts outside the former city boundaries areas because the Lake Forest-
Riverview population represented 25 percent of the nonwhite population in Duval County in 1970 
(Florida Publishing Company 1973). However, tracts outside of the former city boundary did not 
vote in the city elections in 1963 and 1967. Table 6.2 profiles the population of majority black 
Census tracts. 
Over the five mayoral election cycles in Jacksonville, two occurring pre-consolidation and 
three post-consolidation, turnout among blacks and turnout among all voters followed similar 
patterns, though black turnout initially was different. Tables 6.3 through 6.7 offer detailed tract-
specific turnout information for 70% majority-minority tracts for each of the years. Figure 6.1 
presents a summary of black and overall turnout over the time period. 




Composition of 70 % Majority Black Tracts in Jacksonville-Duval County 
Tract 1960 Percent Black 1970 Percent Black 
Pre-consolidated city 
boundary 
2 54.8% 76.4% 
4 94.8% 94.0% 
5 54.1% 70.1% 
15 99.1% 99.4% 
16 99.9% 100.0% 
17 100.0% 99.9% 
18 98.3% 98.6% 
28 84.9% 98.1% 
29 100.0% 99.9% 
Included in city post-
consolidation: 
107 74.3% 87.5% 
114 95.6% 99.8% 
115 84.5% 89.7% 
116 98.4% 98.7% 
Source: Florida Publishing Company (1973, November). Census tract data of Duval County. Percent nonwhite. Note. 
Census data show that the nonwhite population in Jacksonville was almost exclusively black during those years. 
For the 1963 election, four of the city's seven majority-minority tracts had precincts that were 
split: Tract 15 and Tract 16 shared a precinct, and Tract 17 and Tract 18 split a precinct. The 
remaining tracts, 4, 28, and 29, contained precincts which were basically coterminous with tract 
boundaries. Any spillover of precinct boundaries was limited to a handful of blocks and/or a 
negligible fraction (10% or less) of the precinct area.17 It should be noted that four additional 
Duval County tracts-1 07, 114, 115, and 116--immediately outside the city boundary were 
majority-minority; however, residents of those tracts were neither represented by nor voted for 
city elected officials. For the three city tracts with no split precincts, voter turnout, based on the 
total number of voters from all precincts within a tract divided by the voting age population (age 
18 and over) in the tract, ranged from 31.27 percent to 40.60 percent. When precincts of tracts 
15, 16, 17, and 18 were combined into one "super-tract," turnout was 26.26 percent for that area. 
17 Precinct maps for all five election cycles were obtained from the Duval County Supervisor of Elections 
office. 
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For all seven majority-minority tracts, voter turnout was approximately 31 .93 percent A summary 
is presented in Table 6.3. 
Table 6.3 
1963 Jacksonville Mayoral Election Turnout, Majority Black Tracts 
Tract Total 1960 Tract-
Voted Voting Level 
Age Turnout 
Pop. 
Total 4 1908 4699 40.60% 
Total 15 6240 
Total 16 4535 
Total 17 4464 
Total 18 3303 
TOTAL 15,16,17,18 combined 4869 18542 26.26% 
Total 28 2172 6945 31.27% 
Total 29 3387 8450 40.08% 
TOTAL ALL BLACK TRACTS 12336 38636 31.93% 
In the 1967 election, three of the seven majority-minority tracts had split precincts: 16, 17, 
and 18. Tract 16 shared a precinct with Tract 17. Tract 17 shared two precincts with Tract 18. 
When precincts of tracts 16, 17, and 18 were combined into one "super-tract," turnout was 32.38 
percent. Turnout for the four tracts without split precincts ranged from 30.64 percent to 48.45 
percent. For all seven majority-minority tracts, voter turnout was 37.07 percent. A summary is 
presented in Table 6.4. 
The 1971 election was the first election to include the office of mayor in the consolidated 
government. Although a second 1967 municipal election for local offices was held following the 
August consolidation referendum, a new mayor was not elected at that time. In 1971, there was 
a total of nine majority-minority tracts within the pre-consolidation city boundary, plus the four 
tracts in the county balance, for a total of 13 majority-minority tracts in Jacksonville-Duval County. 
In the former city, Tract 2 and Tract 5 were added to the seven majority-minority tracts from the 
1960 Census. In 1971, precincts were generally coterminous with tract boundaries, with minimal 
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Table 6.4 
1967 Jacksonville Mayoral Election Turnout, Majority Black Tracts 
Tract Total 1960 Tract-
Voted (all Voting Level 
precincts) Age Turnout 
Pop. 
Total 4 1440 4699 30.64% 
Total 15 2597 6240 41.62% 
Total 16 4535 
Total 17 4464 
Total 18 3303 
TOTAL 16, 17, 18 combined 3407 12302 32.38% 
Total 28 2775 6945 39.96% 
Total 29 4094 8450 48.45% 
TOTAL ALL BLACK TRACTS 14313 38606 37.07% 
spillover. Turnout for all tracts in the former city was a combined 36.91 percent, with turnout in 
individual tracts ranging from 14.64 to 44.63 percent. Turnout for tracts outside the former city 
boundary was 36.86 percent, with individual tract turnout ranging from 24.44 to 46.58 percent. 
Turnout for all 13 majority-minority tracts in the county was approximately 36.90 percent. Turnout 
levels in the county balance excluded, the former city boundary turnout represents a small 
decrease of .08 percent from 1967 levels even though one might anticipate great voter interest in 
the election of the first "metro" mayor. 
Data for 1971 were re-checked for possible errors. Of the five mayoral election years being 
examined, 1971 was the only year in which a complete and contiguous large-scale city and/or 
county precinct map was unavailable. Rather, precincts had to be matched with the majority-
minority tracts based on a Supervisor of Elections office collection of 8.5 by 11 sheets of maps 
containing some hand-drawn precinct boundaries and surrounding areas in addition to some 
printed precinct boundaries on street maps. For this analysis, Census tract boundaries were 
hand-drawn onto these sheets to determine the tracts into which the precincts fell. Results were 
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checked against a Supervisor of Elections office file of precinct boundary changes made in the 
1970s as well as a list of polling place addresses for the 1971 election. Moreover, the overall 
voting turnout trend also reflected a small decrease between these years, so the black turnout 
data are not out-of-line. The 1971 election is summarized in Table 6.5. 
Table 6.5 
1971 Jacksonville Mayoral Election Turnout, Majority Black Tracts 
Tract Total 1970 Tract-Level 
Voted Voting Turnout 
Age 
Pop. 
Total 2 1146 2957 38.76% 
Total 4 1153 3300 34.94% 
Total 5 946 2446 38.68% 
Total 15 2195 5510 39.84% 
Total 16 634 1693 37.45% 
Total 17 617 4214 14.64% 
Total 18 891 2248 39.64% 
Total 28 3277 9044 36.23% 
Total 29 4245 9512 44.63% 
TOT AL FORMER CITY 15104 40924 36.91% 
Total 107 1311 3667 35.75% 
Total 114 1076 2310 46.58% 
Total 115 931 3810 24.44% 
Total 116 1717 3866 44.41% 
TOT AL CO. BALANCE 5035 13653 36.88% 
TOTAL ALL 20139 54577 36.90% 
BLACK TRACTS 
For the 1975 election, none of the 13 majority-minority tracts had precincts that were notably 
split with other tracts. Figure 6.1 shows a section of the 1975 map with hand-drawn Census 
tracts. Turnout, based on the total number of voters from all precincts within a tract divided by the 
voting age population (age 18 and over) in the tract, ranged from 8.35 to 35.83 percent among 
the nine central city tracts, whereas the four county tracts ranged from 34.48 to 38.14 percent. 
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Voter turnout was 25.56 percent in the former city tracts and 36.32 percent in the county 
remainder tracts, with an overall turnout of 28.25 percent, which represents a considerable 
decrease from 1971 as well as the 1963 and 1967 turnout levels. Table 6.6 presents a 
summary of the 1975 election. 
In 1979, again, none of the 13 majority-minority tracts had precincts that had major splits with 
other tracts. Turnout ranged from 4.15 to 34.25 percent among the nine central city tracts, 
Table 6.6 
1975 Jacksonville Mayoral Election Turnout, Majority Black Tracts 
Tract Total 1970 Tract-
Voted Voting Level 
Age Turnout 
Pop. 
Total 2 808 2957 27.32% 
Total 4 663 3300 20.09% 
Total 5 525 2446 21.46% 
Total 15 2123 5510 38.53% 
Total 16 182 1693 10.75% 
Total 17 352 4214 8.35% 
Total 18 223 2248 9.92% 
Total 28 2207 9044 24.40% 
Total 29 3376 9512 35.49% 
TOT AL FORMER CITY 10459 40924 25.56% 
Total 1 07 1331 3667 36.30% 
Total 114 842 2310 36.45% 
Total 115 1453 3810 38.14% 
Total 116 1333 3866 34.48% 
TOT AL CO BALANCE 4959 13653 36.32% 
TOTAL ALL 15418 54577 28.25% 
BLACK TRACTS 
whereas the four county tracts ranged from 11.67 to 34.07 percent. Voter turnout was 23.65 
percent in the former city tracts and 26.70 in the county remainder tracts, with an overall turnout 
of 24.41 percent, which represents another decrease. Moreover, 1979 turnout levels, at least in 
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the majority-minority tracts, are the lowest of the five years examined. Table 6.7 summarizes the 
1979 election. 
Figure 6.1 
1975 Jacksonville Electoral Boundaries with Hand-drawn Tracts 
Turnout for the entire local electorate in contests in which a mayor was elected was 62 
percent in 1963, 62 in 1967, 59 in 1971, 40 in 1975, and 37 percent in 1979. Participation 
decreased slightly in 1971 despite it being the first election in which a "metro mayor" was elected 
and voters in the "suburban" areas had a voice in city government. Overall voter participation 
then dropped dramatically for the 1975 and 1979 elections. Black voter participation also 
decreased over the span of 1963 to 1979 (see Figure 6.1 and Table 6.8). However, it actually 
increased considerably before falling. In the former city (including tracts 29 and below), turnout in 
the black tracts increased by over 5 percent between 1963 and 1967. Voting in the majority black 
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Table 6.7 
1979 Jacksonville Mayoral Election Turnout, Majority Black Tracts 
Tract Total 1970 Tract-
Voted Voting Level 
Age Turnout 
Pop. 
Total 2 608 2957 20.56% 
Total 4 459 3300 13.91% 
Total 5 482 2446 19.71% 
Total 15 1887 5510 34.25% 
Total 16 415 1693 24.51% 
Total 17 175 4214 4.15% 
Total 18 201 2248 8.94% 
Total 28 2486 9044 27.49% 
Total 29 2965 9512 31.17% 
TOT AL FORMER CITY 9678 40924 23.65% 
Total 1 07 428 3667 11.67% 
Total 114 787 2310 34.07% 
Total 115 1276 3810 33.49% 
Total 116 1154 3866 29.85% 
TOT AL CO BALANCE 3645 13653 26.70% 
TOTAL ALL 13323 54577 24.41% 
BLACK TRACTS 
tracts remained essentially level from 1967 to 1971 before decreasing to pre-1960s levels in 1975 
and 1979. When former "county balance" areas were included in the consolidated government, 
voting in the corresponding majority black tracts was initially about the same as in the former city, 
but was higher in 1975 and 1979. 
What might explain some of the differences in turnout levels? In terms of total voting 
population participation, it might have been expected that the 1971 election would have sparked 
an interest and spiked participation since it was the first election for a "metro mayor." Although 
there had been a second local election in 1967 (the first had been in the spring) following 
passage of the consolidation referendum in August, mayor had not been among the offices up for 
election. The 1975 drop may be have a factor of the newness of consolidated government 
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wearing off, or, as hypothesized, a feeling of vote dilution, being "small fish in a big pond," 
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among the electorate. In 1979, the mayor was elected in the general election contest between 
Democrat Jake Godbold and Republican Don Brewer. Turnout was actually several percentage 
point higher, however, for the first (42.9 percent) and second (45 percent) primary races, which 
included Godbold, who had succeeded former mayor Hans Tanzler six months prior to fill the 
remaining term, and Lew Brantley, former state Senate president (Drane, H. 1979, 22 April. And 
then there were two ... Florida Times-Union, page 1.). Republicans only accounted for 4,489, or 
2.25 percent, of the 199,994 registered voters in Duval County in 1979, which meant that by the 
time of the general election, there wasn't much of a contest for mayor (Supervisor of Elections 
I 
office file of registered voters and voter turnout summary cards). 
In terms of the slightly different trend in voting participation in the majority black tracts, 
the increase between 1963 and 1967 may be related to Civil Rights and Voting Rights legislation 
occurring in the interim as well as the fact that two strong black female candidates were running 
for council positions in 1967. It is difficult to determine which might have had a stronger role. On 
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Table 6.8 
Comparison of Turnout Over Time, Jacksonville 
Year Black Turnout Overall Turnout 
1963 31.9% 62% 
1967 37.1% 62% 
1971 36.9% 59% 
1975 28.3% 40% 
1979 24.4% 37% 
Note: Black turnout data based on author's calculations. Overall turnout data are as recorded In 
Documents in the office of the Duval County Supervisor of Elections. 
one hand, Florida was one of two Southern states with high levels of black voter registration prior 
to the Voting Rights Act (Alt 1994). However, the number of black registered voters in 
Jacksonville increased from 24,107 to 29.153, a 17 percent change from 1963 to 1967. The 
number of white registered voters in Jacksonville fell four percent from 45,935 to 44,046 during 
the same period, which may be explained by white population shifts to the suburbs. 
The lack of a notable drop-off in Jacksonville in 1971 might be a rallying response to the fact 
that the percent of the population and of registered voters that were black was dramatically 
decreased as a result of the consolidation. For example, in 1967, blacks were nearly 40 percent 
of the registered electorate, but under 21 percent in 1971. 
Unconsolidated Tampa as a Comparison 
In unconsolidated Tampa, which might be used as a control to check for effects of the 
Voting Rights Act on black turnout in Jacksonville, overall voter turnout pre- and post-Voting 
Rights Act in Tampa mayoral elections fell from 71,065 in 1963 to 60,879 in 1967 (Smith, F. 
Tampa Tribune Sept. 261963 Page B-1 City race unaltered; Cox, B. September 28,1967 Tampa 
Tribune, Greco strides through city in post-election happiness, Page 2-B.). The 1963 turnout 
was a near record 62 percent for the city (Tampa Tribune, 26 September 1962, "It's bigger than 
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men," Page 12-A). Moreover, based on limited data available on precinct-level voter registration 
by race, black voter turnout in mayoral elections also decreased from 1963 to 1967. For the 10 
city precincts in which blacks comprised over 50 percent of registered voters, turnout fell from 
59.57 percent in 1963 to 42.80 percent in 1967. When a 70 percent black registered voter 
criterion is used, there are six "black" city precincts. Turnout in those Tampa precincts also fell 
between 1963 and 1967, from 56.60 percent to 41 .55 percent. 18 Many attribute the high turnout 
in 1963 to interest in two events occurring the day preceding the 1963 election: indictment of 
three incumbent council members plus the release of a report recommending zoning reform 
(Smith , F. Sept. 25, 1963; Tampa Tribune, Nuccio beats Lane by 1,910 votes; Page 1-A) . 
Figure 6.3 
Tampa Black Voter Turnout 
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Figure 6.2 depicts black voter turnout over time in unconsolidated Tampa for the elections 
preceding and following the Voting Rights Act. At the same time voting increased in Jacksonville 
pre- and post-Voting Rights Act, it decreased in Tampa. Hence, federal legislation may not 
necessarily have played as major a role in black turnout as other factors. 
18 Calculations are based on prec inct-level registration data available from the Hill sborough County 
81 
Socieconomic Factors 
The fairly wide range in participation among the majority black areas lends itself to further 
analysis. Of course, it is possible that competition for other local offices unique to that area, such 
as council member, may have affected the levels. It is noteworthy, however, that the lowest 
participation levels seemed to be concentrated in the same areas over time. Therefore, it is 
essential to look at demographic differences between the areas. 
Initial plans for this dissertation called for exploration of income, poverty levels, educational 
attainment, age, and housing tenure as contributors to spatial differences in black participation 
levels. Due to data availability restrictions, however, age has been removed. The Census 
reports for 1970 did not include median age on a tract basis; rather, population by age groups 
was reported. Therefore, only a median age group, with a range of multiple years, could be 
calculated, and the usefulness thereof was minimal. Moreover, any analysis of the poverty 
population must be restricted to post-1960s elections, since the concept of a poverty line was 
established in the 1960s and data were not reported for the 1960 Census. 
It was hypothesized that as educational attainment increased, voter participation would 
increase. Measured in terms of median years of education attained by the population 25 and 
older, data from the 1960s and 1970s, reported in Table 6.9, didn't show any obvious correlation 
with turnout. In several cases, the relationship was unexpected, I.e. areas with lower educational 
attainment had some of the higher turnout rates. 
Similar to educational attainment, income did not show an obvious strong correlation to 
voter turnout. It was hypothesized that as income increased, voter turnout would increase. Table 
6.10 data reveal some unexpected instances, such as Tract 18 in 1971 with one of the lowest 
household income as percent of area median but turnout among the highest. 
Tenure status, as measured by the homeownership rate, showed some stronger direct 
correlation, as hypothesized, in the 1960s and 1970s elections. Although it was not the case in 
Supervisor of Elections Office and precinct-level actual votes reported in the Tampa Tribune. 
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Table 6.9 
Comparison of Educational Attainment (median for population 25 and older) 
and Voter Turnout by Tract, Jacksonville, 1963 - 1979 
Tract Yrs. Turnout Turnout Yrs. Turnout Turnout Turnout 
Educ. 1963 1967 Educ. 1971 1975 1979 
1960 1970 
4 7.5 40.60% 30.64% 8.1 34.94% 20.09% 13.91% 
15 8.5 n/a n/a 10 39.84% 38.53% 34.25% 
16 7.8 n/a n/a 8.6 37.45% 10.75% 24.51% 
17 6.9 n/a n/a 8.3 14.64% 8.35% 4.15% 
18 7.6 n/a n/a 8.3 39.64% 9.92% 8.94% 
15/16/17/18 n/a 26.26% 32.38% n/a n/a n/a n/a 
28 8.1 31.27% 39.96% 10.1 36.23% 24.40% 27.49% 
29 8.5 40.08% 48.45% 8.4 44.63% 35.49% 31.17% 
107 n/a n/a n/a 11.6 35.75% 36.30% 11.67% 
114 n/a n/a n/a 12 46.58% 36.45% 34.07% 
115 n/a n/a n/a 8.9 24.44% 38.14% 33.49% 
116 n/a n/a n/a 11.2 44.41% 34.48% 29.85% 
Source: U.S. Censuses of PopulatIOn and Housmg 1960. PHC(1)-66 JacksonvIlle, Fla. SMSA. 
Table 6.10 
Comparison of Household Median Income (as percentage of area median income) and 
Voter Turnout by Tract, Jacksonville, 1963-1979 
Tract Household Turnout Turnout Household Turnout Turnout Turnout 
Income % 1963 1967 Income % 1971 1975 1979 
of Area, of Area, 
1959 1969 
4 50.69% 40.60% 30.64% 43.65% 34.94% 20.09% 13.91% 
15 67.74% n/a n/a 59.82% 39.84% 38.53% 34.25% 
16 45.07% n/a n/a 39.88% 37.45% 10.75% 24.51% 
17 40.67% n/a n/a 32.99% 14.64% 8.35% 4.15% 
18 41.70% n/a n/a 36.53% 39.64% 9.92% 8.94% 
15/16/17/18 n/a 26.26% 32.38% n/a n/a n/a n/a 
28 68.93% 31.27% 39.96% 65.30% 36.23% 24.40% 27.49% 
29 68.84% 40.08% 48.45% 61.02% 44.63% 35.49% 31.17% 
107 n/a n/a n/a 102.30% 35.75% 36.30% 11.67% 
114 n/a n/a n/a 122.30% 46.58% 36.45% 34.07% 
115 n/a n/a n/a 51.31% 24.44% 38.14% 33.49% 
116 n/a n/a n/a 91.37% 44.41% 34.48% 29.85% 
Source: U.S. Censuses of Population and HOUSing 1960. PHC(1)-66 Jacksonvtfle, Fla. SMSA. 
Median income as percent of area calculated from Table P-1 data. 
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every majority black tract, there were some notable examples. In 1963 and 1967, e.g., Tract 28 
and Tract 29 had the highest rates of homeownership and among the highest turnout rates, 
though Tract 4 was an exception, with a much lower turnout rate but similar turnout rate. In the 
1970s, 114 and 116 had high homeownership rates and high turnout. Tracts, 16, 17, and 18 had 
low homeownership rates and low turnout. Tract 108 seems an anomaly with the second highest 
homeownership rate but one of the lower turnout rates. Moreover, there are several instances of 
tracts with homeownership rates in the middle of the range with a wider range of turnout rates. 















Comparison of Tenure (homeownership percentage) 
and Voter Turnout by Tract, Jacksonville, 1963-1979 
Percent Turnout Turnout Percent Turnout Turnout 
Owned 1963 1967 Owned 1971 1975 
1960 1970 
39% 40.60% 30.64% 45% 34.94% 20.09% 
48% n/a n/a 47% 39.84% 38.53% 
16% n/a n/a 21% 37.45% 10.75% 
7% n/a n/a 10% 14.64% 8.35% 
5% n/a n/a 7% 39.64% 9.92% 
n/a 26.26% 32.38% n/a n/a n/a 
60% 31.27% 39.96% 60% 36.23% 24.40% 
63% 40.08% 48.45% 56% 44.63% 35.49% 
nfa n/a n/a 84% 35.75% 36.30% 
n/a nfa nfa 93% 46.58% 36.45% 
n/a n/a nfa 58% 24.44% 38.14% 















Source: U.S. Censuses of Population and Housing 1960. PHC(1)-66 JacksonVille, Fla. SMSA. 
Homeownership rate calculated from Table H-1 (owner-occupied as percent of all housing units). 
Jacksonville in Summary 
Black voter turnout in Jacksonville followed a general trend of a decrease, at least for the 
study years. The decrease mirrored an overall decline in voter turnout following the consolidation 
of Jacksonville and Duval County. Table 6.12 outlines changes in black voter turnout and 
possible explanations. Black turnout had increased by over five percent between 1963 and 1967, 
when two black representatives were elected to the old city government following a decades-long 
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drought of municipal descriptive black representation. 
Turnout among blacks was only 0.2 percent lower, virtually unchanged, in the first 
mayoral election following consolidation, although overall turnout decreased by about three 
percent. It is possible that there were effects of the Voting Rights Act that prevented larger 
changes in participation levels; however, the difference between overall turnout and black turnout 
was not alarming. Moreover, since turnout did not increase in unconsolidated Tampa during 
Table 6.12 
Black Turnout Changes and Possible Factors 
Time Period Change Factors/Notes 
1963-1967 +5.2 percent Two strong black candidates 
for council positions 
1967-1971 -0.2 percent If any "first blush effect" 
occurred, there would likely 
have been a larqer decrease 
1971-1975 -8.6 percent Newness of consolidation 
worn off; possible feelings of 
loss of voting strength 
1975-1979 -3.9 percent Consistent with overall 
decrease 
the pre- and post- voting rights legislation elections, it is likely that the consolidation and/or other 
local factors were at play in the changes in Jacksonville turnout. 
As in Nashville, the socioeconomic variables examined did not appear to consistently 
explain variations in turnout among the black electoral districts. There were some apparent 
correlations between turnout and income, education levels, and tenure, respectively, with tenure 
showing the strongest possibilities. However, several exceptions make it likely that other factors, 
such as the strength of a particular race in a district, may have played stronger roles. 
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CHAPTER VII 
LOUISVILLE-JEFFERSON COUNTY BACKGROUND 
Over three decades after the last large-scale U.S. city-county consolidation (Indianapolis 
in 1969-70-see Appendix), a referendum to consolidate Louisville and Jefferson County was 
successful in 2000 after a long history of efforts to reorganize local government, including two 
previous failed consolidation referenda. At the time of the consolidation campaign, blacks 
comprised nearly one-third of the Louisville population, and the support of the black community 
was considered essential to the passage of the referendum. This chapter chronicles black 
politics and representation in Louisville prior to consolidation, offers background on local 
government and the push for consolidation, and provides an overview of post-consolidation black 
political power and participation. 
BLACK POLITICS AND LOUISVILLE GOVERNMENT PRE-CONSOLIDATION 
As part of a Civil War border state in which many identified with the South (including 
slave trade businesses in the 1860s), Louisville, Kentucky had a legacy of segregationist values 
that was apparent well into the twentieth century (Yater 2001). At the turn of the century, 
Louisville ranked seventh in the nation in terms of the number of black residents-over 39,000-
and blacks comprised over 19 percent of the population. That proportion hovered in the upper 
and mid-teens until the period between 1960 and 1990, when the city's population of black 
residents shifted from approximately 18 percent to almost 30 percent. The trend is largely 
attributable to a white population outflow to suburban areas, while the number of blacks increased 
slightly in the city (Cummings & Price 1997). By 2000, the black population proportion was nearly 
one-third. Louisville was historically, and remains today largely segregated residentially, with 
blacks primarily concentrated in the "West End," (just west of downtown), a few neighborhoods 
immediately south and southeast of downtown, and an enclave in the somewhat suburban 
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Newburg area just south of 1-264; the segregation index, though, has decreased somewhat from 
the 1970s to the present. 
Kentucky may be considered part of the South as a Civil War border state, but, in 
contrast to many parts of the South, post-Civil War blacks in Louisville were never denied the 
right to vote (Braden 2001). However, during the Reconstruction period and well beyond, blacks 
did not have much political influence in Louisville. In 1917, the NAACP helped black leaders 
overturn a segregation ordinance and blacks helped Republicans regain political control of the 
city. Between 1917 and 1931, Republicans relied on the black vote to help maintain their power 
(Cummings & Price 1997). However, because the Republicans generally did not follow through 
by supporting blacks once the elections were complete, blacks began to sever ties with the party. 
Blacks organized the Lincoln Independent Party in the early 1920s, and although the party was 
unable to get any candidates elected, it elevated the political clout of blacks in the community and 
was a factor in getting blacks onto the police force and into the fire department (Hudson 2001). In 
the 1930s, black had "significant political breakthroughs" as "shifting political alliances" 
encouraged both the Democratic and Republican parties to sponsor black candidates (Yater 
2001, p. xxvi). Because Democrats had a black man running for state representative, black votes 
helped the Democratic slate win the mayor's office after a long stint of Republican control (Yater 
2001 ). 
In 1945, Eugene S. Clayton became the first black elected to Louisville's Board of 
Aldermen. Several others followed, including Louise Reynolds, Lois Morris, and the Rev. W.L. 
Hodge (Hudson 2001). Beginning in the 1950s, civil rights progress helped pave the way for 
blacks to increase their political clout. All library branches were desegregated by 1952, and 
public parks followed shortly thereafter. Schools were integrated without incident in 1956 (Yater 
2001). Though there were some high racial tensions in the 1960s and 1970s, including the 
movement for open housing (an act was passed in 1967), a race riot that erupted in 1968, and 
the contentious 1975 school busing order as a measure to desegregate schools, blacks 
continued to make steady political progress. By 1962, there was consistently one black alderman 
on the 12-member Board of Aldermen. Following the dramatic civil rights progress in the mid-
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1960s, with the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the 
number of blacks on the Board of Alderman doubled to two, or 17 percent. By the mid-1970s, 
blacks comprised one-fourth, and by 1982, one-third of the Board of Aldermen (Cummings & 
Price 1997). 
Consolidated Louisville-Jefferson County is unique by comparison to the other large cities 
in terms of black political power in that blacks had achieved proportional representation in the city 
decades before the merger of the two local governments. This feature can be attributed in part to 
the fact that Louisville's consolidation happened nearly four decades after passage of the Civil 
Rights Act in 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. In the early 1980s, when two 
consolidations were rejected by the public, African-Americans comprised about 28 percent of the 
city's population and held four of the 12 positions (33 percent) on the city's Board of Aldermen. 
Louisville and Jefferson County have a long history of efforts to reform the local 
government. Most of the efforts focused on city-county consolidation. In the late 1940s, County 
Commissioner E. P. White urged city-county consolidation and Mayor Leland Taylor said that 
merger was eventually certain to happen. In the early 1950s, the Kentucky constitution and tax 
laws were cited as barriers to consolidation. The 1956 Mallon Plan sought to expand Louisville's 
boundaries by 46 square miles but failed at the polls due to a dual-majority requirement for the 
suburbs and the city. Another expansion plan, the Morton-Wyatt Plan, failed to clear the 
Kentucky General Assembly in 1970. When a plan for city-county consolidation endorsed by both 
the mayor and the county judge-executive was rejected by the Kentucky General Assembly in 
1980, the city tried to annex parts of Jefferson County (Vogel 1994). 
In 1982, enabling legislation for city-county consolidation passed the General Assembly 
and was placed on the November ballot. It was defeated by a narrow margin. With a few minor 
changes, the plan was presented as a referendum again in 1983. It was also defeated due to a 
dual-majority requirement. In both cases, the city supported consolidation and the county 
opposed it. However, African-Americans, whose population base was concentrated mostly in the 
city, clearly opposed merger. Clayton and Hagan (2003) show that of 38 majority-black precincts 
in 1983, all but one voted against consol.idation. 
88 
An alliance of blacks in the city's west end and blue-collar whites in Louisville's south end 
and southwestern Jefferson County was a major factor in the defeat of the 1982 and 1983 merger 
proposals. Both groups shared concerns about the motives of power elites in the east end and 
the business community driving the efforts (Vogel 1994; Cummings & Price 1997). The coalition 
was somewhat ironic in that just a few years prior to this joint effort, the two groups were at odds 
over the busing issue (Braden 2001). Blacks in particular were opposed to the effort because of 
fears that they would lose newly-gained political power and influence through population dilution 
in a merged government. Blacks had organized an influential political action committee, PAC-10, 
in 1981, and one of its "notable successes" was organizing black voters against the merger 
efforts (Braden 2001). Black opposition was led by attorney Darryl Owens (who later became a 
county commissioner) and State Senator Georgia Davis Powers. Both had been members of the 
Charter Commission that drafted the merger legislation in 1982 (Vogel 1994). 
More annexation attempts by the city occurred throughout the early 1980s until Louisville 
and Jefferson County entered into ''The Compact," a 12-year agreement for a moratorium on 
annexation, shared financial responsibility of several local government agencies, and 
occupational tax revenue sharing, in 1986 (Vogel 1994). With concern about the longevity of The 
Compact, local leaders had already begun to look again at restructuring local government in the 
early 1990s. In 1994, the Jefferson County Governance Project was established, and a citizen 
task force appointed. The citizen task force made a recommendation against city-county 
consolidation and proposed a reorganization that transferred more resources and political power 
to the county. The proposal was not acted upon by the legislature. The Compact was renewed 
in 1998, but later that year, the state legislative delegation from Jefferson County established the 
Task Force on Local Government, which consisted of state and municipal officials from Jefferson 
County and Louisville. By the fall of 1999, city-county consolidation was once again proposed 
(Savitch and Vogel 2000a). 
The health of the economy and economic development and tax base concerns have long 
been a reason cited for consolidation, but other factors may have been at play. 
It is unclear whether the impetus for local government reorganization in the 
community really stems from economic development concerns or if concern for 
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economic development has become the vehicle to sell local government 
reorganization. The business community has long favored merger in this 
community. It is also unclear whether it is really economic development or some 
other issues that led the mayor and county judge to favor merger or other 
metropolitan government schemes. The most common explanation provided by 
both business leaders and the mayor and judge for local government 
reorganization is that a community must have one common vision and leader and 
that this is not the case in Louisville and Jefferson County (Vogel 1994, p. 31). 
LOCAL PROBLEMS AND THE NEW PUSH FOR CONSOLIDATION 
As the end of The Compact between Louisville and Jefferson County had loomed, 
relatively little effort was placed into consideration of renewing the agreement as compared to a 
renewed focus on city-county consolidation efforts. It had been renewed in 1998, but city-county 
consolidation was already on the minds of leaders (Savitch and Vogel 2000a). In 2000, new 
enabling legislation for city-county consolidation was passed by the Kentucky General Assembly. 
The original plan was for a special election for the public referendum; however, "pro-merger 
legislators agreed to change the merger vote from a single-issue special election scheduled in 
May 2001 to the November 7,2000 presidential election," a tactic that would result in larger 
turnout and "limit the amount of time the public would have to debate the merger issue and mount 
significant opposition to it" (Clayton and Hagan 2003, p. 9). 
Prominent local proponents of the 2000 merger referendum, including business leaders, 
the chamber of commerce, and the major local newspaper, the Courier-Journal, were typical of 
supporters in other city-county consolidation cases. In addition, the mayor, the county judge-
executive, the immediate past mayor and county judge-executive, and U.S. Senator Mitch 
McConnell, a past county judge-executive, also endorsed merger. A sophisticated, well-funded 
pro-merger campaign called Unity outspent the opposition group, Citizens Organized in Search of 
Truth (COST) by a large margin, approximately $1.25 million to $70,000 (Clayton and Hagan 
2003; Shafer 2000). Strong opponents included County Commissioner Darryl Owens, an African 
American, as well as the majority of the Board of Aldermen, some police and fire fighter groups, 
some of the smaller suburban city governments, some neighborhood associations, and a variety 
of progressive activist groups such as the NAACP and the Kentucky Alliance Against Racist and 
Political Repression. 
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Unity supporters argued that merger was desperately needed and predicted a negative 
future outlook for the Louisville area if the city and county were not consolidated into the City of 
Greater Louisville. Pro-merger arguments included that merger was necessary to increase 
efficiency and effectiveness by eliminating duplicate services and lowering the ratio of citizens to 
legislators in the county by forming many relatively small council districts (prior to consolidation, 
Fiscal Court, the county's governing body, was comprised of three county commissioners and the 
county judge-executive). 
Opponents were concerned about issues such as preservation of public service jobs 
such as police and fire positions, urban service districts, and minority political representation. 
The issue of minority political representation was particularly notable because none of the 
proposed districts had been drawn prior to the vote as they had in Nashville and Jacksonville, so 
black voters had no guarantees. Supporters of merger accused opponents of trying to protect 
their own jobs and of spreading fear about merger based in "myths." Beginning October 1, 2000, 
and leading up to the election, the Courier-Journal began running daily "Myths About Merger" 
sections, purporting to debunk the myths, on the editorial pages. 
Whereas in the 1982 and 1983 merger attempts, vocal black support was essentially 
nonexistent, some prominent black leaders did endorse the consolidation in 2000, including 
Louisville Urban League president Ben Richmond, former deputy mayor and chamber of 
commerce executive vice president Bill Summers IV, and wealthy entrepreneur Charlie Johnson. 
Moreover, the Louisville Defender, a black community newspaper, surprised many with its 
endorsement. Blacks in support of consolidation claimed the need to grow rather than stagnate 
or decline economically was even more important than black political representation. After 
announcing his support in February, Johnson, however, withdrew his support in June primarily 
due to concerns about representation (McDonough 2000). The plan called for 26 council districts, 
of which there would likely be a maximum of five or six majority-black districts, and there were no 
guarantees of those numbers. Said Johnson, 
"I said I was for merger if all issues could be worked out in a fair and equitable 
way. I have not seen that the issues have been worked out. We need to get 
back to the drawing board and work out the details of this so that most people 
can be satisfied" (McDonough 2000). 
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The consolidation referendum passed with a dual majority and an overall vote of 
approximately 54 percent for the consolidation. Clayton and Hagan (2003) note that the margin 
of support in the county increased significantly between the 1983 and 2000 votes. Most African 
Americans lived in the city in both of those elections, and a larger proportion of blacks voted 
against merger in 2000 than did in 1983, an increase of 6.9 percent from 74.8 percent against in 
1983 to 81.7 percent against in 2000 (Clayton and Hagan 2003). 
POST CONSOLIDATION BLACK POLITICAL POWER AND PARTICIPATION 
A unique provision of the merger legislation was that the representative districts were to 
be drawn not by elected officials, as is generally the case, but by a geography professor at the 
University of Louisville. Moreover, it also required that the Jefferson County Fiscal Court adopt 
the plan created by the geographer without making any amendments (Clayton and Hagan 2003). 
It did, however, allow for public hearings on the plan. 
Professor Bill Dakan drafted several versions for public comment before submitting the 
final version in July 2001. The major point of concern was the number of majority black districts, 
particularly since the U.S. Department of Justice was investigating whether the merger 
referendum passed into law violated the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (McDonough 2001, June 9). 
The initial plan, introduced in June, included five majority black districts with a sixth minority 
influence district including both blacks and Hispanics. In early July, other drafts for public 
comment reduced the number of minority districts to four, increased them to five, and added a 
sixth in the course of a few days in early July. The final plan included five majority black districts 
and a sixth minority district comprised of roughly 45 percent African Americans and 6 percent 
other non-white races (McDonough 2001, July 6). 
Blacks were elected to six of 26 council seats following the first metropolitan government 
election in 2002, a number repeated in the 2006 election. In terms of descriptive representation, 
this means that blacks continue to exceed proportional representation in local government in 
Louisville, holding approximately 23 percent of the council seats while compriSing roughly 19 
percent of Jefferson County's population. In terms of substantive representation, though, power 
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dynamics may have shifted for blacks. For several decades, blacks have identified strongly with 
the Democratic Party after the Republican Party shifted away from its party of Lincoln/Civil War 
era roots. As noted by Clayton and Hagan (2003), prior to consolidation, all 12 members of 
Louisville's Board of Aldermen were Democrats. The merging of the city and county 
governments split the power base among parties by incorporating suburbs more likely to vote 
Republican. In fact, on the first council, Republicans won 11 of the 26 seats (42 percent), a 
number maintained in the 2006 election. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
LOUISVILLE-JEFFERSON COUNTY DATA AND ANALYSIS 
As in Nashville and Jacksonville, race was a major issue in the push for consolidation in 
Louisville. The black community was divided in its support, with some black business and civic 
leaders campaigning for the consolidation and others speaking vociferously against it due 
primarily to concerns about representation. This chapter examines voter turnout in the two 
elections involving the mayor's race prior to consolidation and two following the consolidation and 
finds that, contrary to expectations, voter turnout increased over time. Moreover, a brief 
comparison to unconsolidated Covington is included, along with some possible explanations for 
changes in participation levels. 
Mayoral elections immediately preceding and following the consolidation were held in 
November 1989, November 1993, November 1998, November 2002, and November 2006. Prior 
to what would have been a 1997 mayoral election at the end of a third and final four-year term for 
incumbent mayor Jerry Abramson, there was a state-mandated transition in the election cycle to 
place local and federal elections on the same cycle. The 1992 constitutional amendment meant 
that the winner in the 1993 mayoral race would serve a five-year term, with the next mayoral race 
occurring in 1998 (Goodwin 1993). Because the Jefferson County Board of Elections was unable 
to locate precinct boundary maps and precinct-level turnout reports for 1989, this study will 
examine only two elections prior to city-county consolidation, 1993 and 1998. Figure 8.1 depicts 
a section of the large poster-size 2002 electoral map with Census tracts drawn. 
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Figure 8.1 
2002 Louisville Electoral Boundaries with Hand-drawn Tracts 
In 1990, there were 23 Census tracts in Jefferson County with populations over 70 
percent black. However, the boundaries of two of those tracts, 113.02 and 128.01, were located 
entirely or mostly outside of City of Louisville boundaries in Shively and the Newburg 
neighborhood respectively. In 2000, there were two fewer 70 percent black tracts in Jefferson 
County, for a total of 21. One of those , 113.02, was located outside the former city boundary in 




Composition of 70% Majority Black Tracts in Louisville-Jefferson County, 
1990-2000 
Tract 1990 Percent Black 2000 Percent Black 
4 81.02% 73.93% 
6 88.20% 94.17% 
7 95.43% 96.03% 
8 97.94% 97.84% 
9 94.77% 96.99% 
10 97.79% 98.76% 
11 98.32% 96.38% 
12 93.71% 97.90% 
13 99.52% * 
14 99.56% 96.49% 
15 95.27% 93.72% 
16 90.93% 92.34% 
17 99.34% 92.57% 
18 98.20% 95.55% 
20 93.53% * 
24 95.74% 92.97% 
27 96.09% 86.62% 
28 92.96% 83.88% 
30 91.33% 95.07% 
35 73.84% 78.52% 
62 73.43% 83.00% 
Outside former City boundary 
113.02 84.77% 87.90% 
128.01 74.26% * 
Note: Tracts marked with an astensk (*) denote that a maJonty black population or the tract was 
no longer extant. 
Over the four mayoral election cycles in Louisville, two occurring pre-consolidation and 
two post-consolidation, turnout among blacks and turnout among all voters followed the same 
pattern, although turnout in the majority black tracts remained at levels several percentage points 
below the overall turnout levels. Tables 2 through 5 offer detailed tract-specific turnout 
information for 70% majority-minority tracts for each of the years. Figure 8.1 presents a summary 
of black and overall turnout over the time period. 
In 1993, overall local turnout was approximately 41.3 percent. The black turnout rate was 
less than half that, at 20.14 percent. Turnout in black tracts varied widely, ranging from 6.01 
percent to 46.4 percent, although the range low and high seemed to be extreme outliers since 




1993 Louisville Mayoral Election Turnout, Majority Black Tracts 
Tract Total Voted 1990 Voting Age Tract Level Turnout 
Population 
4 679 3247 20.91% 
6 334 1338 24.99% 
7 595 2294 25.94% 
8 500 1862 26.85% 
9 215 1864 11.51% 
10 390 2026 19.25% 
11 974 2953 32.98% 
12 282 1690 16.66% 
13 425 916 46.40% 
14 207 1930 10.70% 
15 464 2539 18.27% 
16 428 2348 18.23% 
17 363 1992 6.01% 
18 76 1259 20.58% 
20 260 1261 15.46% 
24 297 1918 21.56% 
27 512 2375 28.46% 
28 432 1518 6.06% 
30 132 2170 29.72% 
35 336 1129 11.16% 
62 165 1479 17.44% 
TOTAL ALL 8076 40107 20.14% 
BLACK TRACTS 
For the 1998 election, overall local turnout was approximately 48.4 percent. The black 
turnout rate also increased, but continued to lag behind the overall level by nearly 20 percentage 
points at 29.81 percent. Turnout in black tracts varied widely, ranging from 8.08 percent to 65.72 
percent, although the range low and high seemed to be extreme outliers since nearly half of the 
tracts had turnout within a few percentage points of the turnout for all black tracts (see Table 8.3). 
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Table 8.3 
1998 Louisville Mayoral Election Turnout, Majority Black Tracts 
Tract Total Voted 1990 Voting Age Tract Level Turnout 
Population 
4 1004 3247 30.92% 
6 506 1338 37.82% 
7 962 2294 41.94% 
8 799 1862 42.88% 
9 313 1864 16.77% 
10 600 2026 29.60% 
11 1223 2953 41.42% 
12 403 1690 23.85% 
13 602 916 65.72% 
14 263 1930 13.63% 
15 706 2539 27.81% 
16 65 2348 28.32% 
17 370 1992 18.56% 
18 102 1259 8.08% 
20 417 1261 33.07% 
24 325 1918 16.94% 
27 741 2375 31.20% 
28 745 1518 49.08% 
30 278 2170 12.79% 
35 391 1129 34.59% 
62 541 1479 36.58% 
TOTAL ALL 11956 40107 29.81% 
BLACK TRACTS 
In 2002, the first "metro" election, overall local turnout was approximately 52.5 percent. The 
black turnout rate increased again, too, yet remained over 17 points behind at 35.29 percent. 
Turnout in black tracts varied widely, ranging from 12.49 percent to 69.95 percent, although the 
range low and high seemed to be outliers of sorts since several of the tracts had turnout within a 
few percentage points of the turnout for all black tracts (see Table 8.4). 
In 2006, overall local turnout was approximately 53 percent, virtually unchanged from 2002. 
The black turnout rate, at 38.34 percent, gained some ground against the overall turnout rate. 
However, several pieces of missing data for 2006 make comparison difficult. For two-thirds of the 
19 Census tracts, turnout information for some of the precincts matching the tracts, according to 
the available map, was unavailable on the precinct turnout report for 2006. This may mean that 
the map was an incorrect version or that election data were incomplete. However, the available 
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Table 8.4 
2002 Louisville Mayoral Election Turnout, Majority Black Tracts 
Tract Total Voted 2000 Voting Age Tract Level Turnout 
Population 
4 1382 3621 38.17% 
6 503 1002 50.20% 
7 812 2176 37.29% 
8 1226 1752 69.95% 
9 620 1666 37.21% 
10 907 1967 46.11% 
11 1209 2711 44.60% 
12 1147 2248 51.02% 
14 282 807 34.94% 
15 685 2213 30.95% 
16 686 2236 30.68% 
17 226 1810 12.49% 
18 443 1222 36.25% 
24 .. 3590 .. 
27 .. 2317 .. 
28 725 1371 52.88% 
30 580 1996 29.06% 
35 .. 1136 .. 
62 282 1500 18.80% 
TOTAL ALL 13178 37341 35.29% 
BLACK TRACTS 
Note: Astensk (*) denotes partial missing data/Incomplete information. 
data for the majority black tracts indicate a continuity of trend, which may lend some credibility to 
the map. 
Over the study period, the trend in voter turnout in the majority black tracts mirrored that 
of overall local turnout (see Figure 8.1). A nine-percent jump in the black tracts and a seven-
percent jump overall occurred between 1993 and 1998, when the election for mayor was on the 
same ballot as federal offices, which would have been expected; turnout has historically been 
higher for state and national office elections than for local offices. Moreover, both overall turnout 
and turnout in the black tracts increased by four to five percentage points between 1998 and the 
first metro election. Finally, only a minor increase-less than one percent-was seen overall 
between 2002 and 2006, although the few available data for the black tracts indicates a three-
percent gain; that figure may be an artifact of too few cases. 
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Table 8.5 
2006 Louisville Mayoral Election Turnout, Majority Black Tracts 
Tract Total Voted 2000 Voting Age Tract Level Turnout 
Population 
4 1343 3621 37.09% 
6 " 1002 " 
7 * 2176 • 
8 " 1752 " 
9 " 1666 " 
10 " 1967 " 
11 " 2711 " 
12 1178 2248 52.40% 
14 434 807 53.78% 
15 707 2213 31.95% 
16 689 2236 30.81% 
17 * 1810 " 
18 383 1222 31.34% 
24 * 3590 " 
27 " 2317 " 
28 * 1371 • 
30 " 1996 " 
35 * 1136 • 
62 " 1500 " 
TOTAL ALL 4734* 12347* 38.34%" 
BLACK TRACTS 
Note: Asterisk (*) denotes partial missing data/mcomplete mformatlon. 
Fifteen of the tracts experienced continued increases in voter turnout over time, although 
two of the tracts, 13 and 20, didn't exist in 2000 and two more tracts, 27 and 35, only had two 
years of complete data for comparison, and data on only three cycles were available for six 
others, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 28. Furthermore, it is also notable that for tracts 12 and 14, the 
amounts of increase in turnout were much larger than the overall trends, e.g., turnout more than 
doubled for each between 1998 and 2002. 
Although this study is not including the 1989 election, some background context from the 
1989 election and overall turnout can inform the analysis of Louisville-Jefferson County. In 1989, 
the incumbent mayor, Democrat Jerry Abramson was running for re-election to a second term. He 
was able to run again after a 1986 constitutional amendment that made Abramson "the first 
mayor in this century who had the right to succeed himself" (McDonough, November 8, 1989). 
When he had won his first term in 1985, turnout in all of Jefferson County for municipal elections 
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was 41 percent. Because of a 20 percent decline in the Jefferson County voter rolls and the lack 
of serious opposition-there was no Republican candidate, only a little-known independent-to 
the popular Abramson, numbers of voters at the polls were expected to be lower. A large portion 
of the decline in voter registration was attributed to actions by state and local election officials. 
State officials purged about 50,000 Jefferson County voters because they had not voted in the 
prior four years. Local officials dropped another 25,000 after their voter registration cards could 
not be delivered. The largest decline, however, was among black voters. The number of black 
registered voters dropped about 25 percent between 1985 and 1989 after sustained growth in the 
1970s and early 1980s achieved in part by NAACP voter-registration drive efforts (McDonough 
November 6, 1989). However, there had been some broad interest in the local race for Jefferson 
County Judge-Executive, which made news for candidates David Armstrong and John G. 
Heyburn II each raising and/or spending over a million dollars (McDonough, November 8, 1989). 
Moreover, there had been a degree of public controversy after the Louisville Board of Aldermen 
voted to raise their own pay by 40 percent, an unpopular move vetoed by Mayor Abramson 
(McDonough, November 7, 1989). 
The 1993 election would be the last time that Jerry Abramson could run for Louisville 
mayor. A 1986 constitutional change limited mayors to three terms (Goodwin 1993). Abramson 
had remained very popular and did not face strong opposition; he defeated the Republican 
candidate, Tommy Klein, by a margin of greater than four-to-one. Overall turnout was 41.3 
percent. 
In 1998, the very popular Abramson was unable to run for mayor again, and popular two-
term County Judge-Executive David Armstrong decided to run for mayor. Even though polling 
indicated that it wasn't a tight mayoral race, turnout was expected to be higher than in the 
previous mayoral contest because it was coinciding with a federal election, with former baseball 
star Jim Bunning running for U.S. Senate and Congresswoman Anne Northup seeking a second 
term (Shafer 1998). Overall voter turnout was 48.4 percent. 
The 2002 election was the first for the new "metro" government and the second to 
coincide with a federal election. Former Louisville mayor Jerry Abramson handily won the 
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Democratic primary and faced only moderate competition from Republican Jack Early, but all 26 
council seats were at stake. Overall turnout in the county, which closely mirrors the metropolitan 
boundary with the exception of some small cities enclosed within, was 52.5 percent, representing 
a small bump post-consolidation. 
In 2006, there was another metro mayor race, this time with Abramson facing tougher 
competition from popular Republican council member Kelly Downard. Additionally, half of the 
metro council seats were up for grabs due to the staggered election cycle (13 seats elected every 
two years) outlined in the metropolitan charter. Countywide turnout was 53 percent. 
Figure 8.1 
Louisville Voter Turnout 
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The unconsolidated city of Covington, located in northern Kentucky in the Cincinnati, 
Ohio metropolitan area, might be used as a comparison to consolidated Louisville-Jefferson 
County as a means of screening for possible voter turnout effects of consolidation. According to 
the main hypothesis , one might expect that the voting pattern would be different in the two sites, 
with voting decreasing over time in Louisville's municipal elections and at a minimum decreasing 
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Table 8.6 
Comparison of Turnout Over Time, Louisville 
Year Black Turnout Overall Turnout 
1993 20.14% 41.3% 
1998 29.81% 48.4% 
2002 35.29% 52.5% 
2006 38.34% 53.0% 
at a smaller rate in Covington. However, Louisville has shown a small increase in overall voter 
turnout and slightly larger increase in black voter turnout post-consolidation. In Covington, voter 
turnout decreased considerably and consistently in the four elections leading up to 2008, with the 
largest decrease occurring between 1992 and 1996, when turnout dropped twenty points from 
75.7 percent to 55.7 percent. Further declines occurred in 2000 (51.4 percent) and again in 2004 
(47.7 percent). Jefferson County, Kenton County, and Kentucky each saw an overall decrease 
over the same time period beginning with a precipitous drop in 1996; however, each gained back 
some of the losses to end up no more than 10 to 13 percent down over time, compared to the 
difference of 30 percent in Covington. It could be that lack of strength in local races in Covington 
translated into lack of voter interest, or it could be a change in demographics in Covington. 
Figure 8.2 depicts Covington overall voter turnout over time, which follows the opposite trend of 
Louisville turnout (see Figure 8.1). The fact that Covington's mayoral elections were held 
concurrently with presidential elections, however, as well as the fact that none of the elections 
were held in coinciding years, makes comparison to Louisville difficult. 
Socioeconomic Factors 
As in Jacksonville and Nashville, the wide range in turnout in the black tracts for given election 
election years in Louisville lends itself to further analysis. It is possible that election-specific 
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Figure 8.2 
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factors played a role, such as the race in a particular district, but the fact that lower turnout and 
higher turnout numbers seem to be concentrated in the same areas over time suggests that voter 
characteristics might playa role. As hypothesized, socioeconomic differences between the tracts 
might explain some of the difference in turnout. Initial plans for this dissertation called for 
exploration of income, poverty levels, educational attainment, age, and housing tenure as 
contributors to spatial differences in black participation levels. Due to data availability restrictions, 
however, age has been removed. The Census reports historically have not included median age 
on a tract basis; rather, population by age groups has been reported. Therefore, only a median 
age group, with a range of multiple years, could be calculated, and the usefulness thereof was 
minimal. Moreover, any analysis of the poverty population must be restricted to post-1960s 
elections, since the concept of a poverty line was established in the 1960s and data were not 
reported for the 1960 Census. Since age and poverty were not analyzed in the context of 
elections adjacent to the earlier consolidations, they are also excluded from the analysis of 
Louisville. 
It was hypothesized that as educational attainment increased, voter participation would 
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increase. Tract level educational attainment data for Louisville were reported differently than the 
data reported for Nashville and Jacksonville in the 1960s and 1970s. Rather than a median year 
of schooling, e.g., 10.7, data were grouped into categories of highest level completed, such as 
less eighth grade, less than high school, some college, etc. For the case of Louisville, turnout by 
educational attainment is examined in terms of the percent of the population 25 and older that 
has completed an associate degree or higher. In each of the majority black tracts, educational 
attainment levels were low, at best slightly over half of the county-wide level. The data are 
somewhat contrary to expectations. In 1993, for example, higher levels of attainment 
corresponded with higher turnout levels and lower levels of education with lower turnout levels 
just about as many times as it didn't, although several in the middle of the education range were 
also in the middle of the turnout range. The situation was much the same in 1998 and 2002, with 
data mixed with occasional exceptions/extremes but mostly middling tendencies. Too much 
information was missing from 2006 for analysis purposes (see Table 8.7). Overall, educational 
attainment might not explain much of the difference in voting turnout among black tracts. 
It was also hypothesized that as income increased, voter turnout would increase. Income 
was measured in terms of tract median household income as a percentage of area median 
household income. Although there were some mixed results, in all years, the higher income 
levels had the higher turnout rates and the lowest were among the lowest (see Table 8.8). It 
should be noted, however, that the highest incomes did not always equal the highest tumout. In 
some cases, the top four or five in income were several spaces apart when ranked by turnout 
percentage. Overall, due to the small number of tracts and the fact that there were multiple 
exceptions to the expectations, it appears that income may not explain much of the difference 
among turnout in black tracts. 
Tenure status, as measured by the homeownership rate, showed mixed correlations with 
turnout over the years, although of the three socioeconomic variables being analyzed, there were 
fewer exceptions to expectations. For example, in 1993, 1998, and 2002, two-thirds of the top 
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Table 8.7 
Comparison of Educational Attainment (median for population 25 and older) 
and Voter Turnout by Tract, Louisville, 1993-2006 
Tract Percent Turnout Turnout Percent Turnout Turnout 
with 1993 1998 with 2002 2006 
associate associate 
or higher or higher 
1990 2000 
4 15.79% 20.91% 30.92% 14.91% 38.17% 37.09% 
6 14.05% 24.99% 37.82% 9.23% 50.20% ** 
7 6.83% 25.94% 41.94% 12.44% 37.29% ** 
8 15.95% 26.85% 42.88% 17.25% 69.95% ** 
9 12.39% 11.51% 16.77% 20.66% 37.21% ** 
10 8.92% 19.25% 29.60% 9.2% 46.11% ** 
11 14.54% 32.98% 41.42% 17.87% 44.60% ** 
12 8.87% 16.66% 23.85% 16.11% 51.02% 52.40% 
13* 10.74% 46.40% 65.72% * * * 
14 4.4% 10.70% 13.63% 13.33% 34.94% 53.78% 
15 9.57% 18.27% 27.81% 12.94% 30.95% 31.95% 
16 8.78% 18.23% 28.32% 12.26% 30.68% 30.81% 
17 5.52% 6.01% 18.56% 11.94% 12.49% ** 
18 7.34% 20.58% 8.08% 7.63% 36.25% 31.34% 
20* 11.9% 15.46% 33.07% * * * 
24 3.4% 21.56% 16.94% 10.11% ** ** 
27 6.17% 28.46% 31.20% 7.71% ** ** 
28 7.76% 6.06% 49.08% 9.62% 52.88% ** 
30 4.01% 29.72% 12.79% 5.52% 29.06% ** 
35 2.13% 11.16% 34.59% 3.14% ** ** 
62 2.64% 17.44% 36.58% 6.9% 18.80% ** 
Jefferson 24.57% 41.3% 48.4% 30.42% 52.5% 53.0% 
County 
Note: Astensk (*) indicated tract did not eXist that year. Double astensk (**) indicated missing 
data. 
three in terms of tenure were also in the top three in terms of turnout. In 2006, there were too 
few tracts with complete data for comparison. Again, as with educational attainment and income, 
there were many in the middle of the range in terms of percent of residents who owned their 
home that were mixed in terms of expectations, and there were a couple of outliers, such as 
tracts 15 and 30 (see Table 8.9). Therefore, although tenure appears to have a closer 
relationship to turnout than income and education, it may not be useful in explaining the 
difference in turnout among black tracts. It is possible, then, that specific races, i.e., candidates, 
may have played a role in the turnout levels. 
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Table 8.8 
Comparison of Household Median Income (as percentage of area median income) and 
Voter Turnout by Tract, Louisville, 1993-2006 
Tract Household Turnout Turnout Household Turnout Turnout 
Income, % 1993 1998 Income, % 2002 2006 
of Area, of Area, 
1989 1999 
4 89.15% 20.91% 30.92% 66.93% 38.17% 37.09% 
6 54.36% 24.99% 37.82% 44.30% 50.20% ** 
7 61.85% 25.94% 41.94% 67,63% 37.29% ** 
8 99.86% 26.85% 42.88% 73.83% 69.95% ** 
9 49.15% 11.51% 16.77% 67.62% 37.21% ** 
10 51.47% 19.25% 29.60% 44.02% 46.11% ** 
11 73.75% 32.98% 41.42% 60.15% 44.60% ** 
12 63.64% 16.66% 23.85% 68.91% 51.02% 52.40% 
13* 83.05% 46.40% 65.72% * * * 
14 19.70% 10.70% 13.63% 53.28% 34.94% 53.78% 
15 57.24% 18.27% 27.81% 55.33% 30.95% 31.95% 
16 61.44% 18.23% 28.32% 79.65% 30.68% 30.81% 
17 74.82% 6.01% 18.56% 58.08% 12.49% ** 
18 36.21% 20.58% 8.08% 35.54% 36.25% 31.34% 
20* 41.72% 15.46% 33.07% * * * 
24 32.61% 21.56% 16.94% 39.37% ** ** 
27 31.30% 28.46% 31.20% 39.41% ** ** 
28 44.76% 6.06% 49.08% 60.15% 52.88% ** 
30 18.45% 29.72% 12.79% 17.09% 29.06% ** 
35 18.45% 11.16% 34.59% 15.42% ** ** 
62 23.83% 17.44% 36.58% 32.86% 18.80% ** 
Louisville in Summary 
Black voter turnout in Louisville increased steadily over the study years. The trend 
mirrored an overall climb in voter turnout that continued following the consolidation of Louisville 
and JeffE~rson County. Table 8.10 outlines changes in black voter turnout and possible 
explanations. The largest increase in black voter turnout, nearly 10 percent, occurred between 
1993 and 1998, when state legislation required the municipal elections to coincide with federal 
elections cycles. It is not surprising to see higher turnout for higher offices. 
Turnout among blacks increased 5.5 percent in the first mayoral election following 
consolidation, with overall turnout also increasing by over four percent. Overall turnout was 



























Comparison of Tenure (homeownership percentage) 
and Voter Turnout by Tract, Louisville, 1993-2006 
Percent Turnout Turnout Percent Turnout 
Owned 1993 1998 Owned 2002 
1990 2000 
79.81% 20.91% 30.92% 69.45% 38.17% 
56.73% 24.99% 37.82% 51.90% 50.20% 
67.53% 25.94% 41.94% 56.97% 37.29% 
81.24% 26.85% 42.88% 74.24% 69.95% 
53.77% 11.51% 16.77% 53.36% 37.21% 
63.95% 19.25% 29.60% 52.56% 46.11% 
75.20% 32.98% 41.42% 70.36% 44.60% 
72.07% 16.66% 23.85% 71.77% 51.02% 
77.78% 46.40% 65.72% * * 
12.83% 10.70% 13.63% 35.10% 34.94% 
63.55% 18.27% 27.81% 61.57% 30.95% 
68.69% 18.23% 28.32% 59.93% 30.68% 
70.39% 6.01% 18.56% 61.20% 12.49% 
59.19% 20.58% 8.08% 45.48% 36.25% 
49.21% 15.46% 33.07% * * 
38.36% 21.56% 16.94% 29.70% ** 
45.15% 28.46% 31.20% 41.64% ** 
43.51% 6.06% 49.08% 61.22% 52.88% 
2.80% 29.72% 12.79% 0.37% 29.06% 
15.08% 11.16% 34.59% 16.56%% ** 
38.99% 17.44% 36.58% 58.34% 18.80% 

























percent. It is possible that the first election following consolidation was a first-blush effect related 
to interest in the new government and voter mobilization generated by the spirited campaign and 
districting process. If that were the case, it might be expected that future elections would show 




Black Turnout Changes and Possible Factors 
Time Period Change Factors/Notes 
1993-1998 +9.7 percent Similar trend in overall voting; 
popular long-serving mayor 
met term limits, new mayor to 
be elected 
1998-2002 +5.5 percent Similar trend in overall voting; 
election coincided with federal 
election 
2002-2006 +3.0 percent Up slightly more than overall 
increase; may be related to 
particular races 
As in Nashville and Jacksonville, in terms of the differences in turnout among the black 
electoral districts, the socioeconomic variables examined did not appear to consistently explain 
variations. There were some apparent correlations between turnout and income, education 
levels, and tenure, respectively, with tenure showing the strongest possibilities. However, several 
exceptions make it likely that other factors, whether socioeconomic or political, such as the 




This study examined large-scale metropolitan city-county consolidations in terms of 
impact of the government reorganization on black voter participation. The primary hypothesis 
was that black voter turnout in local government elections decreases following large-scale 
consolidations. Rationale for the hypothesis was that blacks, concentrated in the central city, 
would perceive dilution of their voting power with the addition of suburban residents to the city 
voting pool, be discouraged, and therefore not participate. 
The hypothesis was tested in three of the four truly large-scale city-county consolidations 
(Detailed analysis could not be performed for Indianapolis, though data from an existing study 
indicated a rise in black voter participation that mirrored an overall rise in participation; see 
APPENDIX B.). Based on the evidence, the data do not support the hypothesis. Table 9.1 
outlines the direction of change over the study period in each of the three cities. In only one 
case, Jacksonville, did black voter turnout experience a notable and consistent post-consolidation 
decrease. 
Table 9.1 
Summary: Change in Black Voter Turnout and Support of Hypothesis 
City Change, pre- Change, first post- Hypothesis 




Nashville Increase Increase No 
Jacksonville Decrease Decrease Yes 
Louisville Increase Increase No 
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Although the data do not appear to support the hypothesis that city-county consolidation 
negatively impacts black voter turnout, the results of this study do not necessarily indicate that 
black voters do not perceive a loss of power and change their levels of political participation. A 
few points should be considered. First, given quality and availability limitations on maps and 
voter turnout records, as well as the fact that Census and electoral boundaries did not always 
perfectly coincide, it may be that that data accuracy issues skew actual trends. The types and 
quality of data available varied among the cities, and in some cases, from year to year in the 
same city, so some approximations were made. Missing or poor quality data and approximations 
may have led to errors and inaccuracies or created validity issues. Secondly, decisions in how to 
ope rationalize the research may have affected the validity of the study. For example, why choose 
only elections in which the mayor's race was included? Did the choice to use the election, 
whether primary or general, or run-off, in which the mayor was elected, mask voter behavior in 
some way? Finally, comparison of the cities reveals unique circumstances may help explain the 
differences in outcomes among the sites. 
Nashville was the first of the cities to consolidate. It shared many similarities with 
Jacksonville. First, neither had a black elected to municipal office for most of the first half of the 
twentieth century, and beyond in the case of the latter. Both cities were reform-minded; 
annexation either occurred or was a serious threat in both. Moreover, Jacksonville had 
undergone government reorganization in the early 1950s. Nashville had previously attempted 
city-county consolidation. Both cities had experienced rapid suburban growth and resulting 
infrastructure and service provision shortfalls, as well as eroded tax bases in the city. Corruption 
was cited by merger proponents in both cities, though an actual legal case was made in 
Jacksonville. 
Although Nashville's consolidation occurred prior to national civil rights and voting rights 
legislation, the study period includes that era. Jacksonville's consolidation occurred in the height 
of awareness of these issues. Indianapolis's consolidation also happened around the same 
period, though its situation is unique altogether because the consolidation was not a voter 
decision; rather it resulted directly from action, considered highly partisan-based, of the state 
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legislature. 
As was the case in Nashville, the black community in Jacksonville was somewhat divided 
over the consolidation proposal. In Nashville, the two black council members were split among 
the two black factions in the community, with Looby a proponent and Lillard against it. Similarly, in 
Jacksonville, Sallye Mathis campaigned for the merger, while Mary Singleton was an outspoken 
opponent. A key difference between the two cities is that in Jacksonville, the black population 
was on the verge of becoming a majority. With blacks gaining political power, perhaps the desire 
to maintain newly-acquired power and potential for more immediate representation (even if it 
meant a diluted population in the long term) drove blacks to the polls in larger numbers for the 
first election. 
When compared to Louisville's much later consolidation, Nashville does share a few 
similarities in that both stood to potentially lose black representation if the mergers occurred, 
though the situation in Louisville was arguably a stronger threat since it was already entirely 
single-member district-based and black council representation was proportional to population. 
Blacks in Jacksonville felt it to an extent, too, though they had just elected the first blacks in over 
five decades months prior to the consolidation; because of "white flight" to the suburbs, blacks 
were well on their way to comprising half of the city's population, with the potential to elect more 
black representatives and a black mayor. Even in unique Indianapolis, blacks were concerned 
about the impending legislative action because the existing system more or less guaranteed one 
black council member, and they were becoming a larger proportion of the city's population as 
whites relocated to new suburban developments. 
Although Louisville did not share the "crisis" type situations experienced by Jacksonville 
and Nashville, such as the threat of school disaccreditation or lack of adequate sewer services, 
there was concern over the looming expiration of The Compact that provided for revenue sharing 
between the City of Louisville and Jefferson County. 
With all the similarities, then, why were the trends in black voter turnout so different for 
the cities? Turnout in Nashville remained fairly level over time but spiked in 1971. The lack of a 
decrease between 1962 and 1966 may have been an artifact of voting rights legislation, though 
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comparative analysis of Memphis indicates that it wasn't a strong factor in municipal turnout. 
Rather, hot-button issues or individual races may have contributed heavily to the difference. The 
jump between 1966 and 1971 levels was probably largely attributable to the strong candidacy of a 
segregationist in the mayoral race run-off. 
Jacksonville's political climate was especially unique in that over 90 percent of voters 
were registered as Democrats, so there were rarely any realistically-contended partisan 
races/general elections, especially for mayor. The partisan makeup has tended to remain largely-
Democrat. The real races were in the primaries and run-offs. Also unlike the other cities, 
Jacksonville, at over 40 percent black, was on the cusp of becoming majority-black and 
experienced the highest level of what amounts to minority vote dilution, whether intentional or not; 
the black proportion of the voting pool was cut by more than half with the consolidation. 
Louisville's trend is complicated by the change in election cycles. In the last election prior 
to consolidation, the municipal election cycle underwent a state-mandated change to coincide 
with federal elections years. That arguably led to an increase in turnout across the board, as 
turnout for state and local offices has been shown to generally be higher than for municipal 
elections. The largest increase was seen between 1993 and 1998, when that change occurred. 
Still, a slight increase occurred again between 1998 and 2002, when the first "metro" election was 
held, and again between 2002 and 2006. The trend occurred among all voters as well as among 
black voters, suggesting that perhaps the increase was a factor of the state and federal races, 
although there could have been some "first blush" effects of consolidation since the 2002 election 
was the second to coincide with elections for federal offices. 
Although some wide ranges were seen in voter turnout among the black tracts, 
preliminary analysis of socioeconomic differences yielded mixed results that were sometimes 
contrary to expectations but mostly across the spectrum. In general, levels of educational 
attainment, income, and tenure status did not initially appear to explain much of the differences 
among the areas. 
This study contributes to the literature on city-county consolidations by addressing a little-
examined topic in the field. Equity for minorities, and minority political participation in particular, 
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has been one of the major arguments against city-county consolidation, yet few studies have 
addressed it beyond enumerating the numbers of black elected officials. Three major sets of 
conclusions can be drawn from the analysis. 
First, students of metropolitan government should take away from the analysis that other 
facets of local politics may be much stronger factors than government structure in terms of the 
level of voter turnout. A particular "hot button" issue, a scandal, partisan concerns, strength of 
candidates, or lack thereof, may draw voters or keep them away from the polls. 
Secondly, the problems of data availability should impress upon policymakers that 
detailed election results and election geographies should be a priority for preservation in 
perpetuity, not disposal after three decades (or only a matter of years in some cases). If physical 
storage space is an issue, documents may be scanned and stored electronically, which can also 
help prevent loss in case of deterioration of paper versions. 
Thirdly, future research might improve upon this study by extending the study periods for 
voter turnout by race in consolidated cities. Further analysis could also explore the differences in 
turnout among black voting districts by examining the particular races in each district for strength 
of races and interest in candidates and/or conducting survey research on electoral participation of 
large numbers of individual black voters to be able to conduct rigorous and significant statistical 
analysis of the relationships between turnout and socioeconomic and other variables. Moreover, 
more research on voter turnout by race in municipal elections in all types of cities, as opposed to 
state and local elections, is needed. Finally, future research should include the exploration of 
other equity concerns beyond electoral representation for minorities in consolidated cities, such 
as more detailed analysis of the distribution of local resources and services by racial composition 
of neighborhoods vis a vis political representation. 
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APPENDIX A 
TECHNIQUES FOR MATCHING GEOGRAPHY 
Most of the maps utilized for this study~Census or electoral~were not geo-coded to 
allow more precise comparison and analysis of the overlapping boundary systems. In some 
cases, available electoral district maps were large scale and clearly marked with street 
boundaries, which made it relatively easy to compare them to Census tract maps and draw 
, 
Census boundaries onto the electoral map. This was the case in Jacksonville for all years 
studied. In other cases, such as some of the years in Nashville for which only small-scale 
electoral maps were available, a lack of detailed municipal boundaries in the electoral maps 
made matching them to Census tract geography by "eyeballing" difficult. In those cases, the 
smaller-scale electoral maps were scanned. Next, using image manipulation software, the 
electoral map was scaled to match the Census tract map and then added to the Census tract 
map as an image layer as seen below in Figure A. This type of matching is possible when a 
common geographic feature and/or municipal boundaries, such as major roads, are marked in 
both maps. In the case of Nashville, the Cumberland River that snakes along an east-west line 
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Figure A. 





BLACK POLITICS AND INDIANAPOLIS GOVERNMENT PRIOR TO CONSOLIDATION 
Prior to consolidation, the separate entities of Indianapolis and Marion County were 
governed by a mayor-council system with a strong mayor and a county commission respectively 
(Owen and Willbern 1985). The city generally had a Democrat majority on the nine-member 
council. 
Council members were elected on an at-large, city-wide basis. Each party could 
nominate six candidates for council. Since blacks comprised over a quarter of the population and 
could influence election outcomes, both parties typically nominated five white candidates and one 
black candidate. Each voter was allowed to cast nine votes. All six candidates from the winning 
party were seated, and the top three from the losing party were also seated. With Democrats in 
power, it was not uncommon to have one black council member (Pierce 2005). 
Unlike prior consolidations in Nashville-Davidson County and Jacksonville-Duval County, 
and the more recent Louisville-Jefferson County merger, Indianapolis and Marion County 
consolidated following not a successful public referendum but by an act of the state legislature. 
The consolidation was championed by new Republican Mayor Richard Lugar (who later 
became a prominent U.S. Senator) and passed by a Republican legislature. 
The political setting that ultimately made Unigov's passage possible developed in 
two stages. First, the power of the Republican Party in Marion County was 
substantially enhanced by the Republican Action Committee's 1966 party 
reorganization campaign. This brought a whole company of ambitious and far-
sighted newcomers into the party and got many of them elected to city, county, 
and state offices in the succeeding two years. Mayor Lugar was among them. 
The second stage was set when a single party got control of all the key 
instruments of government at both state and local levels in 1968 ... [P]erhaps the 
most obvious illustration of the partisan impact on the debate was in the General 
Assembly. The wholly Republican Marion County delegation was nearly 
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unanimous in support, and the large statewide Republican majority assured 
passage of the Unigov bills (Owen and Willbern 1985, p.1 01-1 02). 
There had been a "widely held perception by the citizenry that local government was 
inefficient, ineffective, and unresponsive" according to Stephens and Wikstrom (2000, p. 81). 
Presumably, this led to the success of Republicans in electing a mayor, Richard Lugar, in 1967, 
along with a majority of seats on the city council and several county offices. When Republicans 
also dominated elections for state positions in 1968, a virtual mandate was given for change. 
Mayor Lugar formed a Task Force on Governmental Reorganization in the spring of 
1968. Forty business and civic leaders were named to the task force, but an executive committee 
consisting of the city and county council chairmen (both Republicans), Lugar and his deputy 
mayor, and four others did the bulk of the work and used the larger group as a "sounding board" 
in four meetings. Two meetings were held with the Marion County legislative delegation and a 
"blueprint for consolidation" was approved in mid-December (Schreiber, not dated, p.8). Charles 
Whistler of the executive committee and a group of lawyers assembled under the direction of 
Lugar drafted a 162-page bill for consolidation that was introduced in the Indiana State Senate on 
January 21, 1969. The Senate approved an amended bill in February following two public 
hearings. The House approved the bill on March 5 and the Senate concurred with technical 
amendments. The "Unigov Act" was signed by the governor on March 13. 
Some may consider the reorganization a political power grab. In 1969, Marion County 
Republican chairman Keith Bulen called it his "greatest coup of all time, moving out there and 
taking in 85,000 Republicans" (Blomquist and Parks 1995, p. 50; also quoted in Schreiber, not 
dated). Schreiber (not dated) posits that "Unigov was primarily a political act intended to 
perpetuate Republican control of Indianapolis city government" (p. 23). 
Representation issues 
Black leaders in Indianapolis were generally opposed to consolidation on the grounds 
that it would dilute black political power. Although blacks comprised only about a quarter of the 
pre-Unigov city population, blacks felt that they had a strong voice and growing power in the 
dominant Democratic Party in the city. However, there was never a strong black opposition to the 
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Unigov legislation, just as there was never a highly organized campaign in general against 
Unigov; only four people from the "black community" spoke against Unigov at legislative public 
hearings (Owen and Willbern 1985). Stephens and Wikstrom (2000) note that along with 
Democrats, black leaders, and suburbanites failed to create effective opposition. 
[A] score of Democratic activists opposed the reorganization out of partisan self-
interest, perceiving that the reorganization of government would provide the 
Republicans with a significant advantage in city politics. Second, a number of 
African-American political leaders opposed the reorganization proposal, 
concerned that it would dilute the political power of their community and 
effectively preclude, at least in the short term, the election of an African-American 
mayor. And, third, many suburbanites who had recently departed from the city 
negatively viewed the plan because it would once again make them city 
residents. The strength of these forces opposed to reorganization, however, 
dissipated over time, due to internal divisions (Stephens and Wikstrom 2000, p. 
82). 
Frank Lloyd, a well-known black doctor and influential Democrat in the 1960s, 
commented that blacks lacked organized leadership in general and were divided on Unigov 
(Pierce 2005; Owen & Willbern 1995). 
POST CONSOLIDATION BLACK POLITICAL POWER AND PARTICIPATION 
The bill was passed by the state legislature and signed in March 1969, and the new 
consolidated government took effect on January 1, 1970 (Stephens and Wikstrom 2000). 
Consolidated Indianapolis-Marion County had a 29-member council, with 25 seats 
elected from single-member districts and four members elected at-large. In theory, the new 
political structure would give black voters a chance to elect more than one black council member, 
as had been the norm under the old system. Pierce (2005, p. 122) notes that the "percentage of 
black candidates seated on the county council has increased," though most have been 
Democrats on a Republican-dominated council. 
In terms of political power and participation, Blomquist and Parks (1995) claim that 
What may be Unigov's clearest and longest lasting impact on central-city 
residents is that the consolidation solidified Republican party control of city 
government, which had been controlled most often by the Democratic party 
during the two decades before Unigov. Politically, the Republican-dominated 
county took over the marginally Democratic city (Blomquist and Parks 1995, p. 
50). 
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Blomquist and Parks (1995) find that the first two elections following Unigov saw increased voter 
turnout in general but that participation began decreasing considerably thereafter. Participation in 
local elections had climbed from a low of 41.1 percent in 1959 to 45.2 percent in 1967, when 
Lugar was elected, then grew to 53.8 percent in 1971. It remained fairly steady in 1975 at 52.4 
percent, but had fallen to 33.6 percent just four years later in 1979. Blomquist and Parks attribute 
the drop-off to the "message that Democrats could not win under Unigov" that was conveyed in 
1975 when Democratic candidate Robert Welch lost to Republican William Hudnut despite 
carrying the pre-consolidation city. 
Turnout in the 1979 municipal elections, and in all municipal elections since, 
indicates that central-city Democratic voters have adjusted their behavior 
accordingly. In 1979, 60,000 fewer Marion County residents voted in the mayor's 
race than had done so in 1975. Yet Hudnut's 1979 vote total was almost 
identical to that of 1975. In other words, between 1975 and 1979, 60,000 
potential Democratic votes disappeared from Indianapolis'[s] municipal 
elections ... Most of that loss occurred in the precincts of the old central city. 
These voters did not leave the city, nor did many of them leave the voter 
registration rolls. Most of them continued to vote in state and national elections. 
(Blomquist and Parks 1995, p. 52). 
BLACK POLITICAL PARTICIPATION DATA & ANALYSIS 
Data and availability issues 
The new metropolitan government took effect in 1970, with the first election for 
metropolitan officials taking place in November 1971. For consideration in this study, mayoral 
elections relatively immediately prior to and following the consolidation approval were held in 
Indianapolis in 1963, 1967, 1971, and 1975. 
In 1960, 19 Census tracts in Indianapolis were greater than 50 percent black. Of these, 
14 tracts had a black population above 70 percent. There were 35 Census tracts that were over 
50 percent black in 1970, 27 of which had a black population over 70 percent. 
Although there were no Census tract geographic boundary changes between the 1960 
and 1970 Census, the population demographics within the tracts and Marion County appear to 
have changed considerably. All but one of the 1960 majority black tracts were located within the 
Center Township, which was also the location of all but three of the 1970 majority black tracts. 
Center Township, representing the city center and central business district areas and the bulk of 
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the pre-consolidation Indianapolis boundary, experienced a large overall population decline 
between 1960 and 1970 of nearly 18 percent, losing nearly 60,000 people in a drop from 333,351 
to 273,596. Simultaneously, the black population in Center Township increased by over 18.6 
percent, from 89,439 to 106,124, a gain of 16,685 blacks. Together, these two trends brought the 
black population portion of the central city from 26.83 percent to 38.79 percent. 19 
Stickles (1973) studied black voter participation in the pre-consolidation Indianapolis city 
in six elections between 1966 and 1972, including the mayoral elections in 1967 and 1971. 
Grouping precincts into Black (75 percent or greater black), Mixed (25-74 percent black), or White 
(0-24 percent black), Stickles found that voter participation increased for all categories between 
1967 and 1971 (pre- and post-consolidation). Turnout in "black" precincts increased by 10 
percentage points, from 45.47 to 55.66 percent. Participation in "white" precincts increased by 12 
percent, from 52.46 to 64.57 percent. Differences between the races were much smaller when 
socioeconomic status in terms of income group and education level was controlled (Stickles 
1973). 
Although turnout increased for both racial groups, it should be noted that not only did the 
white turnout percentage increase by more than the black turnout, but the gap between white and 
black turnout increased from about seven percent to about nine percent. 
Unfortunately, complete precinct level data on registration, turnout, and precinct maps 
that Stickles obtai Red from the "city-county building in Indianapolis" are no longer available from 
local or state government sources. An exhaustive effort was made to locate data and maps, with 
government offices, university sources, newspaper archives, and other sources consulted. The 
Marion County Election Commission did not house detailed municipal election data prior to the 
1980s. The Indiana State Board of Elections and Indiana State Library held only county level 
figures. Some historical precinct level results were available at the Indiana State Archives, 
though not for municipal elections. The Indianapolis Star newspaper reported precinct level 
results for some years, by ward only for others, and summaries by race for at least one other. 
19 Calculations based on data reported in: Department of Metropolitan Development Division of Planning 
(1984, August). A decennial statistical profile of Indianapolis-Marion County: 1960, 1970, 1980. 
Indianapolis-Marion County, Indiana. 
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Precinct maps from 1980, but not prior, were also available at the Indiana State Archives. None 
of the government election data sources had any precinct maps from the 1960s or 1970s. Stan 
Huseland, an Indianapolis Star reporter in the consolidation era and author of a book on 
Republican boss Keith Bulen, recommended checking with the Indianapolis Historical Society and 
the archives at University of Indianapolis, where Bulen and Lugar archives are held (Huseland 
interview, October 27,2008). Those sources did not have the missing data or maps available. A 
large collection of Indianapolis government data donated to the historical society by historian 
George Geib was unavailable to the public at the time of request. Material was also unavailable 
from the Marion County Democratic and Republican parties. Bredensteiner Imaging, a local print 
shop in downtown Indianapolis, has large-scale 1971 and 1975 precinct maps, though they are 
mounted on retractable, pull-down rolls and can only be reproduced without damage by 
photograph. 
The lack of available data would require alternative sources and measures to be 
employed for analysis of black voter turnout over the 1963-1975 period. In theory, city wards 
could be used as an approximation. Prior to consolidation, the city of Indianapolis consisted of 32 
wards, each containing multiple precincts. Election registration and turnout data in Marion 
County continued to be reported by wards following consolidation, at least for the study years. 
Indianapolis Star newspaper archives report turnout by ward, and sometimes precinct, for some 
of the mayoral elections prior to and following consolidation. Since precinct maps are unavailable 
for the purposes of this study, wards are the smallest municipal geographic area that may be 
matched to census tracts for voting turnout analysis. However, the wards are larger than census 
tracts, each containing multiple tracts. Moreover, many of the tracts are split between wards. 
These two complications together, make any further meaningful analysis of black voter turnout in 
Indianapolis nearly impossible. 
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